Raul Wallenberg svéd diplomatáról 1.

6 MAY 56

Levelezőtőkent szeretném kérni, hogy mindent amit Raul Wallenberg svéd diplomatával kapcsolatban papírra vetek hajlandó vagyok bármilyen nemzetközi fórum előtt eskü alatt is vallani.
Azt hiszem azok közül ~~a Budapesten~~ tartozom, aki el mesélek egyik korábbi tanúja. Mindenesetre ~~a nyilvánosságra~~ hozatalával egyelőre nem akarok meg előjönni, ezzel várok.

Raul Wallanberg svéd diplomata 1944-ben amikor Magyarországon a legnagyobb nyilas terror dult bátran, élete kockázatával ezreken és tízezreken igyekezett segíteni.
Mind Magyarországon, mind pedig itt a szabad világban és talán Svédországban is úgy tudják, hogy Raul Wallenberg csak a zsidókon segített és azok részére adott ki svéd-menlevelet amivel el lehetett érni, hogy közülük többszörös megmenekült, nem pusztult el. Ez tévedés, mert a hős svéd diplomata a politikai üldözötteken is segített. Igy én pontosan egyről tudok precizen.
Horváth Árpád, a Nemzeti Szinház volt főrendezője, aki az ellenállási mozgalomban "Laci bácsi" néven dolgozott, többször észrevette, hogy követik. Egy alkalommal már annyiban a nyomában voltak, hogy a letartóztatását várta, mikor az úton feltünt Raul Wallenberg gépkocsija. Ismeretlenül leállította a kocsit, és az megállt. Az üldöző nyilasok elől berontott a kocsiba. Csak annyit mondott, németül:
"Hilfe, hilfe, ich bin komunist..."
Erre már a nyilas járőr ott volt a kocsinál. Géppfegyvert fogtak rá, mire Raul Wallenberg az általa ismeretlen embert, aki mondta, hogy üldözik politikai magatartása miatt - megvédte. Azt hangoztatta, hogy a kocsi svéd terület... Szóváltás után a nyilasok elhagyták. Raul Wallenberg így mentette meg Horváth Árpádot, ismeretlenül, elvitte a város másik végébe és ott tette le. Később mégis elfogták, akkor pedig járt az érdekében a Margitköruton Dominich Vilmos hadbíró századosnál is, de ott eredményt elérni nem tudott. Horváth Árpád elpusztult, de arról, hogy Raul Wallenberg 1944 október elején megmentette az életet rajtam kívül tud még KUSINSZKY Endréné budapesti lakos, kell, hogy tudjon róla egykori felesége NEMENYI Lili operaénekesnő és úgy tudom, hogy tud meg erről PASZTOR Béla filmrendező, aki ma IZRAEL-ben él.

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1945 január végén 25-a körül a Vas utcában levő Fájó szanatoriumból két orosz katonatiszt igen udvarias formában elvitte KORNIS Gyula dr-t, a magyar képviselőház volt elnökét, hogy legyen szíves és adjon néhány felvilágosítást. Supka Géza (lakik Budapest, Múzeum körút) arra kért, hogy menjek utána, nézzem meg hová viszik Gyula bácsit. A Budapest VI. kerület Lövölde téré vitték. A számra nem emlékszem, ahogy a Király utcából jobbra fordultunk a második házba a téren. Ekkor itt volt Raul Wallenberg is. Mondtam és hallottam a nevét, egy szovjet katona vezette át az udvar részén. Kornis kb. ora múlva kijött, csak annyit mondott, hogy nagyon

Megkerdeztem töle: Talalkozott-e Raul Wallenbergel, lattam ott, az utcarol latni lehetett, ahogy ment fel a lepcson... Mintha ö lett volna - mondtam.
Kornis azt valaszolta, hogy töle is kerdeztek:tenyleg olyan sok emberen segitett a sved.

...

Ezutan hosszu ideig nem is hallottam semmit Raul Wallenbergröl. 1945 marcius 12-en rossz tehergepkocsival mentem le Budapeströl Debrecenbe, ahol a szüleim laktak. Akkor itt szekelt az Ideglenes Nemzeti Kormany is.
Debrecenben ismerkedtem meg egy orosz katona-tiszttel, OLDNER Vladimirral, aki magyarul, oroszul, nemetül egeszen jol es franciaul kicsit beszelt. Ö abban az idöben a szovjet hadsereg lapjanal az UJ SZO-nal dolgozott. Elmondta, hogy hanyszor volt uton mar Debrecen es Budapest között. A legemlekezetesebb utja azonban,mint mondta februarban volt. Akkor egy olyan egyennel jött Debrecenbe, aki annyit meselt a haboru borzalmairol, ami meg neki a harcedzett katonanak is sok.
Egy nyitott jipp kocsin egy szovjet tiszt egy civil urat kisert Debrecenbe, akit a Dery muezeum mellett levö orosz komandaturara vittek, majd innen pillanatok alatt átvittek a Kossuth utcaban levö Vorosilov tabornok hadiszállására. Vorosilov ebben az idöben Debrecenben a Kossuth utcaban lakott, az egykori Balogh házban. Ez egy egy emeletes palotaszerü epület. Szemben a szinhazzal. Vele szemben akkor a miniszteriumok voltak, a penzügyi palotaban. Oldner egy csomó adatot is kapott az utitarstol,aki nem volt más,mint Raul Wallenberg.
Ismét hangsulyozom, hogy Raul Wallenberget egy szovjet tiszt vitte le Debrecenbe, ezzel a kocsival ment le Oldner Vladimir szovjet föhadnagy is (sajnos ö mint tanu ebben az ügyben mar nem szerepelhet, mert Baden-Baden környeken a szovjet föhadiszállásra menve autoszerencsetlenseg aldozata lett), ott elöbb a parancsnoksagon idöztek rövid ideig, majd a sved diplomatat átvittek Vorosilov tabornok rezidenciajara. Ott mi történt - arrol mar többet esküü alatt nem merek vallani, mert nem tudom.
Ide tartozik meg, hogy Oldner Vladimir az akkor kapott anyag egyreszet fel is dolgozta, mert könyvet akart irni elmenyeiröl,amit a haboruban szerzett. Ennek a kezirata ma is edesapjanal, Kassai Gezanal van, aki Budapesten egyetemi tanar.
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WALLENBERG, Raoul Swedish diplomat.

In this introduction I would like to declare that I am willing to testify and deposit under oath before any international authority (forum, everything that I will set down here on this paper in connection with WALLENBERG Raoul, Swedish diplomat.

I believe that I am one of those very few persons who are the chief witnesses of his disappearance. At any rate, I do not want to publish all this yet, I shall wait.

In 1944, when the greatest Arrow-cross (Nazi) terror raged in Hungary, WALLENBERG Raoul, Swedish diplomat tried to help thousands and tens of thousands bravely, risking his own life.

As it is known in Hungary and here in the free world and perhaps also in Sweden WALLENBERG Raoul helped only Jewish people by issuing them Swedish safe-conducts enabling several thousands of them to save their lives instead of perishing.

This is an error, because the brave Swedish diplomat also helped the politically persecuted. I know of one particular case precisely.

HORVATH Arpad, the former chief stage director of the National Theater, who worked in the resistance movement under the cover-name of "Uncle Laci" discovered several times that he was being followed. At one occasion they (the Arrow-cross-Nazis) were so close behind him that he expected his arrest when the motorcar of WALLENBERG appeared on the road. Not knowing who was in the car, Uncle Laci, flagged down the vehicle, and when it stopped, he jumped in saying in German "Help, help, I am a communist....."

By this time the Arrow-cross-Nazi patrol reached the car already and raised their machine gun but WALLENBERG Raoul defended the unknown man who said that he was persecuted for his political belief. WALLENBERG repeated that the motorcar

WALLENBERG, Raoul

i. Jewish territory..... After rude exchange of words the Arrow-cross-men left them. Thus, WALLENBERG Raoul saved HORVATH Arpad who was unknown to him, he took HORVATH then to the other end of the city and let him go. Later, HORVATH was arrested again and this time WALLENBERG intervened in his interest at the military tribunal, on the Margit boulevard, by DOMINICH Vilmos, captain, military judge, but could achieve no result.. HORVATH Arpad perished, but the fact that his life was saved by WALLENBERG Raoul at the beginning of October 1944 is known besides me, to MRS. KULINSZKY Endre, resident of Budapest; must be known by his former wife at that time NEMENYI Lili, opera singer; and the way I know it, is also known by PAUSZOR Bela, film stage manager, who lives in Israel today.

. . .

At the end of January 1945, around the 23rd, two Russian army officers with very courteous manner took with themselves from the Vas street, Pajor sanatorium ~~a~~ KORNIS Gyula Dr. the former president of the Hungarian House of Representatives, with the request that he should be kind enough to give some information. SUPKA Geza (residing at Museum Boulevard, Budapest) asked me to follow them to find out where they take Uncle Gyula. They took him to the Lovolde square, Budapest, VI district. I do not remember the house number, as we turned to the right from the Kiraly street it was the second house on the square. At this time WALLENBERG Raoul was here also. I have seen him and heard his name, a Soviet soldier escorted him through the courtyard. After a few hours KORNIS came out and said only that they were very polite to him and to all those who were there.

I asked him: Did you meet WALLENBERG Raoul, I saw him, he could be seen from the street as he ascended the stairs.... It seemed as though it was he - I said. KORNIS answered, that they asked from him also: is it really true that the Swede helped so many people.

. . .

WALLENBERG, Raoul.

For a long time after this, I did not hear anything of WALLENBERG Raoul. On the 12 of March 1945 I went with a truck, that was in bad condition, from Budapest to Debrecen where my parents lived. At this time the Temporary National Government also resided there.

While in Debrecen, I got acquainted with a Russian officer, OLDNER Vladimir, who spoke Hungarian, Russian, and German very well, and some French. At this time he worked at the "Uj Szo"(New Word) the Hungarian language newspaper of the Soviet army. He related to me how many times he had already traveled between Debrecen and Budapest. However, he said that his most memorable trip he made in February. At this time he traveled to Debrecen with an individual who related so much about the horrors of the war that it was too much, even for him, a battle seasoned soldier. A Soviet officer escorted to Debrecen in an open Jeep a civilian gentleman who was taken to the Russian head quarters (commandatura) -next to the Dery museum- and who in a few moments was taken from there to the head quarter of General VOROSHILOV on Kossuth street. At this time VOROSHILOV lived in the former Belogh house on Kossuth street in Debrecen. This house is a one story palace like building opposite the theater. Facing this house in the Finance building were at this time the ministries. OLDNER received an amount of data from his traveling companion who was no one else but WALLENBERG Raoul.

Again I repeat, WALLENBERG Raoul was taken by a Soviet officer to Debrecen, OLDNER Vladimir, first lieutenant of the Soviet army also went with the same car - unfortunately OLDNER cannot appear as a witness in this case anymore, because he became a victim of an auto accident in the vicinity of Baden-Baden on his way to the Soviet general head quarters - first they spent a short time at the commandatura, and then the Swedish diplomat was taken to the residence of general VOROSHILOV. Under oath I dare not testify more because I do not know

as to what happened there.

It also belongs to the matter, that OLDNER Vladimir elaborated part of the material received at this time because he wanted to publish in book form his experiences in the war. His manuscripts are still kept by his father KA..AI Gezu, who is a university professor at Budapest.

On that mentioned day, on the 12th or 13th of March, OLDNER would ~~[illegible]~~ have liked to have talked again to WALLENBERG Raoul, but he could not find him anymore.

Hay Gyula Kossuth-dijas iroról.

Hay Gyula iro a komunista irodalmi arisztokraciahoz tartozik, mindenröl tajekozott, ami ezen a téren történik, nemcsak magyar vonatkozásban, hanem szovjet vonatkozásban is. Öt egeszen könnyen meg lehetne hogni es akkor Önök a komunista vilag szellemi, irodalmi, müvészeti eleteröl első kezből lehetnenek informalva.
Semmi mas nem kellene hozza csupan az, hogy haynak Nyugaton valamelyik szinhaz valamelyik darabjat elöadja es ö erre kijöjjön. Ez pedig minden nehezseg nelkül menne az ö reszere.

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Harom Hay testver van az en tudomasom szerint, Hay Gyula az iro, Hay Karoly a festö es Hay Laszlo a volt külkereskedelmi miniszter, jelenleg a Nemzeti Bank elnöke.
Hay Gyula resztvett mar az 1919-es komunista forradalomban is, mint egeszen fiatal ember. A ket vilaghaboru közötti idöt külföldön töltötte, tehat nem Magyarországon elt. Legtöbb idöt Berlinben töltött, ahol több szindarabjat is elöadtak (Isten, császár paraszt). Majd onnanugy tudom, hogy Franciaországba ment es onnan ment at a Szovjetunioba. 1945-ben vagy 1946-ban tert haza Magyarországra. Itt hamarosan megnösült, egy Lajoros Eva nevezetü ujsagironö a hitvese, aki 1945-ben, 1946-ban meg nyugati lapoknak - emlekezetem szerint amarikai lapnak is - a magyarországi tudositoja volt.

...

Hay hazaterte utan a magyar irodalomban igen elökellö helyet foglalt el. Csenedes modoraval es humanista felfogasával azonban hatterbe került, Illes Bela lett helyette a "lathatatlan vezer". Közben valamiert - az okot nem tudom - összetüzesbe került Major Tamassal a Nemzeti Szinhaz igazgatojaval is. Emiatt aztan darabjai csak nagyon nehezen tudta szinrekerülni. Major teljesen el akarta nemitani, de a szovjet iroszövetseg lepett közbe, es ezek meg Majornal es a magyar nepmüvelesi miniszteriumnal is erösebbnek bizonyultak. Igy az emlitett Isten, ~~xxxx~~ császár paraszton kivül Az ELET HIDJA cimü darabja is elö~~került~~ csaldu, sőt most filmesitettek azt meg. De Hay elnyomottnak érzi otthon magat.

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Külföldön az elmult evekben több helyen bemutattak a darabjait. Ennek mindig örült. Egy igen lelkes TOKIO-i egyen ket evvel ezelött kezdte forditani egyik darabjat. Ennek a hiret en közöltem vele, mert a vilagbajnoksagrol visszaerkezett birkozok monditak. Hihetetlenül megörült neki. Azota tudtommal a darabot ott elö is adtak. Ha emlekezetem nem csal tavaly Svedországba vettek elö egyik darabjat, oda ki akart utazni, de megbetegedett es nem tudott menni. A magyarországi mellözesert ezek a külföldi elöadasok jelentik reszere a karpotlast, bar otthon is

.o szob ide resztvett a part legfelsöbb aveszeti, irodalmi bizott-
sagának a munkajaban is.
Jelenleg amellett, hogy ir darabokat, regenyeket - a Vas utcaban szeles
szinmuveszeti fiiskola dramaturgiai tanszakanak a vezetöje.

...

May Gyula 170-172 cm. magas, körülbelül 75 kilo sulyu egyen lehet. Kora
52-56 ev. Fekete haja erösen öszül. Sarga böre van. Jellegzetesen
sokat dohanyzik. A felesege Majoros Eva 35-40 ev körüli nö, sokkal több
dicsöseg-vagy van benne, mint a ferjeben. Azt hiszem, hogy elsösorban
ö piszkalja a ferjet, hogy ne hagyja magat elnyomni.
Gepkocsival rendelkeznek, amit azonban szinte csak a feleseg hasznal.
Majoros Evat a ferje reven a Jozsef Attila perem-szinhazhoz szerzödtette
1955-ben dramaturgnak. A nöre mindent lehet mondani, csak azt nem,hogy
meggyözödeses komunista. Közvetlen a haboru utan teljesen szocialdemok-
rata vonalon allt. Most vonalasnak kell mutatkoznia - ha masert nem,
a ferje miatt.

...

Iro es ujsagiro körökben nem titok otthon, hogy May bejaratos a legfelsö
komunista politikus körökbe is. Mindenhol kellö tisztelettel fogadjak,
es komoly tekintellyel is rendelkezik. Sokkal lenyegesebb azonban ennel,
hogy a szovjet Iroszövetsegben is igen nagy tekintelye van. (Sokan ezert
haragszanak ra otthon), de ezzel ö nem el vissza. Egy tudom, hogy Fagya-
jevvel vagy Ryihonovval (nem tudom,hogy a kettö közül melyikkel) igen
szoros kapcsolatban van. Allandoan leveleznek, söt az volt Allay vendege
is az elmult evekben a Leanyfalun levö villajaban.

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Megjelenese, beszede, viselkedese teljesen polgari. Nem hangoztatja a
komunista jelszavakat. Emebereket, akit ismer es meggyözödött rola,hogy
becsületesek - igyekszik tamogatni. Mindenröl igen jol van ertesülve.
Hihetetlen sok elkeseredes van benne, ez erthetö mert eleg sok alap-
talan elnyomas erte. Emiatt ha a hite a komunizmusban nem is rengett
meg, de belül nagy tüskevel jar. Kifele nem igen mutatja, de nagyon hiu
nak ismertem meg. Ennek oka reszben, hogy evtizedeken keresztül müvei
csak külföldön jelentek meg, vagy adtak azokat elö - es Magyarországon
alig ismertek. A hazai hirt szerette volna megkapni, de ebben allandoan
gancsoltak. - A masik ok, pedig amint mar emlitettem a felesege.

...

Az irok köreben igen nagy tekintelye van. Nem tul sokat jar azonban
közejük. Az Iroszövetseg is igyekezven Major Tamas kedvében jarni gyak-
ran csipkedte meg. Azeket szinte szo nelkül türte, nagy neha szanta csa
magat ra a valaszra. Ö y tudom,de nem allitom, hogy az ellene halo hecc
löjednek a fö irányitoja hosszu idön keresztül REVAI Jozsef a part egyi
föideologusa volt.

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Nagy Gyula Kossuth díjáról 2

Amikor Budapesten van hetenbe legalább két-három alkalommal a Sztalin út 104 szám alatt levő Újságíró klubban szokott vacsorázni feleségével együtt.
Anyagi gondja a legjobb tudomásom szerint egyáltalán nincsen. A merlőzés ellenére is véleményem szerint feleségével együtt így is megkeresi a havi 15 000 forintot.
Budapesti lakásának a telefonszáma 160-034 vagy 039

...

Egyéni véleményem:

Most, hogy megindult Magyarországon az erjedés, Nagy Gyula egészen meresz hangú cikkben követelte az Irodalmi Ujságban a politikai változásokat is. Ha a közeljövőben Önök beszelnenek vele, vagy vele és a feleségével igen sok eredményt erhetnének el. Ez a tehetséges ember ugy erzi, hogy lenézik..Pedig tehetségesebb,mint a legtöbb párt-író, és-régi komunista, talán az a baj, hogy régi harcos... Ugy forr belül,mint a vulkán.
És nem lényegtelen az, hogy igen jól van informálva. Elsősorban természetesen a szellemi élet frontjáról, és itt is nemcsak a magyar ügyeket és azok kulisza-titkait ismeri, hanem a szovjet és a komunista világ művelődési, kulturális egyszóval szellemi életet ismeri és ott igen előkellő helyet tölt be.

Egy alkalommal beszélgetés közben felmerült Eisenhower elnök beszéde (Genf előtt volt valami nagyjelentőségü megnyilatkozása, amiben a vasfüggöny mögötti országokról is szó esett). - Nagy akkor azt mondta, hogy csodálatosak ezek az amerikaiak. Már évtized alatt a világ leggazdagabb birodalmát hoztak létre, jó lenne ott élni pár esztendőt. Mire a felesége cinikusan jegyezte meg: "Ez csak rajtad múlik."
Azt hiszem e beszélgetés eleg világos...

HAY, Gyula writer, Kossuth prize winner.

HAY Gyula, the writer, belongs to the literary aristocracy of the communist world. He is well informed about everything that happens in that field, not only in its Hungarian but also in its Soviet relation. He could be very easily won over and then you could have first hand information of the intellectual, literary, and artistic life of the communist world.
All that would be necessary is that one of HAY's plays should be presented by one of the western theaters and that he should come out for the occasion. This he could achieve without any difficulty.

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As far as I know, there are three HAY brothers; HAY Gyula, the writer; HAY Károly, the painter; and HAY Laszlo, the former minister of foreign commerce, who is now the president of the National Bank.
As a very young man HAY Gyula already participated in the 1919 communist revolution. He spent the time between the two world wars abroad and therefore did not live in Hungary. He spent the most time in Berlin where several of his plays were presented (God, Emperor, Peasant). As I know it, he went from there to France and then went on to the Soviet Union. In 1945 or 1946 he returned to Hungary and soon married MAJOROS Eva, a newspaperwoman who had in 1945 and 1946 still been a correspondent of Western papers, and if I remember right, of an American paper as well.

• • •

After his return to Hungary, HAY occupied a very prominent position in Hungarian literature. However, he with his quiet manner and humanistic conception of life has been pushed in the background and instead of him, ILLES Bela became the "invisible literary leader". In the meantime for some reason he was in a controversy with MAJOR Tamas, director of the National Theater. (I do not know what caused this,

HAY, Gyula writer.

Therefore, HAY's plays could be presented only with great difficulties. RAJOK wanted to silence him completely but the federation of the Soviet writers intervened and they (the Federation) proved to be stronger than RAJOK, and even stronger than the Hungarian ministry of public education. So, the mentioned play (God, Emperor, Peasant.) and another one "The bridge of life" have been produced, in fact the latter has been adapted for screen recently. Still, HAY feels opressed at home (in Hungary).

• • •

His plays have been presented at several places abroad in the past years. He was always happy about this. A very enthusiastic Tokyo man started to translate one of his plays about two years ago. HAY was incredibly happy to receive this news from me which I learned from the wrestlers returning from the world championship games. As I know it, the play has been presented there since. If my memory does not deceive me, one of his plays was going to be presented in Sweden last year. HAY wanted to go there but because he became ill he could not go. These foreign presentations mean a compensation to him for the slighting suffered in Hungary, although even at home many people bow to him not only for his knowledge but also for his political influence. However, HAY does not have a fighting spirit.

• • •

For a longer time HAY participated in the work of the uppermost artistic and literary committee of the party.

At present, besides writing plays and novels, HAY is the head of the dramaturgical faculty of the high school of theatrical art.

• • •

HAY Gyula is 170-172 cm.tall, weighs about 75 kilograms. He is about 52-56 years old, has black hair, strongly greying, has dark complexion. He is a very strong boxer. His wife RADOCZ Eva, is a woman of about 35-40 years, is much

HAY, Gyula writer.

more ambitious than her husband. I believe that she nags her husband, that he should not let himself be oppressed.

They have a motorcar that is used almost exclusively by the wife. In 1955, MAJOROS Eva through her husband was contracted as a dramaturgist to the Jozsef Attila Szeged theater. Everything can be said about the woman, save that she is a convinced communist. Immediately after the war she has been completely on the socialist line. Now, she has to show that she is on the party line, if for nothing else but for her husband's sake.

. . .

It is no secret at home among writers and newspapermen that HAY frequents the highest communist political circles. He is received everywhere with due respect and, in fact, he enjoys a serious prestige. It is more important however, that he also has a very great prestige in the Federation of Soviet writers. Many people at home are angry at him for this, but HAY does not abuse this advantage. As I know it, HAY is in very close connection with FADYAJEV (FADIAJEV?) or TYIHONOV (TJICHONOV?) /I do not know which one of the two/. They correspond regularly and in the past years he has been a house guest in HAY's villa at Leanyfalu.

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HAY's appearance, speech and behavior is completely middle class(bourgeois). He does not repeat communist slogans. He tries to help and support the people whom he learns to know and finds honest. He is well informed about everything. He has an incredible great amount of bitterness in himself which is understandable since he suffered enough unjustified oppression. For this reason, even if his faith in communism has not been shaken, he still bears, inside, a big thorn. He does not show this on the surface but I learned to know him as a very vain man. The reason lies partly in the fact that for decades his

HAY, la writer.

works have been published and presented only abroad and he was barely known in Hungary. He wanted to achieve recognition at home but in this endeavor he has always been thwarted. The other reason, as I mentioned before, is his wife.

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HAY enjoys a great respect among the writers, however, he does not frequent them too often. The Federation of Writers, playing up to MAJOR Tamas very often needled HAY. HAY tolerated this needling almost without words, and very seldom deigned to answer. I do not state it, but the way I know it, is that for a long time the main instigator of these intrigues against HAY has been REVAI Joseph, one of the chief ideologists of the party.

When in Budapest, HAY together with his wife, usually has dinner at least two or three times weekly at the Newspapermen's club, No.101. Stalin street.

According to my best knowledge, he has no financial worries at all. It is my opinion, despite the fact that he is neglected, he still earns 15 000 forints per month jointly with his wife.

His Budapest home telephone: 160-034 or 039.

. . .

My personal opinion:

NOW that the fermentation process has started in Hungary, HAY Gyula, in a truly daring voiced article in the "Irodalmi Ujsag"(Literary News) demanded political changes. If in the near future you should talk to him , or with him and his wife very great results could be achieved. This talented man feels that he is looked down upon. Whereas, he is more talented than most party faithful writers and he is an old communist, perhaps the trouble is that he is one of the old fight Inside he is boiling like a volcano. It is not unimportant that he is very well informed. Naturally, in the first place he is well informed about the front of the intellectual life,and here too he

MAY, Gyula writer.

not only knows the Hungarian intellectual life and its behind the stage secrets but also he knows the educational, cultural, in one word the intellectual life of the Soviets and the communist world, and there he occupies a very prominent position.

At one occasion President Eisenhower's speech came up in conversation.(He made a declaration of great importance before the Geneva conference, in which the countries behind the iron curtain were also mentioned.) At this time MAY said, " These Americans are wonderful. In a few decades they created the richest country of the world. It would be nice to live there a few years. " To this, his wife sarcastically remarked; " That is only up to you. "

I believe that this conversation is clear enough.....

WALLENBERG, Raoul Swedish diplomat.

In this introduction I would like to declare that I am willing to testify and deposit under oath before any international authority (forum) everything that I will set down here on this paper in connection with WALLENBERG Raoul, Swedish diplomat.

I believe that I am one of those very few persons who are the chief witnesses of his disappearance. At any rate, I do not want to publish all this yet, I shall wait.

In 1944, when the greatest Arrow-cross (Nazi) terror raged in Hungary, WALLENBERG Raoul, Swedish diplomat tried to help thousands and tens of thousands bravely, risking his own life.

It is known in Hungary and here in the free world and perhaps also in Sweden WALLENBERG Raoul helped only Jewish people by issuing them Swedish safe-conducts enabling several thousands of them to save their lives instead of perishing. This is an error, because the brave Swedish diplomat also helped the politically persecuted. I know of one particular case precisely.

HORVATH Arpad, the former chief stage director of the National Theater, who worked in the resistance movement under the cover-name of "Uncle Laci" discovered several times that he was being followed. On one occasion they (the Arrow-cross-Nazis) were so close behind him that he expected his arrest when the motorcar of WALLENBERG appeared on the road. Not knowing who was in the car, Uncle Laci, flagged down the vehicle, and when it stopped, he jumped in saying in German "Help, help, I am a communist....."

By this time the Arrow-cross-Nazi patrol reached the car already and raised their machine gun but WALLENBERG Raoul defended the unknown man who said that he was persecuted for his political belief. WALLENBERG repeated that the motorcar

in Swedish territory..... After some exchange of words the Arrow-cross-Nazis left them. Thus, WALLENBERG Raoul saved HORVATH Arpad who was unknown to him, he took HORVATH then to the other end of the city and let him go. Later, HORVATH was arrested again and this time WALLENBERG intervened in his interest at the military tribunal, on the Margit boulevard, by DOMINICH Vilmos, capetain, military judge, but could achieve no results. HORVATH Arpad perished, but the fact that his life was saved by WALLENBERG Raoul at the beginning of October 1944 is known besides me, to MRS. KUSINSZKY Endre, resident of Budapest; must be known by his former wife at that time NEMENYI Lili, opera singer; and the way I know it, is also known by PASZEOR Bela, film stage manager, who lives in Israel today.

. . .

At the end of January 1945, around the 23rd, two Russian army officers with very courteous manner took with themselves from the Vas street, Pajor sanatorium Q KORNIS Gyula Dr. the former president of the Hungarian House of Representatives, with the request that he should be kind enough to give some information. SUPKA Gesa (residing at Museum Boulevard, Budapest) asked me to follow them to find out where they take Uncle Gyula. They took him to the Lovolde square, Budapest, VI district. I do not remember the house number, as we turned to the right from the Kiraly street it was the second house on the square. At this time WALLENBERG Raoul was here also. I have seen him and heard his name, a Soviet soldier escorted him through the courtyard. After a few hours KORNIS came out and said only that they were very polite to him and to all those who were there.

I asked him: Did you meet WALLENBERG Raoul, I saw him, he could be seen from the street as he ascended the stairs.... It seemed as though it was he - I said. KORNIS answered, that they asked from him also: is it really true that the Swede helped so many people.

. . .

WALLENBERG, Ra

For a long time after this, I did not hear anything of WALLENBERG Raoul. On the 12 of March 1945 I went with a truck, that was in bad condition, from Budapest to Debrecen where my parents lived. At this time the Temporary National Government also resided there.

While in Debrecen, I got acquainted with a Russian officer, OLDNER Vladimir, who spoke Hungarian, Russian, and German very well, and some French. At this time he worked at the "Uj Szo"(New Word) the Hungarian language newspaper of the Soviet army. He related to me how many times he had already traveled between Debrecen and Budapest. However, he said that his most memorable trip he made in February. At this time he traveled to Debrecen with an individual who related so much about the horrors of the war that it was too much, even for him, a battle seasoned soldier. A Soviet officer escorted to Debrecen in an open Jeep a civilian gentleman who was taken to the Russian head quarters (commandatura) -next to the Dery museum- and who in a few moments was taken from there to the head quarter of General VOROSHILOV on Kossuth street. At this time VOROSHILOV lived in the former Balogh house on Kossuth street in Debrecen. This house is a one story palace like building opposite the theater. Facing this house in the Finance building were at this time the ministries. OLDNER received an amount of data from his traveling companion who was no one else but WALLENBERG Raoul.

Again I repeat, WALLENBERG Raoul was taken by a Soviet officer to Debrecen, OLDNER Vladimir, first lieutenant of the Soviet army also went with the same car - unfortunately OLDNER cannot appear as a witness in this case anymore, because he became a victim of an auto accident in the vicinity of Baden-Baden on his way to the Soviet general head quarters - first they spent a short time at the commandatura, and then the Swedish diplomat was taken to the residence of general VOROSHILOV. Under oath I dare not testify more because I do not know

as to what happened there.

It also belongs to the matter, that OLDNER Vladimir elaborated part of the material received at this time because he wanted to publish in book form his experiences in the war. His manuscripts are still kept by his father KASSAI Geza, who is a university professor at Budapest.

On that mentioned day, on the 12th or 13th of March, OLDNER would ~~[illegible]~~ have liked to have talked again to WALLENBERG Raoul, but he could not find him anymore.

AIR

[redacted]

11 Jan 56

[redacted]

Chief, WE

Background
Article on Raoul WALLENBERG

Headquarters notes from the enclosed clipping from Christian Science Monitor, dated 17 December 1955, that an article on Raoul WALLENBERG recently appeared in the periodical Vi. Please procure a copy of this issue and forward it to Headquarters.

[redacted]

[redacted]

6 Jan 56
[redacted]
Distribution:
2- [redacted] w/enc, clipping as described above
2- [redacted]
1- [redacted]

C/WE [redacted]

C/WE-1 [redacted]

201-592[illegible]

VIA A I R
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. [redacted]

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO Chief, WE

DATE 29 June 1956

FROM [redacted]

SUBJECT { GENERAL [redacted]
SPECIFIC Visit of Members of Supreme Soviet to Stockholm, May 1956

Enclosed is [redacted] report on a press conference held by members of Subject delegation.

[redacted]

26 June 1956

Encl: 1 report

Distribution:
5 Headquarters w/1 encl.
[redacted] 1 encl.

1 att H/W
1
~~Encl~~

INDEX
SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR. 1949

RI COPY

[redacted]

Enclosure to [redacted]

3P

8 May 1956

SUBJECT: Soviet Parliamentary Delegation in Stockholm.

1. As often happens in connection with events of interest in this country, a press conference for the visiting delegation of 10 members of the Supreme Soviet was arranged last night, with only the Swedish press and the large news agencies invited.

2. The press conference was held in Room 418, Grand Hotel, which was so small that news photographers were let in first and reporters afterward.

a. Gustaf Lidén, a member of the Foreign Ministry press division who had been "lent" to the Swedish parliament leadership as press liaison man for the duration of the visit, explained that the Swedish parliament people had turned a deaf ear to his request for larger quarters for the press conference. "It's full of Rubbestads," Lidén said. (Rubbestad is a politically myopic Agrarian party politician.)

b. Once inside, the reporters were told by A. P. VOLKOV, the head Russian, that he was sorry there was so little room, "but we are not the hosts here and there was so little time to prepare for this conference." (The visit has only been planned 10 months.)

c. Besides the Swedish press and the news services, there were quite a few others. Felix BELAIR of the New York Times, whose office is in the building, had not been invited, but came along anyway. Norbert ZADA, whom I had asked earlier in the afternoon if he had been invited (he had not), came along, and so did the Polish emigrés Count MICHELSKI who works at RFE. Others:

(1) Lennart BRICK, the ex-NTB man now an importer.

(2) Helge (?) [illegible], the Russian embassy interpreter.

(3) Harry [illegible] and his bride of 6 May, the former Ilse MICHELS of Germany.

(4) Both Mr and Mrs Gaston FOURNIER, the husband head of Agence France Presse who does not understand a word of Swedish or Russian.

(5) Ilya MOROZTSOV and Dmitri YERSHOV, the TASS boys, who took no notes during the performance.

(6) Some unidentified young females who looked like decorations, or perhaps foils for the plain clothes cops who helped crowd the room to the bursting point.

(7) Yevgeniy VOROZHEYKIN, Soviet press attache in Stockholm.

att #1 to [redacted]

3. VOLKOV, as delegation leader, did most of the talking. What he had to say was extensively reported in the papers. His first little ~~xxxx~~ spiel about the "Soviet parliament not being so perfect that we cannot learn from others" was delivered with eyes half closed and with little nose wrinklings that looked disarming.

4. ... M. TALMENTSEV, editor of the magazine KOMMUNIST, a bespectacled man who looked slightly like a gray, finer-featured Hemingway, was visibly nervous when trying to reply to some of the sharper political questions put by the associated Press man Gustav SVENSSON. He had to stop and let VOLKOV take over.

5. T. S. GORBUNOV, a round-faced, pink-cheeked man of 60 who is a member of the law committee of the Supreme Soviet, was asked about the decrees of 1934 (in connection with the assassination of KIROV) and of 1937 (beginning of the purge trials), and at first professed to know nothing about them. When SVENSSON pointed out that PRAVDA and other Soviet papers had printed pieces about their revision, although in small type, GORBUNOV recalled that those laws were emergency decrees. VOLKOV helped out by adding that the emergencies were over and that these out-of-date laws and others were being revised. "That is not to say that the sentences passed under the emergency laws were wrong at the time. ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~ I don't want to generalize and anyway there is no time for that. But it is completely natural that certain laws have been changed. I am sure that in the Swedish parliament the same thing happens. We are not saying that anybody has been unjustly condemned.

6. ~~xxxxxxxxx

8. Ivan G. KÄBIN, a member of the Central Committee, and the top man in the Estonian Communist party, is a fleshy man in his 40s, with thinning dark blond hair and a worried expression. Although most of the other delegates smiled at least once or twice, he never relaxed his tight-lipped watchfulness.

9. A. M. SAFRONOV, first vice-chairman of the Russian Federated S.R., is said to be a budget expert. He is leader of the Budget Committee of the Supreme Soviet.

10. The main interpreters were Sven N. Storck, veteran employee of the Soviet embassy in Stockholm, and Nina KRYMOVA, a middle-aged woman who made shorthand notes of the Russian replies and efficiently translated them to Swedish.

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA A I R
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. [redacted]

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

JUL 30 1956

TO [redacted]

DATE

FROM Chief, WH

SUBJECT { GENERAL [redacted]
SPECIFIC Transmittal of Report on Raoul WALLENBERG

ACTION REQUIRED: [redacted]

1. Transmitted herewith [redacted] is a resume of information supplied by a recent Hungarian defector concerning the missing Swedish diplomat, Raoul WALLENBERG. It should be noted that the source has since returned to Hungary. This report is one of several elicited from him prior to his "redefection".

2. The attached information is obviously questionable, but it should be of some interest to the Swedes. Perhaps the report might serve as an excuse for the Chief of Station to meet with one of the [redacted]

[redacted]

by [redacted]

Distribution:
2 - Stoc w/encl
2 - WE-1 w/encl
1 - C/H w/encl
1 - A1 w/o encl

24 July 1956
WE-1/Kwa:nal

[redacted]

(Coordinating Officer) (Authenticating Officer)

CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-29
JUN 1949

DI COPY

COPY

[illegible]: Hungarian defector whose bona fides have not been established. Since supplying this information, source has returned to Hungary.

1. In 194[illegible], the Swedish diplomat Raoul WALLENBERG risked his life to help victims of the Nazi terror in Hungary. By issuing Swedish safe-conduct passes, he helped to save thousands of persons who otherwise would have perished. It is generally believed that WALLENBERG helped only Jews. This is an error, for the brave Swedish diplomat helped the politically persecuted as well. The case of Erpad HORVATH is an example.

2. HORVATH, the former chief stage director of the National Theater, worked in the resistance movement under the cover name of "Uncle Laci." Several times he had discovered that he was being followed by the "Arrow-Cross Nazis" (Hungarian Nazi Party), and once he was so closely pursued that his arrest seemed imminent. On this occasion a motorcar driven by WALLENBERG was passing by, and HORVATH flagged down the vehicle. When it stopped, HORVATH jumped in and exclaimed in German, "Help! Help! I am a Communist...." By this time the pursuing Nazi patrol reached the car, and leveled their weapons at HORVATH. WALLENBERG protected the unknown man by claiming the motorcar to be Swedish territory and hence outside the jurisdiction of the Nazi patrol. After an exchange of words, the patrol left them, and WALLENBERG drove HORVATH to the other end of the city where he let him go. Later HORVATH was arrested and tried by a military tribunal. WALLENBERG again intervened in his behalf at the trial, but to no avail. HORVATH perished, but the fact that WALLENBERG saved his life in October 194[illegible] is known to Lili MEMMY, an opera singer who was HORVATH's former wife, and to Bela PAUNCH, a film stage manager who lives in Israel today.

3. At the end of January 194[illegible], Mr. Gyula KONIS, former president of the Hungarian House of Representatives, was taken by two Russian army officers to a house in Lovolde Square, in the VI district of Budapest. Source followed them to find out where they were taking "Uncle Gyula," and gave the following description of the address: "I do not remember the house number, but as we turned to the right from the Kiraly street, it was the second house on the square." At this address, source observed a Soviet soldier escorting WALLENBERG through the courtyard, and watched him ascend the stairs. After a few hours, KONIS came out of the house. He told source that the Russians had asked him a number of questions, including whether or not it was really true that WALLENBERG had helped so many people.

4. In March 194[illegible], [redacted] a Russian officer, First Lieutenant Vladimir [illegible], who worked for Uj Szo (New World), the Hungarian language newspaper of the Soviet Army. This officer told of escorting WALLENBERG from Budapest to Debrecen in February 1945 in an open jeep. On the way, the Swedish diplomat related stories about the horrors of the war which shocked even the battle-hardened officer. [illegible] claimed to have received an "amount of data" from WALLENBERG.

6. WALLENBERG escorted/

[illegible] escorted [illegible] to the Soviet Kommandatura next to the Dery Museum, and a short time later to the residence of General [illegible] on Kossuth Street in Debrecen, a one-story, villa-like building opposite the theater and Finance Building. [illegible] [redacted] he had tried to contact [illegible] R early in March 19[illegible], but had been unable to locate him. Unfortunately [illegible] R was killed in an auto accident near Baden-Baden. He had planned to publish his memoirs after the war, however, and his manuscripts are still kept by his father, Jenő R[illegible], who is a university professor in Budapest.

[illegible] on Rossith street in [illegible] recen[illegible] tory, [illegible] building opposite the theater [illegible] Finance building. [illegible] told source that he had tried to contact [illegible] early in March 1[illegible], but had been unable to locate him. Unfortunately [illegible] was killed in an auto accident near Baden-Baden. He had planned to publish his memoirs after the war, however, and his manuscripts are still kept by his father, [illegible], who is a university professor in Budapest.

CO[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

2 August 1956

[redacted] Info: KE

[redacted]

Search Request

REFERENCE: [redacted] 21 June 1956 Investigation

1. This is only a "stab in the dark" but the subject of the reference may possibly be identical with:

[redacted] irrelevant

B. SCHNEIDER, Helmut: [redacted] ubject is known to you. [redacted] 18 Nov 55)

C. SCHNEIDER, Helmut (1st Lt.) Subject is a German officer held in the USSR in Camp 6124 Stalingrad, April 1952. (Information dated 10 Oct 52)

2. Information in our files on Raoul WALLENBERG has been studied without result.

3. There is no information in our files on the "BENDIG Group".

[redacted]

Approval:

[redacted]

Distribution
2 - [redacted]
2 - [redacted]

RI COPY

VIA AIR POUCH
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. OSSA-4995

CLASSIFICATION

TO Chief, WE

DATE 3 August 1956

FROM [redacted]

SUBJECT { GENERAL OPERATIONAL/Raoul Wallenberg
SPECIFIC Transmittal of Magazine article #201-5929

1. Forwarded herewith are two issues of Vecko Journalen containing a two part article on Raoul WALLENBERG.

2. These articles are forwarded to Headquarters for information and contain the latest available information from overt sources.

[redacted]

1 August 1956

Enclosures:
1. Vecko Jonrnalen Magazine(2)

Distribution:
3 - Hdqts. w/encl.(2 issues)
2 - [redacted] w/o encl.

Encl

CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR. 1949

VIA FM. POLCOF
Specify Air or Sea Pouch

DISPATCH NO. [redacted]
201-5929

Secret
CLASSIFICATION

TO Chief, WE

DATE 24 August 1956

FROM [redacted]

SUBJECT | GENERAL Operational/Raoul Wallenberg
| SPECIFIC Transmittal of Magazine Article

REFERENCE: [redacted] of 3 August 1956

1. Forwarded herewith are two additional issues of Vecko Journalen containing two articles on Subject.

2. These articles are forwarded to Headquarters for information.

[redacted]

22 August 1956

Enclosures:
Vecko Journalen, as noted

Distribution:
3 - Hdqts, w/encls, sgl cy ea
2 - [redacted] w/o encls.

Secret
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR. 1949

THE MYSTERY OF A WAR HERO

BY JOSEPH L. LICHTEN

Reprinted from the HIAS Bulletin

TWELVE years ago a 32-year-old business man departed from his native Sweden on a wartime mission. On July 9, 1944, he arrived in Nazi-occupied Budapest. He bore credentials as an attaché of the Swedish embassy. But diplomacy was not his business.

His name was Raoul Wallenberg.

His task was incredible and gigantic, as bizarre as it was courageous. He had been selected to rescue as many of Hungary's hapless Jews (there were 500,000 in Budapest alone) as his ingenuity and his immunity as the citizen of a neutral nation could manage.

Raoul Wallenberg had come in haste. The free world was aware that for several months the Nazi movement in Hungary had been planning systematic genocide, the same inhuman plan of forced deportations and mass liquidations that had destroyed the Jewish community of Poland. The horrors and tortures that had befallen Jews in the ghettos of Warsaw, Lodz and Cracow were now to descend on Hungary.

Each week the list of deportees ran into the hundreds. Many of the victims never reached the concentration camps they were marked for: they died of hunger or dysentery, or frantically killed themselves, on the way. Appeals to Admiral Horthy, the Hungarian regent, that he force a halt to the butchery had little effect. The pleas of the Pope, of Sweden's King Gustaf and other neutral leaders, were spurned. A warning from President Franklin D. Roosevelt was ignored. Mass round-ups were routine incidents in Hungary on the day Raoul Wallenberg arrived there.

Wallenberg was a Christian gentleman, scion of a distinguished Swedish family. His father was a well-known banker; his grandfather had been an ambassador to Turkey and Japan. Raoul had studied architecture in the United States. But he returned to Sweden after his schooling to establish himself successfully in the export-import field.

He knew little about Jews, less about Jewish affairs. Before the war he had visited Palestine, more as a tourist however, than as an observer of political or social developments. The rescue of Hungary's Jews had been planned by Swedish and American authorities in Stockholm. Wallenberg had been asked to lead the undertaking; he accepted promptly. He was a bachelor and—to repeat—a Christian in the finest tradition.

Raoul Wallenberg proved his mettle at once. To combat the mass deportations he began rescue operations on an equally wholesale, and completely unheard of, scale. He started by recruiting an embassy staff. But what a staff! It swelled to 600 persons and their families—most of whom were Jews who, for various reasons, had been accorded priority status in his rescue plan. The priority non-Jews whom Wallenberg similarly gathered into his fold were leaders of Hungary's anti-Nazi underground.

As members of a legation, the new

"Swedish officials" found immediate safety in their diplomatic status. The success of this happy fraud prompted Wallenberg to play it to the hilt. Within weeks he was issuing Swedish passports to anybody and everybody who could, in the remotest way, show some prior contact with Sweden. These passports saved hundreds more. . .

But thousands were being deported. So Wallenberg next challenged the Nazi tormentors by designing a "protective passport" which he had printed in Sweden's colors and which bore the embassy's seal and signature. This document bluntly affirmed that its holder was under the protection of the King of Sweden—a broad hint to Hungarian officials that a passport owner was not to be molested in any way!

Hungarian Nazis, frustrated and angry, nonetheless respected the hint. They were fearful to do otherwise. By that time, the war was going badly for Hitler and Wallenberg had a disturbing habit of reminding them of a day of reckoning.

The protective passport trick was used widely. Soon the Swedish Red Cross in Budapest began distributing them, as did the embassies of several neutral nations and the Papal Nuncio. Finally, several underground groups went to work circulating forged copies. Within weeks the number of protective passports mounted to tens of thousands.

The Nazis tried hard to invalidate the forgeries. The Gestapo visited Wallenberg regularly, bringing him obvious forgeries to examine. Wallenberg studied them carefully. But his answer was always the same. "They're authentic," he insisted.

Wallenberg carried his rescue operations inside the councils of the enemy. He planted agents with both the Hungarian police and the Gestapo. In that way he sometimes got his hands on a copy of the daily list of Jews placed under arrest. Promptly, Wallenberg prepared protective passports for them, personally bringing the documents to deportation headquarters. There he forced the authorities to give up a large part, if not all, of the imprisoned group.

Wallenberg acted with utter fearlessness in his confrontations with the Nazis. His personal heroism was reflected in the persistent ways in which he harassed their rule. But always he maintained the correct, dignified demeanor of the diplomat. Nazi transport commanders, assigned to deliver truckloads of Jews to nearby concentration camps, often were dismayed to find that Wallenberg had attached himself to their motor caravans. He rode in a Red Cross truck which bore food, medicine and clothing for the Jewish victims. With Swiss legation workers and Roman Catholic nuns to assist him on these mercy errands, Wallenberg became a common sight on the dusty roads leading out of Budapest.

The Nazis were afraid to harm him in public. But they marked him for murder and Wallenberg found himself in all sorts of freak accidents. He was threatened, shot at, run down by army tanks and trucks. He always escaped—to persist with his urgent mission.

When Hungary's pro-Nazi Szalasi government, eager to facilitate the mass deportations, tried thwarting Wallenberg and the underground by ordering a 10-day blockade of Jews, Wallenberg quietly fought back by organizing a Jewish commando group. The commandos successfully infiltrated the

RAOUL WALLENBERG
A sketch made eleven years ago.

blockade to bring food and supplies to the embattled Jewish families. Later, with the assistance of the Swedish Red Cross and underground Zionist groups, Wallenberg established several children's centers which he insisted were Red Cross operations protected by Sweden's international immunity. In that way he saved at least 8,000 children from certain death.

Again, when Budapest Jews were ordered to enter a newly created ghetto, Wallenberg popped up with 32 large houses which he rented and placed under Swedish immunity. He filled the houses with thousands of Jews. Other neutral embassies followed his example, creating among themselves an international ghetto, probably the only one in history.

By December, six months after Wallenberg's arrival in the city, Russian troops had begun their siege of Budapest. In frenzied retaliation, the Arrow Cross movement, Hungary's Nazi gang, planned a mass murder of the remaining Jews. Wallenberg learned of it and

quickly intervened by reminding the Wehrmacht chief, General Schmidthuber, of the death penalty that would befall a German commander who allowed a pogrom of this sort. The general understood perfectly; he ordered his troops to prevent any possible massacre.

On January 13, 1945, four days before Soviet troops were to seize full control of Budapest, Wallenberg decided to seek out their military chiefs for assistance in rescuing Jews still trapped in the ghetto. He was referred to a Major Demchenko and, to his surprise, was placed under guard. Wallenberg reappeared at his office four days later, in the wake of the liberating troops. Three Russian soldiers accompanied him. "I am going to see Marshal Malinovsky [the Soviet commander]," Wallenberg informed his co-workers. He added, somewhat ruefully, "I don't know whether I am going as a prisoner or as a guest."

Raoul Wallenberg left the office, the three armed soldiers with him. He has not been heard of since. . . .

If Wallenberg is still alive he is probably unaware that the thousands of families he rescued and protected, in their gratitude, built a monument in his honor; that a pavilion of Budapest's Jewish Central Hospital is now called Wallenberg Building, that a busy avenue similarly bears his name. Nor is it likely that Wallenberg knows of the petition signed by 1,080,000 Swedish citizens demanding an explanation of his fate, or that Sweden's Prime Minister, on a recent visit to the Kremlin, kept posing an embarrassing question to his Soviets hosts: "What happened to Raoul Wallenberg?"

The Communists are uncommunicative about it. Shortly after Wallenberg's sudden disappearance, Russian officials reported that he was "under the protection of the Russian Army." Since then, however, they refuse to acknowledge that they ever heard of him.

In 1946, a report filtered through the Iron Curtain that Wallenberg was in a Ukrainian prison camp. Later, he was reported a prisoner in the most dreaded MVD camp in Moscow. And last year, several German prisoners of war, returning from Russia, recalled a "Raoul Wilborg, a Swedish Red Cross officer," as an internee at a camp in Tayshed in Central Asia. "This Wilborg," they said, "was a tuberculosis case."

None of these rumors has been corroborated. To all inquiries, the Soviets shrug and say nothing. Thus, the fate of Raoul Wallenberg, one of war's noblest heroes, it yet to be answered for.

Dr. Joseph L. Lichten was prior to World War II in the diplomatic service of the Polish Government, but escaped to Sweden when the Soviet Union occupied Eastern Poland. From 1941 to 1945 he was attached to the Embassy of the Polish Government-in-Exile in Washington as consultant on Eastern European affairs and nationality problems. Since 1945 he has been director of the Foreign Affairs Department of the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith.

AIR POUCH

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM: AmEmbassy STOCKHOLM

TO: THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON

October 9, 1956

REF:

4004249

For Dept Use Only

SUBJECT: NEW SWEDISH REPRESENTATION TO MOSCOW ON WALLENBERG CASE

The Swedish Foreign Office announced on September 28, 1956 that a "new serious reminder" had been made in Moscow the day before on the Raoul WALLENBERG case.

In an unusually sharp memorandum, by Swedish standards, the Foreign Office stated, according to a communique which it issued to the press:

> "In a Memorandum handed by the Swedish Chargé d'Affaires to Vice Foreign Minister ZACHAROV it was first recalled that the Soviet Government in connection with Prime Minister ERLANDER'S and Interior Minister HEDLUND'S visit to Moscow and March-early April 1956 had undertaken to study carefully the exhaustive material at that time submitted by Sweden and to advise the Swedish Government of the result of this study. The Memorandum then stated that it is consequently now almost half a year since the Soviet Government promised to start its new investigations. The Swedish Government establishes that during this time, when repeated reminders have been made to the Soviet authorities, it has not received any information on the result of the investigations. Because of this, it wishes to underscore anew the enormous importance ~~w~~ attaches to this affair. It has been a source of great disappointment both for the Swedish Government and the Swedish public that the Soviet Government has not even seen fit to supply any information on what has thus far transpired through the investigations."

With the sole exception of the Communist organs, the entire Swedish press welcomed this new reminder. In an unusual departure from its normal practice with the press the Foreign Office confirmed that this was an especially sharply worded representation. The unanimous tenor of the press reaction to the reminder was to lay emphasis on the strong public demand that Moscow stop irritating Swedish patience and at last clarify the circumstances surrounding the disappearance of Raoul Wallenberg. It was recalled that after the Moscow visit of Prime Minister Erlander and Interior Minister Hedlund this spring and their subsequent presentation of material in Swedish possession to the

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JSweney/m.

Soviet authorities documenting Wallenberg's whereabouts on various occasions in different Russian prisons and concentration camps, the following had happened:

(1) During the Stockholm visit last May of a delegation from the Supreme Soviet the Russians requested, and later received, "supplementary information on the testimony concerning Wallenberg in Swedish hands.

(2) In June, 1956 the Swedish Foreign Office informed the press that the Government was still waiting for a Soviet reply.

(3) In July, 1956 Soviet Ambassador RODIONOV called on the Foreign Office and advised that the results of the investigation into the Wallenberg case made by the Soviet authorities would be forthcoming "shortly".

(4) During August the Raoul Wallenberg Committee (made up of 25 prominent private citizens) appealed to the Government to summon the Foreign Relations Council for consultations on what steps to take next.

An editorial in semi-official Social Democratic Morgon Tidningen on September 29, which has been widely quoted and endorsed by other papers, stated that there should be no doubt among the Soviet leaders that the Swedish people looked upon the lack of Soviet information on the Wallenberg case as a highly serious matter:

> "Yet, the reply is still missing. Why? This is a question which the Swedish nation asks itself. If there is any seriousness at all behind the East's talk about a desire to bring about friendly relations, it should be a natural thing that what has become a whole nation's concern not be ignored but, instead, an open and honest account be given of the measures taken and of the results achieved. The renewed Swedish reminder is well motivated. The serious tone corresponds to the sentiments among the Swedish people in this matter. Why is the Soviet Union silent on Wallenberg?"

Liberal Dagens Nyheter September 29, noting that it is now more than eleven years since Raoul Wallenberg disappeared, found that it was "about time" for the Swedish Foreign Office to employ strong words in the latest note to Moscow. This paper continued:

"It is known that on Sweden's part the most detailed information has been submitted to Moscow concerning Raoul Wallenberg's imprisonment in Russia. It is out of the question for the Soviet authorities not to have been able to trace him. In the Wallenberg case the Soviet Union's brazen nonchalance vis-a-vis elementary Swedish demands has crystallized. If even after the latest Swedish note the Russian reply should not come forward, all that remains for the Swedish Government is to place the cards on the table and give an exhaustive account of all the facts in the case of Wallenberg."

Conservative Sydsvenska Dagbladet wrote October 2.

"The Swedish Government's note in the Wallenberg affair was certainly warranted. It should have come months ago. The nonchalance shown by the Soviet authorities in this matter is unbelievable. Six months have past since the Soviet leaders promised to supply information on Wallenberg's fate. Since then Moscow has been silent. We have been given one more proof of how little Moscow cares about the most well-founded and legitimate Swedish demands."

The Foreign Office is very much concerned about the Raoul Wallenberg case and has done a tremendous amount of work to obtain information about this missing Swede who at the time of his disappearance possessed diplomatic status. Of necessity a large portion of this work has been done without publicity and under classified circumstance. However, public opinion in the past, as expressed in several of the leading papers, has implied that the Foreign Office has not done all that it might to secure the release of Wallenberg. The Foreign Office has been somewhat frustrated in not being able to answer this criticism without jeopardizing the work it was actually doing. Considerable pressure has been exerted on the Foreign Office to publish all of the material in its possession concerning Wallenberg. So far the Foreign Office has been hesitant to do this because much of the material has been obtained from foreign sources and, furthermore, it does not want to establish any sort of precedent. Feeling is so high in official Swedish circles over this case, however, that if some sort of satisfactory reply is not received soon from the USSR the Foreign Office will approve the publication of a report which will illustrate the intransigeance of the Soviet Government in following up leads supplied by the Swedish Government.

For the Charge d'Affaires ad interim:

Joseph Sweeney
First Secretary of Embassy

LET 7062

AIR POUCH

CONFIDENTIAL

DESPATCH

Amembassy STOCKHOLM

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE WASHINGTON

October 12, 1956

Despatch 586, October 9, 1956

4010902

Additional Information on Swedish Representation to Moscow on Wallenberg Case.

WALLENBERG, RAOUL

The acting head of the Political Section, Bureau Chief Bergström, volunteered the following additional information on the recent Swedish reminder to Moscow on the Wallenberg case:

(1) The Swedish reminder that the Soviet Union had made no recent response on the Wallenberg case was deliberately delivered in Moscow rather than in Stockholm. The reason for this action stems from the Moscow visit of Prime Minister Erlander and his party. When these high ranking Swedish officials discussed the Wallenberg case with their Soviet counterparts, they had the feeling that the Soviet leaders had not previously realized the importance Sweden attached to this case. The possibility was put forward by the Foreign Office that Ambassador Rodionov had not accurately reported Swedish reaction on Wallenberg. Therefore, Foreign Minister Undén decided that this reminder to the Soviet Union should be delivered in Moscow.

(2) The language of this reminder is unusually strong for a diplomatic communication between the Swedish Government and the Government of the Soviet Union. A milder but strong draft had initially been prepared in the Foreign Office and approved by everyone except by the Foreign Minister. When Foreign Minister Undén went over the draft with the Prime Minister, he deliberately strengthened several of the expressions. In fact, the Foreign Office believed the language so strong that they decided to publish only a gist rather than the full text.

(3) Because pressure is mounting in Swedish official circles for the publication of some sort of background study on the Wallenberg case, the Foreign Office wanted to assure the Embassy that if any publication should result, it would not compromise materials concerning Wallenberg given by any other government to Sweden. Bureau Chief Bergström emphasized that the Foreign Office had been grateful for American and other help in obtaining information about Wallenberg, and it had no intention of compromising those sources. The present thinking in the Foreign Office regarding publication of material on Wallenberg is that there should be two publications. The first should be a mimeographed press release which would contain only the official communications exchanged between the Swedish

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WALLENBERG FILE

DATE 12 Oct 56

From - Stockholm

the Soviet Government [illegible] the Foreign Office feels, would appear for themselves [illegible] of the Soviet Union. The second contemplated [illegible] elaborate glossy paper interpretation of the Wallenberg [illegible] would cause a presentation of the Swedish case.

(4) The Foreign [illegible] information on whether or not Wallenberg is alive, but feels that it is not proved on the basis that he is. There is no [illegible] of speculation in the Foreign Office as to whether or not Wallenberg will be released in the immediate future.

[illegible] d'Affaires ad interim.

Joseph Sweeney
First Secretary of Embassy

Report U-.1.0
15 November 1956

C I A

FOREIGN DOCUMENTS DIVISION

The Truth About Raoul Wallenberg

Rudolph Philipp

Vecko-Journalen, No 29, 21-28 July 1956, Stockholm, pp 8-13 and 30, 31; No 30, 28 July-4 August 1956, Stockholm, pp 14-17 and 32.

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(This report has not been edited or prepared for publication.)

THE TRUTH ABOUT RAOUL WALLENBERG

Vecko Journalen [Weekly Journal],
No 29, 21-28 July 1953, Stockholm,
Pages 8-13 and 30-31; No 30, 28
July-4 August 1956, Stockholm,
Pages 14-17 and 32

Rudolph Philipp

NEW PROOF CONCERNING WALLENBERG; IN A NEW SERIES
OF ARTICLES RUDOLPH PHILIPP PRESENTS UNPUBLISHED MATERIAL
FROM HIS SECRET DOSSIER

[No 29]

The Soviet prisoners, who under military guard had been taken to the processing camp "Friedland" in West Germany, left the train. They were free.

Among the returning prisoners was a long awaited witness, a former German Attache who knew about Raoul Wallenberg. A German Red Cross worker, and a representative from the Swedish Department of Foreign Affairs asked him, "Have you met any Swedes in prison?"

He answered, "How did you know? As soon as I get the opportunity I am to telegraph the Foreign Office in Stockholm and report that I have regards from Raoul Wallenberg, Legation Secretary, to his mother and to his entire family and relatives. Raoul is the

finest and b . comrade I have met during my int sent. I was his first cell mate when he was brought to the Lubyanka prison in Moscow on 31 January 1945. We promised each other that whoever was freed first would immediately send regards to the closest relatives and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs."

The released prisoner recorded his testimony as well as Raoul's regards on a tape recorder. Again a link in the chain of evidence. But how much evidence does one need before the Russians finally let Raoul Wallenberg return home? It will never do to dismiss the quantity of binding testimony by reasoning and explanations. They carry such force that the Swedish Government ought to be able to put more pressure into its demands. One ought to demand the immediate release of Raoul.

The Swedish people are also entitled to know about our proof, otherwise it runs the risk that the government once more goes back on its promises, and remains satisfied with the same type of vague explanations as heretofore. The cards must be placed on the table.

As the first step I shall report about Eberhard Muller, one of our most important witnesses.

Eberhard Muller and his wife recently returned from the Soviet Union. The name Muller is fictitious but the man pictured is really the witness. His real name cannot yet be disclosed because the Department of Foreign Affairs long refused to use the testimony gathered by the group interested in the Wallenberg activities. The reason was this: if we force the Russians against the wall we will provoke a death certificate. There was one important case: the Soviet had kidnapped a Western diplomat. In the face of all demarches, Moscow answered: "We don't know anything." When the

West Government finally submitted all its material evidence and admitted that they, after a certain period, had no further information, Moscow answered with a German death certificate. The diplomat had died of natural causes in the Soviet Union after the period indicated by his government. When Foreign Minister, Unden, at the request of the Russians, delivered "compromising material," it was done despite agreements in connection with the case, without obtaining approval from Philipp. It was not until several days after 12 May that the author found out that, among other things, Muller's testimony had gone to Moscow. Philipp then wrote to Muller and asked, retroactively, for permission first, to deliver his testimony to the Russians, and second, to use it in the government's heralded Vitbok [White Paper], and thereby accomplish Wallenberg's release. Muller gave his permission but, for security reasons, his real name has been withheld. For the same reason Philipp is asking, "Stop asking me and Raoul's family and relatives on what day we received the most recent proof that Raoul is still alive. It could mean that the Russians would put an end to the withholding tactics with a death certificate on the "prisoner Raoul Wallenberg."

For several years one task belonged among my routine work -- to listen at night to foreign radio broadcasts for information about returned Soviet prisoners.

My interest centered on all prisoners whom the Russians might have considered especially important. Prisoners of the same category as Raoul Wallenberg and his Hungarian chauffeur, Vilmos Langfelder. They belong among the "Privilged" who regardless of rank are usually treated better than generals.

Among the privileged prisoners I considered vice corporal Eberhard Muller. Independently several highly trustworthy "Heimkehrer" [returnees] -- returning prisoners of war and civilian internees -- reported that they had heard speak of Wallenberg and Langfelder.

In 1954 we learned through a prominent "Heimkehrer" that Muller had returned with their transport. The returning prisoners are always permitted to choose for themselves whether they want to be repatriated to East- or West-Germany. Muller had chosen East-Germany. We presumed he had done so because he had close relatives in the German Democratic Republic.

The Department of Foreign Affairs and the government experts on criminology tried unsuccessfully to contact Eberhard Muller. They looked for him in West Berlin and also in West Germany in the hope that he had moved there illegally. But without result.

When Department of Foreign Affairs and the government's experts on criminology asked me to try, both Raoul's family and the chairman of the Raoul Wallenberg Activities, Mrs. Birgitta de Vylder-Bellander, were against such a dangerous experiment. They had long been convinced that it was senseless to try to find new witnesses. The government did not even use the extensive material evidence already on hand for the energetic diplomatic steps, which the leaders of the Foreign Ministry had so long promised.

However, on 9 April 1954 I was called to the Cabinet Secretary, Arne S. Lundberg. As usual my closest "man," Mrs. de Vylder-Bellander accompanied me. Lundberg said among other things:

"Something extraordinary must be done so that the Russians may understand the seriousness of the matter. We are debating sending Unden to the Soviet Union to speak with the Supreme Command. If it should prove necessary, I will have to go to Moscow myself to clarify the matter in the minutest detail."

I answered: "When do you think Unden will be able to go?"

"Not until after the Geneva Meeting."

"Would the result of the meeting in Geneva have any significance in connection with this case?"

"Naturally not. But Molotov, who now is believed to have considerable power, ought to be back. When Unden himself goes, it will show that we consider this case extremely important and that we intend to get to the bottom of it."

The Hunt for Muller Begins

This was the first time I had heard that Unden was contemplating a trip to Moscow. Considering this fact I, in spite of my co-worker's objections, decided that I ought to attempt to interrogate Eberhard Muller. Consequently, I looked up Karl Evert Sundblad one of the best voluntary workers for Raoul's case. I knew that Sundblad, from his previous years in Germany, was a good friend of Eberhard Muller. I asked him to write his name on a few sheets of blank writing paper. If he were to receive letters from East Germany, he was then to leave them, unopened, for me. He agreed to my request without questions.

My plan was to try to contact Eberhard Muller through letters. Unfortunately, we only had Mrs. Muller's address. Her hometown was in a "Uran-Sperrgebiet" [Uranium Closed zone or district], a territory where almost 300,000 workers mine metal containing uranium for the Soviet Russian Monopoly Enterprise "Wismut AG" Muller's comrades, returning to West Germany, reported that he was travelling with a new girlfriend he had met in prison. It was not very likely, therefore, that Muller had returned to his wife. But I figured that the East-German and Soviet Russian Censors might help me in forwarding my letter to him.

Therefore, I wrote to Eberhard Muller using his wife's address. And I wrote as Karl Evert Sundblad. I expressed my joy that I through old friends had heard that Eberhard had returned. I reported that I had married, was getting along well, had 3 fine children, and had a good income. I wrote that I hoped Eberhard likewise was doing well, that he had met his family and found them in good health. I expressed my complete understanding of his decision not to go to West Germany like most of the other "Heimkehrer," without trying to help build up that part of Germany where he had his roots. I myself was very interested in visiting the East zone of Germany some time, because I was convinced that a real spirit of progress prevailed there.

On the other hand I could understand that there were many difficulties in a country which was being re-built from the ruins of the Third Reich. I asked him, therefore, not to misinterpret my intentions when I, as an old friend from a "war-spared" country, wanted to send a few clothes and shoes, above all for his children. Would he please write and tell me their approximate sizes, both his own and those of his children. If the duty would be too high, I would then provide currency for it if not in the same denomination, then at least in usable currency.

A few weeks later I received an answer from Eberhard Muller via Sundblad. As I had expected, the censor had opened my letter and had done everything possible to get it to the addressee. After all, the letter indicated such a sympathetic attitude toward the German Democratic Republic. Eberhard thanked me warmly because I had not forgotten him and reported that he had a nice position in the Kommunistiska Kulturförbundet [Communist Cultural Alliance], that his first wife had died and that his new wife worked as a translator of Russian books. He was so happy that I did not believe all the lies about East Germany. There was much that could also be learned in his country, and he hoped that I would be able to visit there, perhaps during the Leipzig Fair. He also thanked me for the picture of my family. In my letter I had enclosed a picture of the Sundblad family. I had received the picture as a Christmas greeting from Karl Evert. Eberhard was touched by the offering of the clothes. In the hope that he would sometime be able to repay the kindness, he concluded the letter with many hearty greetings from Eberhard and his new wife.

I Begin My Trip

On 16 June 1954 Osten Unden returned from his 10-day "private visit" to Moscow. On 20 June the Cabinet Secretary had a conference with Mrs. Bellander and myself. As a result of this meeting I wrote down the following, which was intended as a "last will and testament" to my co-workers if I did not return from the far from safe expedition: "If the motive and objective of Unden's Moscow trip was really -- as Lundberg solemly explained to Mrs. Bellander and myself -- to solve this extraordinary problem with extraordinary methods, a testimony from Eberhard Muller could be vital for Raoul. According to Lundberg, the Soviet members of

the government told Unden, "We are ready to reopen the case of Raoul Wallenberg if Sweden can give us material evidence to the effect that R. W. is now or has been, in the custody of the Soviet Union." According to Lundberg the Soviet negotiators had added, "What the Swedish newspapers have published to date is of no value to us." Before I, Raoul's family, and my coworkers take up a new open battle, I feel it is my responsibility to comply with the latest request from the Russians to produce unpublished evidence to prove that Raoul has been imprisoned within the Soviet-Russian territory.

On 29 June the Cabinet Secretary called on the telephone, "The Swedish Counsul General to Berlin, Tham, is here. We will confer with you."

On the way to the Department of Foreign Affairs, I stopped and bought a roundtrip plane ticket to Berlin. I expected advice and directions for my work from Sweden's Counsul General in Berlin, but after the introduction the Cabinet Secretary began summing up all the difficulties and risks. A few days prior to this, Lundberg had completely agreed with the Political Department Chief, Gunnar Jarring, and with the government's experts on criminology that I ought to go. In the first place, Lundberg thought it would be very difficult to contact Muller. If this task could be accomplished, the contact man would surely lose his life. Muller's letter proved that he was either a Communist or that he feared the authorities. If this were so it might easily be assumed that he would betray the contact man. As far as I, myself, was concerned I would be shadowed from the very first moment by East German spies. They were all over West Germany. Counsul General Tham was also pessimistic. He did not believe I would obtain Muller's testimony even if I succeeded in contacting him.

"I am flying tomorrow morning at 8:40 o'clock and will reach Berlin at 13:25. Will the Counsul General be kind enough to send a trustworthy person to meet me at the airport and drive me to the residence of a friend?"

"If you have decided to go, then you shall go," answered the Cabinet Secretary and continued to Tham: "I take it that you can arrange by code-telegram for someone to call for Philipp?"

"Yes, surely."

"What is the name of the fellow who is to meet me?"

"Benkt."

Lundberg and Tham wished me good luck.

I bought a travelling bag of pressed cardboard for the clothes and shoes for Muller. I was to travel as a "Mr. Berg" from Stockholm, a good friend of Karl Evert Sundblad, on a through-trip in Berlin.

I landed in Berlin-Tempelhof on 30 June 13:25 o'clock. At the delivery window of the baggage room a gentleman came over to me. He had recognized the Swedish flag on one of my bags, according to directions in the code-telegram. I asked: "Are you Benkt?" He answered "Yes! My name is Rudolph."

In the car I reported that I was Raoul Wallenberg's contact man. Benkt, who appeared trustworthy, intelligent, and honest was acquainted with Raoul's history as a whole. Benkt had worked at the Counsulate General for the past 5 years. His name was Ljunglin and he was de facto the Vice Counsul. He knew Eberhard Muller by name. At the request of his superior he had tried to find him, so far without success. I explained to him that I had to contact Muller and interrogate him, if possible, in the presence of 2 civil servants of the consulate.

The Meeting with the Witness Muller

At 9 o'clock on 5 July Eberhard Muller, his new wife, and Benkt and I were sitting in the home of a nonpolitical "typical German," just outside the town. I was Mr. Berg from Stockholm, a friend of Karl Evert Sundblad. Benkt was a Swedish Charge d'Affairs, active for the past few years in Berlin. I had deposited all my presents with the Germans (the presents I had from my friend Sundblad).

Muller was about 170 cm tall, built squarely, with a round face and bright, brown eyes. I estimated his age at around 40 years. He was extremely grateful to me, who had brought so much; he did not have enough words of praise for his good friend Karl Evert Sundblad. Mrs. Muller was a small blond woman, at most 160 cm tall; she would have been beautiful had she had the opportunity to care for her hair and complexion. Some of her upper front teeth were missing. Mrs. Muller's personal wishes were mostly to obtain a nail file, a little powder and a lipstick, and, for the first time in many years, a pair of nylons instead of the heavily darned cotton hose she wore. She appeared to be deeply religious. She reported at great length on her hard years in a slave camp near the Arctic Ocean, where undernourished women work in the coal mines in an average temperature of 40 below zero and where the summer lasts only a few weeks. Mrs. Muller had been arrested in Berlin in 1948. She had been employed in the Office of the Allies then.

Eberhard Muller described with great intensity his experiences as a Soviet prisoner. He had stayed in many different prisons and for some time in a POW camp. He had become antinazi while he was at the front and had been taken prisoner by the Russians

in the spring of 1945. For 2 months he was transferred around among the various staffs in the front territory. He was then transferred to the Moscow prisons Lefortovskaya and Butyrka and to the prisoner of war camp at Krasnogorsk.

When Muller arrived at this camp the investigating judge said: "You have been tried and there are no indictments or evidence against you. Therefore we are going to place you in a POW camp." However in 1948 Muller was again returned to Lefortovskaya and again treated as a suspect prisoner. In the end he was given a 25 year sentence and placed in solitary confinement. In 1953 without knowing why he was given amnesty together with other Germans. But he was returned home only much later.

Don't You Know Anything About Wallenberg?

When Eberhard Muller and his wife told of their needs, I suggested that Benkt should drive us to a department store where we could buy a few cosmetics, a pair of stockings and shoes for Mrs. Muller and Mr. Muller. With tears in their eyes Muller and his wife protested: "This is going too far, we cannot take advantage of you to that extent."

"This here I have brought from Karl Evert. When we have made the purchases we can stop for a bite before we depart."

Benkt and I got up. Slowly Eberhard Muller also got up, turned to Benkt, and said:

"Mr. Attache, is Wallenberg back?"

Benkt did not know what he should answer and could not comprehend how Muller had figured out that he was from the Department of Foreign Affairs.

"Which Wallenberg?" stuttered Benkt, "Do you mean Wallenstein or Wallentheim?"

"No, after all you are Swedes," Muller answered, "You must have heard about Legation Secretary Wallenberg, the man who was employed at the Swedish Legation in Budapest."

"What interest do you have in that matter," I asked?

"It is very important to me," Muller answered." If the Russians did not send Wallenberg back, then I cannot understand why the Russians released me! When I have told you all I know about the case you will understand how important a role Wallenberg and his chauffeur have played for me and my unfortunate comrades. Anyone who had had the least contact with Wallenberg and Langfelder were brought back sooner or later to the prisons from the POW camp, yes, even from the repatriation camp, often a few weeks before returning home!"

"Therefore, when I unexpectedly was given permission to go along in a home-transport, I was sure that Wallenberg and Langfelder had been sent home and that we, consequently, were no longer important to the Russians."

"Well, this is very interesting," I commented. "Now we will have to sit down again and hear all you know. When you first asked my friend, here, we thought you were a provocator who was trying to trip us into something. The fact that we hid in a CD-auto does not alter the fact that Benkt is a Charge d'Affairs and I am an author. You are Karl Evert's friend. I do believe you are frank with us. And, as you yourself said, as Swedes we are interested in where every imprisoned countryman of ours is."

Muller and his wife were beaming with happiness because they were able to help us, so that it was not just they who were getting help. Without showing the least inhibition, Eberhard Muller began to report. He did not hold anything back. Both he and his wife asked us not to release their names and thereby expose them and Muller's children still living in East Germany to further difficulties. I wrote on and on, page after page was filled. Muller reported, brought up episodes and people, prisons, doctors, prisoners, life, death, hopelessness and monotony, stubborn courage. The hours passed. The names of Wallenberg and Langfelder occurred over and over again in Muller's story which is repeated here in summary:

I was born 1913. As vice corporal I was taken prisoner by the Russians in January 1945. At the end of February I was turned over to the NKVD by the Red Army (NKVD, the mightiest of the political police). On 4 March I was transported by railway to Moscow. On 6 March I arrived at the Lubyanka prison (NKVD's headquarters). The same night I was moved to cell 105 in Lefortovskaya prison. On 12 and 13 March I was interrogated by a NKVD major about my life and how I had come to be taken prisoner.

On 20 March a man named Vilmos Langfelder was placed in the same cell with me, cell 105. He spoke German fluently and I asked him, "Are you German?"

Langfelder answered, "No, I am Hungarian with a Swedish passport. I was together with a Swedish diplomat, we were both arrested in Budapest."

As far as I can remember after a period of 10 years, Langfelder reported the following about himself and his friend, Wallenberg's

arrest," I am a civil engineer. My native language is hungarian, but I learned German at an early age; in 1932 I went to Germany. In Budapest my family owned a big machine manufacturing plant which in 1944 was "taken over" by the Goering Concern or by Messerschmitt. I have never worked in our manufacturing plant. I was consulting engineer and inventor. When the Jews were prohibited to work independently, I became a secretary in an export firm.

In the summer of 1944 I was saved through Wallenberg's interference. He was Legation secretary with a special assignment, to protect the Jews. Sweden likewise had been assigned by the Soviet Union to afford power of protection in Hungary.

Budapest was completely surrounded by the Red Army. The section that suffered most under the German bombardment was the section where the Legation was located. There were air raid shelters there. Wallenberg decided to get in touch with the Russian Supreme Command, above all to try to stop the Red Army from shooting at the Section where the Legation was located. He carried approximately 1.5 million pengos with him. On the way we passed a Branch office of the Swedish Legation. Wallenberg informed them there that he was taking a trip to Russian Headquarters in an attempt to intervene.

The first Russian staff we encountered received us very nicely but explained that Wallenberg's request would have to be placed before Marshall Malinovski personally. Another staff, likewise, explained that they had no authority.

We were placed under guard and had to spend 2 nights with the staff. But we did have a certain amount of freedom to move around. One morning we asked to have a bath. We got it.

From this staff we were brought to the periphery of Budapest. We had a long wait there. Finally a major came and said, "Be good enough to give me all your papers."

Wallenberg answered: "I am a diplomat, I can only let you have such papers as I consider it right to let you have."

The major: "I said all papers!"

Wallenberg: "That means you arrest us."

The Major: "You may consider it that way."

Wallenberg turned over all his papers. For some time we waited under guard in a building. While inside we were allowed to walk around quite freely."

What Langfelder reported must have taken place in the middle of January 1945. To the best of my knowledge I cannot give any definite time period. From the continuation of Langfelder's report I recall that he and Wallenberg were transported by train via Rumania, Odessa and Kiev to Moscow. They were escorted by an officer.

At a railway station in Rumania Wallenberg slipped a note to a Rumanian worker or peasant and asked him to forward it to Sweden. In the note he had written a few words saying that he and Langfelder had been arrested and were on the way to Russia.

In Kiev they left the train and the officer took them for a walk in the town. The officer bought a newspaper and read the latest news from the front for Langfelder and Wallenberg.

In Moscow the officer went with Wallenberg and Langfelder to a large department store. There they had to buy many things for

their money. Later the officer brought them to the Ministry of Domestic Affairs. (The Department of Domestic Affairs has an imposing facade toward Lubyanka Street, with beautiful portals, elegant offices, a large banquet room and club facilities for the NKVD Club Djersjinski, named after Tejukan's pioneers. But the rear of the Ministry Building is much wider than the front. It faces a long, grey, narrow, over-all well-guarded caserne street, Little Lubyanka Street. No civilian goes there of his own will.

During the thirties, when I was in Moscow as a foreign specialist on rationalization, I was invited to the Foreign Specialists' Club, also named for Djersjinski. The taxi driver drove me, by mistake, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I believe that I am one of the few who came in and out of NKVD's headquarters alive.

Most interrogations occur at night. Through long, subterranean corridors prisoners are brought up to an almost luxurious interrogation room. All the way the guard hits the buckle of his belt. That is the signal to other guards to prevent another transport of prisoners from crossing the corridor and to make sure that no other prisoner sees the comrade being brought in or out from the interrogation. R. Philipp's note).

Here Muller's report continued:

On 6 February 1945 Langfelder was separated from Wallenberg. Langfelder was placed in cell No 140.

"It is strange that I am always brought to a cell, the number of which can be divided by 35," he said to me, "140, 105 and 35."

When Langfelder was placed in cell 1[illegible], 2 prisoners were already there, the Swiss Koedel and a Czech.

Langfelder reported often and much about Koedel, with whom he came to be on very friendly terms. He showed me an empty cigarette box on which Koedel had written his name in large letters so Langfelder would never forget him. When he showed me the box he said: "It was unnecessary for him to write his name, I could never forget Koedel." Langfelder, on the other hand, never spoke voluntarily about the other cell mate, the Czech. Once I asked him frankly about the Czech. He answered: "No, I never knew him well. He was a Czech who became a German citizen. Later he was drafted for the Wehrmacht. In 1943 he deserted to the Russians and was arrested. Since then he was sitting in Lublyanka. Now he is reading Russian books all day long. I think his father was a Communist.

Langfelder himself was called for interrogation only twice. The interrogator was a major, tall, slender, and dark. The major let him report all that had happened up to his arrest and recorded protocol. Langfelder had the impression that he and Wallenberg were regarded or considered as spies. An accusation of that type had once been read to Langfelder by the major.

On 18 March 1945 Langfelder was moved to Lefortovskaya, where he sat all alone in cell 35. Later he was moved to cell 105, where he met me, who for 1[illegible] days had been sitting alone in that cell.

While we were together I asked Langfelder whether Wallenberg had informed the Legation that he intended to start action with the Russians.

Langfelder answered, "He could not do that. There was no time, and the Swedish Government would not understand such a step because Wallenberg had risked arrest."

(It is uncanny that Langfelder, when Unden was not yet Minister of Foreign Affairs, was able to foresee how the Swedish government, 10 months later, were to judge Raoul's move.

In November 1946 the Department of Foreign Affairs explained in a communique that if Raoul Wallenberg had acted as I described in the book Raoul Wallenberg -- diplomat, kämpe, samarit [Raoul Wallenberg -- Diplomat, Fighter, Samaritan] he had then overstepped his authority.

Didn't the Department of Foreign Affairs know that it was technically impossible for Wallenberg to seek council with either the Chief, who had had to seek refuge in a cellar on the other side of the front, or with the Administration on foreign policies in Stockholm? R. Philipp's note).

Eberhard Muller continues here:

On 6 april 1945 I was brought from cell 105 to Butyrka prison. Langfelder, on the other hand, remained in Lubyanka. In May 1945 the Czech was also transferred from Lubyanka to my cell in Butyrka. He did not tell me, however, that he was a Czech, so I did not know that he was the "Czech."

For a whole year I was transferred around among various prisons and it was not until November 1946 that I for the first time talked to the Czech about Wallenberg and Langfelder.

I asked him then if he had ever met Langfelder; the Czech answered, "Yes." He continued, "The same day that Langfelder was transferred from our cell in Lubyanka (Rudolph Philipp's note: it should, according to Langfelder, be cell 140, 18 March 1945) another prisoner was placed in the cell with Roedel and me. That was Langfelder's Swedish boss, Wallenberg. He asked us about Langfelder. Wallenberg was a good comrade and sent his cigarettes and his tobacco rations to Langfelder through the guard.

Wallenberg was brought up for interregation several times. To us, his cell mates, he said, that the Russians did not have the slightest reason to arrest him. In Budapest his Legation had worked for the Russians. But the leaders of the interrogations did not believe Wallenberg and said: "You are a rich Swedish capitalist, what can anybody like that do for the Russians?"

The Czech likewise reported that the same day he was transferred to cell 92 in Butyrka, Wallenberg and Roedel were transported in the same prison car from Lubyanka.

Wallenberg and Roedel sat in one of the closed stalls in the prison car and the Czech sat in another.

The prison car drove up first to the Lefortovskaya prison. Through a slit in the wall the Czech had seen how Langfelder and Wallenberg had been let out of the car. The Czech, himself, was transferred to Butyrka prison.

FIGURE CAPTIONS

[page 6, original]

Rudolph Philipp, the man, who has for 10 years led the Wallenberg action and who has been the driving force in all the investigations.

[pages 8 and 9, original]

This is the last picture of Raoul Wallenberg. It was taken of Wallenberg and his "General Staff" in the cellar of a large Hungarian Bank on 26 November 1944. Wallenberg, as Swedish charge d'affaires, voluntarily contacted the Russians on 13 January 1945. On 16 January Moscow's Department of Foreign Affairs reported that Wallenberg had been taken into custody. He returned on 17 January under German escort to pick up his baggage. His departing remark was: "I am going to High Headquarters, as guest or prisoner, I don't know." On 31 January he was placed in NKVD's infamous prison, Lubyanka, in Moscow. On 18 August 1947, the Russians answered for the first time through the Department of Foreign Affairs and denied any and all knowledge of Wallenberg.

[page 10, upper left, original]

Vilmos Langfelder, above, fellow prisoner of Raoul. Vilmos Langfelder is a civil engineer. He acted as Raoul's chauffeur and bodyguard and accompanied him into imprisonment. He has not returned either.

(No 30)

CONTACT WITH RAOUL RESULTED IN MORE SEVERE SENTENCES;
NEW DOCUMENTS FROM RUDOLPH PHILIPP'S SECRET WALLENBERG DOSSIER

Rudolph Nilsson

From 1946 until December 1951 Philipp fought a battle on 2 fronts. The first was with Moscow, which refused to answer any and all of the demarches from the Swedish Department of Foreign Affairs. The second front constituted our own Administration of Foreign Affairs, which could not be dissuaded from their defeatist and frightened attitude, which signified their "actions" in the Wallenberg case.

However, on 11 December 1951, a "gentlemen's agreement" was concluded between Cabinet Secretary, Arne S. Lundberg, as representative of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Rudolph Philipp, as Raoul Wallenberg's representative, and Wallenberg's family. In it it was -- among other things -- agreed that they would cooperate to attempt to save Raoul. The investigations of witnesses who returned home from imprisonment in Russia could then be carried out rationally. Among the witnesses interrogated was "Eberhard Muller," whose testimony was in part printed in the previous issue.

There were 4 persons in the parlor of the nonpolitical "typical German" ["appeltysk"] who placed his bungalow at my disposal. It was 5 July 1954; 5 days earlier I had started from Bromma on what I was convinced was a dangerous adventure. It involved getting an important witness in the Raoul Wallenberg case through the Iron Curtain.

But the most dangerous part of the adventure was now behind me. The witness, "Lebernard Muller," was sitting in peace and quiet before us. He reported, without reservations and without fear, all he had experienced during 9 long years in Russian imprisonment -- about his fellow prisoners and, most important, what he directly and indirectly knew about Raoul Wallenberg and his chauffeur, Vilmos Langfelder. Beside Muller sat his wife; she was small and blond and had a few upper front teeth missing -- evidence of the years she spent as a Russian slave worker near the Antarctic Ocean. The third person in the party was Bankt Ljunglin, civil servant of the Department of Foreign Affairs, who was stationed in Berlin, and who, for safety's sake, was to act as a Swedish official living in the town. I was the fourth person; my assignment was to ask and record questions. I looked through the protocol of Muller's testimony. In one place it read, "On 20 March 1945 a man named Vilmos Langfelder was placed in cell number 105, the same cell I occupied in the Lefortovskaya prison in Moscow. He reported that he was a Hungarian with a Swedish passport; that he had been together with a Swedish diplomat, and that they had both been arrested by Russians in Budapest."

A few pages further on was a report about another one of Muller's cell mates, a Czech whom he had met in the concentration camp in Krasnogorsk. Muller had asked the Czech if he had met Wallenberg and Langfelder. He had received the answer "yes." He had been sitting in the same cell with both of them, cell 140, in the Lubyanka Prison in Moscow. He had been together, first with Langfelder, and later, when Langfelder was removed, with Wallenberg. "Wallenberg was a very nice comrade, who sent his cigarettes and tobacco rations to Langfelder via the guard," the Czech had told Muller. The Czech had also seen how Wallenberg was taken away in a prison vehicle.

The Jew Rescuer Wallenberg Shared A Cell With A German Jew Executioner

Eberhard Muller had had to change prisons constantly during his years in Russia. He had also had to change cell mates constantly. The Soviet imprisonment principle is to isolate prisoners who know something which must not seep out. But if a larger circle is involved, individual prisoners are not isolated but are all kept separate from those prisoners with no knowledge or information about it. It is not from a sadistic standpoint alone, but from a rational point of view that isolated prisoners are occasionally kept in solitary confinement. This usually happens when the prisoner is suspected of not having reported the names of all the prisoners to whom he had given his secrets.

In the so-called Schweige-Lager [isolated camps] and in Schweige-Gefängnissen [isolated prisons] the prisoners have greater internal freedom than in Moscow's prisons for interrogations. On the other hand they have absolutely no contact with the outer world, and no normal chance, after the prison term is over, to leave the deportation center. But no partitions are needed in the exercise grounds of the "quiet" camps and prisons. The prisoners live in a "hermetically" sealed world.

Like much other testimony by witnesses, Muller's report showed how Wallenberg's and Langfelder's cell mates were constantly meeting each other and being exchanged with each other.

In the Soviet's inhuman prison and concentration camp world these changes signified rays of hope which did not exist in the prison hells of the Third Reich. Year after year to be forced to share the cell with the same cell mate is frustrating. Witnesses

have reported that prison officials often asked them with which cell mates they preferred to share their cell. The system facilitates a let-up, not only for the prisoners but also for the personnel, who thereby prevent many cases of neurosis.

Muller Continues his Testimony

Muller had been sitting quietly for quite a while. Now he continued his report, "The Czech was far from being my only fellow prisoner who knew about Wallenberg and Langfelder," he said. "There were many, among them a Finn, whom I met in cell 92 in the prison Lefortovskaya, where I was brought on 1 February 1948. The Finn talked as little Russian as I, but with the help of my broken Russian and sign language I succeeded in making it clear to him that I had been in cell 105 in Lefortovskaya since 1945. The Finn then pointed out that he had also been in cell 105. His cell mate was then a man named Langfelder.

Later I learned that the Finn had come to that cell at the end of April 1945; that he, besides having Langfelder for a cell mate, had also had for a cell mate a German vice-admiral named Kraft, who had been in command of the harbor Gdingen. The Finn had been in cell 105 only 14 days; then he was moved to various prisons. But one year later he again landed in his old cell, 105. The vice-admiral was still there, but Langfelder had been exchanged for German Lt. Gen. Stachel, who had been an instructor in the so-called Jagerbataljon [Pursuit Batallion] which had been in Finland after 1918. He spoke Finnish flawlessly.

With Stachel as an interpreter, Admiral Kraft and the Finn could talk with one another. Kraft told him, among other things,

that Langfelde. had been in the cell until December 1945. During that time the chief investigator had tried to prove that he was an Allied spy. According to the leader of the investigation Raoul Wallenberg, his chief, was supposed to be not a diplomat but a messenger for a Jewish organization. They were supposed to have tried to escape the Russians in Budapest.

One date the Finn seemed to remember particularly well was 27 July 1947. That day Admiral Kraft had been called in for an interrogation; a quarter of an hour later he himself had been called in for an interrogation. At this time the Finn was interrogated by 2 very high officials. They asked him what he knew of Langfelder and what he had learned about the Swedish diplomat through Langfelder. The Finn was also asked whether he knew the name of the "Swede." He had answered then that he did not know it, which was true. Not until February 1948 did the Finn hear the name Wallenberg through me. After the interrogation the Finn was placed in solitary confinement in the basement of the prison to "recollect." In August he tried to commit suicide by throwing himself head first from the window sill in the cell down to the stone floor. He contracted skull injuries and had to be transferred to the "sick-department."

In February 1948 when I again shared a cell with the Finn -- cell 92 in Lefortovskaya -- he had been there a long time, isolated. For 3 whole years this unfortunate peasant boy, who had become half crazy during the imprisonment, was my only companion; at times it seemed that our fate had been linked. For example, we were separated on 24 April 1951, but we became cell mates again on 20 March 1952, this time in the Penal Institute Vladimir. It was not until there,

that the Fi. . finally began to tell about himse how he, as a child, had had a very severe accident, which still pained and ached him, how he had been taken prisoner on the Karelska Front in July 1944 and how the NKVD, the Russian secret police, had forced him to participate in a film designed to show how the Finns mistreated Russian prisoners of war.

When I asked him about the "Swede," that is Wallenberg, he beat his chest and screamed, "What would it help? I know that I will never be free. The Russians will come and kill me. I have heard something and still I know nothing!"

"It was really too bad about the Finn" Muller continued. "He was continuously terrified and I more than anyone understood his terror. For some years I myself had been considered as an ordinary prisoner of war, but suddenly I was elevated to the rank of spy in a prison for interrogation. Why? Yes, I was among the prisoners who had had somethin to do with Langfelder. And I had often talked with my fellow prisoners about Raoul Wallenberg. Therefore I told myself: one day the Swedish Government will have the means to free Wallenberg. When that day comes, the Russians will come to check with which prisoners Langfelder and Wallenberg have shared cells. Then these prisoners will be isolated mercilessly so that nothing will be known about the fate of Langfelder and Wallenberg," Eberhard Muller concluded.

Russians Investigated Raoul's Past

Muller and the Finn were right about one thing -- their anxiety about being more severely treated because they "knew something" about Wallenberg and Langfelder. There is much evidence to show how important the Soviets considered the prisoner, Wallenberg but I shall give only one example -- even that is taken from Muller's testimony:

In the concentration camp in Krasnogorsk, Muller met German Captain Quade -- a nephew of Goebel's radio commentator, Quade, a General in the Air Force. Captain Quade told Muller that during the war he was assigned to the German Legation in Stockholm. This supposedly provoked his arrest and his being brought to Moscow. Muller asked him if he had ever heard the name Wallenberg. "Yes," he said, "I know Wallenberg, I lived one floor below Wallenberg's apartment over there. In Moscow I was often interrogated about what I knew about Wallenberg. But, after all, I knew nothing."

Muller had the impression that Quade was afraid to talk about the matter.

The word "drüben" -- "over there" -- I first interpreted as "in Moscow," "in Lubyanka." But investigations yielded the following result:

Captain Ferdinand Bodo Horst Quade, born 1898, was assigned to German's Stockholm Legation from January 1942 until October 1944. He posed as a "transport officer" from Sweden to Finland, but he was really a Gestapo man.

Quade stayed several times for a few days at Grand-Pensionat Dehn, Strandvagen 7A. The US Legation was in the same building, but so was the office for Mellaneuropaiska Handels AB [Central European Commerce Corporation] of which Raoul Wallenberg was the Foreign Director until June 1944.

Without a doubt Quade lived in this pensionat [better class boardinghouse] to watch the Americans.

The intensive interrogation Quade had undergone in Moscow shows how far reaching were the checkings the Russians made of Raoul's past.

Muller and his fellow prisoners were constantly interrogated about Wallenberg. These interrogations culminated, according to Muller, on 25 July 1947. The background material is this:

When the Soviet Union left all official Swedish notes and demarches unanswered, more than a million Swedish men and women united through their organizations in a rescue action for Raoul Wallenberg. They dispatched an address to Stalin. Then our government sent a still clearer note to Moscow.

How did the rulers of the Kremlin react?

Prisoners who had been in contact with Wallenberg or Langfelder were again brought to Moscow. "Atalsfria" prisoners [prisoners, who were to be freed according to certain agreements] who had begun to serve relatively light sentences (8 to 15 years) and even prisoners who were being trained as communist agitators for their homelands and were waiting for the return trip to repatriation camps were accused of trumped up well-studied crimes and sentenced to a maximum penalty of 25 years. This was the sudden activity that the Finn and his comrade observed on 25 July.

Muller and his Finnish comrade were not alone in suspecting a connection between their miserable situation and their knowledge about Langfelder and Wallenberg. Many of the witnesses who returned with the large transports in 1955 and 1956 and who were questioned immediately after they crossed the border explained to the authorities of their own countries and to representatives of the Swedish Government; "We suspect a connection between our contact with Langfelder and Wallenberg and our more severe punishment." One witness declared under oath that the Russian prosecutor himself had openly stated that this was the case.

Vyshinskiy's Note: Lies

Moscow believed that we had thus been robbed of every chance to obtain proof of Raoul Wallenberg's imprisonment on Soviet Russian soil. Therefore after 32 months of silence Molotov recovered his voice and ordered the vice minister of Foreign Affairs, Vyshinskiy, to deliver a note to our Moscow minister. That was 18 August 1947, still not quite a month after the "memorable" day in Moscow's prisons.

The note explained that Raoul Wallenberg had never been found in the Soviet Union and that he must certainly be dead, probably as a result of an auto accident, a bomb or something else. All searches in camps for prisoners of war and civilian internees had been without result.

That the first statement was a lie was proved by Molotov's own note on 16 January 1945, in which Moscow's Department of Foreign Affairs explained that the Soviet power had taken Raoul Wallenberg and his personal belongings into custody.

That Raoul reached Moscow alive, was testified to by Russia's Ambassador in Stockholm, Mrs. Alexandra Kollontay, who in February 1945 stated that Raoul Wallenberg was in good health, on Russian soil, and that he was not directly arrested, merely in "custody."

Vyshinskiy's Note: Nonsense

Moscow's other part in the searches may best be characterized as "Goddag yxskaft" ["How do you do, axehandle."] Neither in my book, nor in my articles and communiques did I state that Raoul was in a labor camp. On the contrary, at that particular time I

explained that "he is alive, staying in Russian custody in various prisons." Neither Lubyanka nor Lefortovskaya belong to the Soviet labor camp system.

The cabinet secretary, Arne S. Lundberg, characterizes this, the only real note we have so far received from Moscow about Raoul Wallenberg, as a conglomeration of nonsense and absurdities.

Our Moscow ambassador Rolf Sohlman explained during one of his various trips to Stockholm, when I had asked him to be sure to show the Russians that Vyshinskiy's note is a lie, that as long as Stalin and Beria are alive, "We cannot do that, it would look as if we are trying to put Vishinskiy's back to the wall."

Stalin is dead. Beria liquidated. The late Vyshinskiy has officially joined the "army of spies and scoundrels;" and Molotov has Shepilov as a successor.

But Unden has not yet found the time ripe to state openly, "Stop this nonsense."

Don't say that this note is the snow of yesteryear. When Unden had visited Moscow in June 1954, he received the same promises as Erlander received in April 1956. On 29 September 1954 Sohlman delivered a detailed, complete memorandum to Moscow's Department of Foreign Affairs. In it our Department of Foreign Affairs explained the strict demands which the Swedish Government placed upon the interrogations of witnesses in connection with Raoul Wallenberg's time in prison in the USSR, and that only completely trustworthy testimonies were accepted.

On 21 December 1954 Sohlman was received by Semenov, then as now deputy minister of Foreign Affairs, department chief for

the People's Democracies and Scandinavia, at one time Madame Kollontay's closest associate and Charge d'Affaires in Stockholm. Semenov explained: "Nothing new has happened. We refer to Vyshinskiy's note."

How long shall we stand for such treatment?

The government and the foreign affairs administration must, finally, speak clearly to the Russians.

In March 1951 I was sitting together with the Finn in cell 287 in Butyrka prison. On the 18th we got a new cell mate, who even had information about Langfelder and Wallenberg. He was an Austrian. He had been in the same cell with Langfelder and he had given him an explicit description of his past. Langfelder was an engineer, the Austrian reported, and engaged mainly in research and experimental work. His relatives owned the well-known Langfelder machine manufacturing plant in Budapest; but after the Nazi coup the family had to relinquish the manufacturing plant to the Goering concern. During his conversations with the cell mate Langfelder, the "Austrian" found out that he knew the sister and cousin of Langfelder's mother in Rumania.

Langfelder had also reported that he, together with a Swedish Legation Secretary, had been arrested by the Russians in Budapest.

The "Austrian" told me that the "Swede" surely was no diplomat but a representative for a more or less private Jewish Mission who were to protect the legal interests of Jews in Budapest.

"The Austrian" also reported that the "Swede" -- he had not heard his name -- had had large sums of money with him.

Like other fellow prisoners of Wallenberg's he had been called in for new interrogations on 27 July 1947. At that time the Russians asked him about Langfelder and what the latter had reported about the "Swede." When the "Austrian" related this interrogation it seemed to me that I recognized the interrogator again as General Karbulo, whom I had seen several times in Krasnogorsk. It was he who had signed the order for my arrest and the sentence.

The Austrian, the Finn, and I were cell mates in cell 287 in Butyrka until 24 April 1951.

That day the Finn and I were sentenced to 25 years in prison.

When the sentence was pronounced, I was sitting in one of the so-called waiting cells in the subterranean floor of the prison. The guards called out our names. The walls were not thick so I could hear the names of some of my closest cell-neighbors. That is where I heard that the Czech was placed in the cell next to me.

The Czech yelled; "Muller, how much did you get." I answered "25 years."

The Czech; "Me too, Muller, where are you from?"

I spoke about my hometown and he about his. When the guards observed that we were talking with each other they warned us.

Swiss Witnesses Knew "The Swede"

On 20 March I came to cell No 13, where I, as mentioned before, again became cell mates with the Finn. On 15 April we were transferred to cell 51 or 52 in Vladimir prison's main building. There we met a Swiss prisoner H, who, a few months before had been sentenced to 25 years just as we had.

The Swiss knew also about the Langfelder story. That was why he was always placed in solitary confinement or together with some "like us."

The Swiss had landed in a Russian prison because he had voluntarily served in Himmler's Waffen SS, first at the Finnish front and later with the Reichssicherheitshauptamt [Gestapo Supreme Headquarters] outside Berlin. He had, however, "played for high stakes," and at the same time worked for the Allied Information Service, with which he kept in contact through cipher-letters via Switzerland. Toward the end of the war he was ordered to Rumania, where he was arrested by the Russians, after NKVD agents kidnapped him from Schweizerhaus [Swiss House] in Bucharest, where he sought protection.

The Swiss also reported on a German named Roedel, who had been a cell mate of both Langfelder and Wallenberg. Langfelder had previously given me information about this German and had stated that he had become very good friends with him. Roedel had stated that he was Legation Consul first class and deputy minister in Bucharest. He was often called in for interrogations in the prison but was well treated by the Russians; Langfelder supposed that this was because he had given them valuable information.

The Swiss now gave me different information: Roedel had been Chief of the Sicherheitsdienst (SD), Himmler's and Heydrich's hated police organization. The Swiss knew this, because Roedel had been his chief. As Himmler's ranking representative in Rumania he was responsible for the extermination of Jews in that country.

When Langfelder was transferred, Wallenberg replaced him as cell mate to this SD man.

(The Jew murderer Koedel and the Jew rescuer Wallenberg shared a cell. Moscow's motive for this was surely to utilize the war prisoner, who had been sentenced to death, as cell spy. He was lured with promises that he could prolong his life by spying on his fellow prisoners. Neither Langfelder nor Wallenberg knew anything about his past, but Langfelder observed that he was so subservient to the Russians that Langfelder said to him that that was beneath his dignity as a legation consul.

Many of the witnesses in Muller's report have been released from imprisonment, among them the Swiss, the Austrian, and the Finn. Immediately after returning home they were questioned by the State Police or Red Cross representatives in their respective countries. They spontaneously reported that they met a Swedish diplomat or his chauffeur. When they were later questioned by representatives of the Department of Foreign Affairs, it appeared that their testimony coincided in all major points with that of Muller's.

Some of Muller's fellow-prisoners and cowitnesses have disappeared or died in prison. As for the "Czech" (mentioned earlier in this series of articles), we do not know if he has returned. If not, he is still behind the Iron Curtain. Those who died in prison were either very old or war criminals. Among these was Koedel.

When he had nothing more to report to the interrogators, and did not succeed in obtaining proof against Wallenberg and Langfelder, he became of no value to Moscow.

"He was treated well by the Russians," Langfelder maintained.

He died in a slave labor camp in 1949. K. Philipp).

Continuation of Muller's Narrative

During the fall of 1953 I was transferred back and forth between various prisons. The long journey home had started. In a transient camp I met a female fellow-prisoner -- she is now my wife.

When Eberhard Muller concluded his report, several hours had passed. My fingers, not used to writing with a pen, were numb and tired.

I read the protocol. Muller affirmed that it was faithful to his dictation by signing it. Vice counsul Benkt Ljunglin was a cowitness.

Neither Benkt nor I wanted Mr. and Mrs. Muller to hurry to a department store and later to the station to take the long, and possibly dangerous, return trip.

I proposed instead that the Mullers take a room in my hotel, rest in peace and quiet, take a bath, change from old clothes to new ones, have a beautiful evening with a visit to the movies, and travel home well rested the next day.

I waved the objections that it would cost too much. Karl Evert Sundblad had given me a blank check to do everything for his old friend, Eberhard. Surely some day the Mullers could reciprocate.

First we all drove to my hotel, obtained a room and a couple keys. The registration was accomplished.

We took care of the marketing and returned to the hotel. Benkt and I accompanied Mr. and Mrs. Muller to their door.

The next morning Benkt arrived very early. We went to the Mullers' room and helped them pack. I read the protocol aloud once more. Muller testified again that everything agreed with what he had reported. He wrote a receipt for all the presents I had left for him in the name of Karl Evert. During the night he had written a letter to his old friend.

Muller would not throw away his old clothes. There were many packages to keep track of; therefore I got the cardboard suitcase which I had bought at Tempo in Stockholm before leaving. Then we said good-bye.

Two hours later I was sitting with Benkt in a locked room at the General Counsulate dictating the report to the cabinet secretary. The Mullers had now been on the other side of the border for an hour. There was a knock on the door. Benkt went out.

A few minutes later he came back.

Somebody telephoned the consulate and asked excitedly if there was an attache there with a green CD [Diplomatic Corps] automobile. The deputy answered that there were hundreds of such autos in Berlin and put the receiver down. It must have been Muller.

Something had gone amiss.

"If it is Muller he is trying to contact you or me, I answered. Either he is coming to the hotel or he is going to the home of the German, where he wrote the protocol. Muller knows that address. He has a good memory.

Benkt drove me to the hotel and continued to the home of the German.

The room clerk informed me that our 2 friends had returned and placed their baggage there, which they would call for later. I went up to the room and waited. After a while there was a knock at my door. In came Muller. His face revealed fear and hate. He went after me with his fists.

I forced him down in a chair and held his arms.

"What has happened, have you gone crazy?"

"You are a Russian spy," Muller yelled. "You have lured us here to get us arrested when we come home."

"How did you get such a wild idea?"

"When we came to the station my wife wanted to lock the suitcase, which you gave us this morning. The keys were tied to the handle with a piece of paperstring. Such are not to be found in West-Berlin, much less in rich Sweden. You took the suitcase along from the East Zone, but we are not stupid enough to be lured by you."

I asked him to take it easy and went to my suitcase to get a copy of the Swiss Sie und Er. It contained an article about an interview I had had about my work for Raoul's freedom. The article was illustrated with a picture of Raoul and myself. I gave the newspaper to Muller.

He first looked at the newspaper photos and then at me. Then he began to read. After a few seconds he had tears in his eyes.

he took my hand and asked my forgiveness. After that he hurried to get his wife, who evidently had been waiting at the door. he showed her the newspaper.

Mrs. Muller started to cry terribly, hysterically. Then she slumped down on the couch and buried her head in the corner.

When she had become more quiet, she said:

"This is God's will. We should not return to the East Zone. We stayed there because we lacked courage and because we were comfortable there. There we have a room, a typewriter, and a little bread. We can start all over in West Germany, even if we may have to live in barracks for a few years, separated from each other."

Muller asked:

"Can you help us stay here? Can you really help us?"

I promised to do what I could to have Eberhard Muller and his wife recognized as political refugees and to get them "hometown rights" and working permits in one of the states in the Federal Republic.

Two years have passed. Eberhard Muller and his wife are living in modest circumstances in West Germany. They believe in the future. A few weeks ago they got one room where mama and papa and their one-year old child can be together.

Muller does not dare to write to the children of his first marriage. They are living on the other side of the border, growing up as "pioneers." In their father they would see only a class enemy and capitalist lackey.

Koerhard Muller is grateful that "Mr. Berg from Stockholm" alias Rudolph Philipp came his way. I, who played "Mr. Berg," am very grateful that a couple of paperstrings on a suitcase from Tempo saved Mr. Muller, gave him freedom and enabled him to recollect from his phenomenal mind so many facts from his prison years. Even the data Muller had obtained "second hand" have proved surprisingly accurate when later compared with data provided by returning eyewitnesses.

In a few cases Muller's data have been inaccurate as far as the exact time is concerned, sometimes a few days or weeks. But who could account for every single day without the assistance of calendars, notebooks, pens (or pencils) over a period of 10 years? According to Muller's recollection of Langfelder's report, Raoul Wallenberg and Langfelder were supposed to have arrived at the Lubyanka Prison on 6 February 1945. Raoul's first cell mate, a German attache, whose regards from Raoul constituted the data that instigated my series of articles, testified that it was 31 January. (In the next issue: Agents, Provocators, and Prostitutes.)

FIGURE CAPTIONS

[pages 14 and 15, original]

They hope and fight. The mother of the imprisoned Raoul Wallenberg, Mrs. Maj von Dardel, and his stepfather, and the present guardian of Raoul's estate, Overdirektör [General Director] Frederick von Dardel, confer with the author, Rudolph Philipp. A constant stream of new testimony arrives in connection with Wallenberg's imprisonment. All of it confirms that Raoul is in a Russian prison.

The family is now excitedly waiting to find out if the Russians' detailed investigation will result in the positive solution of Raoul's case.

[page 16, original]

Vilmos Langfelder, Raoul's chauffeur. Even he is still in a Russian prison according to the testimony of witnesses.

[page 17 left, original]

Raoul Wallenberg, "A good comrade" said witnesses -- (fellow prisoners of Wallenberg's home-bound from Russian prisons) -- about Wallenberg.

[page 17 middle, original]

Witness "Muller": contact with Langfelder or Wallenberg, brought about sharper punishment in Russia.

[page 17 right, original]

Benkt Ljunglin, Swedish official of the Department of Foreign Affairs, helped Philipp obtain Muller's sensational testimony.

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

Control: 4215
Rec'd: February 7, 1957
11:56 a.m.

Action
EUR

Info
RMR
SS
G
SI
C
L
P
UOI
SCA
SY
CLI
OCB
USIA
CIA
OSD
NIC

FROM: Stockholm

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 843, February 7, 3 p.m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 843; REPEATED INFORMATION MOSCOW 23.

Am informed that Swedish Government will announce this evening Russian reply to Swedish representations re Wallenberg case. Reply states that following exhaustive investigations report doctor of Lubianka wrote Minister of Security in July 1947 has been discovered stating Wallenberg had died. Doctor was instructed to have his body cremated. Reply states doctor dead points out many wrongful acts of minister for which he since executed and deeply regrets affair.

Foreign Office has no clear evidence Wallenberg alive after 1947 and is inclined to believe Russian story since Russians did not know Swedes lacked clear evidence of Wallenberg's whereabouts after 1947. They point out how extraordinary it was for Russians to admit having held Wallenberg after so many details.

CABOT

BF MJH/6

201-5-925

walleng file

CONFIDENTIAL

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Wallenberg file - 4 Feb 57

Wallenberg Story Disputed

International News Service

A former Soviet secret police official yesterday branded Moscow's official explanation of the disappearance and death of Swedish diplomat Raoul Wallenberg as a "misstatement of facts from beginning to end."

The Soviet claim that the arrest and death of Wallenberg in a Russian prison was the fault of Victor S. Abakumov, former Minister for State Security, was challenged by Yuri Rastorov, former lieutenant colonel in the Soviet Secret Police.

The Kremlin this week admitted that Wallenberg had been held a prisoner in Moscow and claimed he died of a heart attack in his cell in 1947.

Rastvorov appeared before the staff of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee Friday and his testimony was made public yesterday.

Rastvorov said he had known Abakumov from the time he entered the security service in 1943, and that at the time of Wallenberg's arrest in 1944 Abakumov was "not the Minister" in charge.

He said the security chief at that time was Gen. Merkolov, who later was executed with Secret Police Boss Lavrenti P. Beria.

Rastvorov said Abakumov was appointed to the top post in late 1946, and was Minister when, according to the Kremlin account Wallenberg died of a heart attack in prison.

Abakumov, himself, was imprisoned in 1951 by Beria for alleged "social crimes" which included "unlawful accumulation of several million rubles worth of property in Germany." At that time, Beria recalled Merkolov to the Minister's post.

The witness said that three years later, after Beria had been shot these charges were dropped in favor of what he termed a "new obviously ridiculous one" that he was one of the participants in the Beria plot.

Rastvorov said Abakumov's trial was secret and he "merely disappeared."

Feb 57

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

SECRET

53-51
Action

Control: 4465
Rec'd: FEBRUARY 7, 1957
4:44 PM

ECR
Info
RMR
SS
S
SP
R

FROM: MOSCOW

TO: Secretary of State

S/S

NO: 1914, FEBRUARY 7, 7 PM

SENT DEPARTMENT 1914, REPEATED INFORMATION STOCKHOLM 20

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION.

SWEDISH AMBASSADOR TOLD ME TODAY THAT YESTERDAY HE WAS HANDED AIDE-MEMOIRE FROM GROMYKO ON WALLENBERG CASE WHICH STATED THAT ALTHOUGH NO RECORD OF WALLENBERG COULD BE FOUND IN REGULAR FILES SOVIET GOVERNMENT, A SPECIAL SEARCH SUPPLEMENTARY RECORDS PRISON HAD REVEALED A HANDWRITTEN NOTE FROM DOCTOR AT LUBIANKA PRISON TO ABAKUMOV INFORMING HIM OF DEATH FROM HEART ATTACK OF WALLENBERG ON JULY 17, 1947 AND A NOTE, LIKEWISE HANDWRITTEN, FROM ABAKUMOV IN REPLY ORDERING BODY TO BE CREMATED WITHOUT AUTOPSY. AIDE-MEMOIRE CONTINUED THAT ABAKUMOV, WHO WAS SUBSEQUENTLY EXECUTED FOR ANTI-SOVIET ACTIVITIES, HAD BEEN OBVIOUSLY MISLEAD MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ON WALLENBERG CASE WHICH WAS WHY THEY HAD NO PREVIOUS INFORMATION. PRISON DOCTOR HAD DIED IN 1953 AND THERE WAS NO POSSIBILITY OBTAINING ANY FURTHER DETAILS THIS MATTER. AIDE-MEMOIRE CONCLUDED WITH EXPRESSION SINCERE REGRETS TO SWEDISH GOVERNMENT AND THROUGH GOVERNMENT TO FAMILY.

SINCE SWEDISH GOVERNMENT WILL MAKE SOME FORM ANNOUNCEMENT OF THIS, AMBASSADOR ASKED THIS TO BE HELD IN CONFIDENCE UNTIL THAT TIME.

AMBASSADOR BELIEVES THIS IS PART SOVIET ATTEMPT RE-ESTABLISH BETTER RELATIONS WITH SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES (IMPAIRED BY HUNGARIAN EVENTS) WHICH HE HAD SENSED AT TIME VISIT [illegible] PRIME MINISTER. HE BELIEVES UNUSUAL ADMISSION [illegible] DUE SOVIET DESIRE [illegible]

AIR POUCH

PACK IT

CONFIDENTIAL
(Security Classification)

DO NOT TYPE IN THIS SPACE
758.00(W)/2-867

FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

903
DESP. NO.

FROM : Embassy, STOCKHOLM

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

February 8, 1957
DATE

REF :

SY-2 S/AE-2 NO-1

For Dept. Use Only	ACTION	DEPT.	RM/R-2 ICA-10 EUR-5 NEA-4 S/P-1 C-1 IO-2
	OCI-10	INFO OTHER	USIA-16 OSD-2 ARMY-35 NAVY-30 AFR-24 CIA-16 OCB-2 SACLANT-1
	REC'D 2-11		

SUBJECT: JOINT WEEKLY NO. 6 - SECTION I - POLITICAL

1. Soviets Finally Reveal Wallenberg is Dead: (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

After years of official Swedish inquiries, the Soviets have finally disclosed that Raoul WALLENBERG, the Swedish diplomat and humanitarian, died in Lubianka prison in 1947 (two years after Soviet troops picked him up in Budapest). Deputy Foreign Minister GROMYKO handed a note to Swedish Ambassador SOHLMAN on February 6 explaining that after an intensive investigation it was learned that Wallenberg died of a heart condition on July 17, 1947, according to a physician's report to Minister of State Security ABAKUMOV (liquidated in the Beria purge). The Soviets blamed Abakumov for concealing Wallenberg's fate and expressed their regrets. Prime Minister ERLANDER presided over a press conference at 4 p.m., February 7 at which Foreign Minister UNDEN and former Foreign Office Secretary-General Arne LUNDEBERG were present to give the details of the Soviet reply on Wallenberg to the press. The story was first released to the Swedish public by radio at 7 p.m. last night. No story in contemporary Swedish history has received the press and radio play given the Soviet answer on Wallenberg. In general, the editorial reaction has been regretfully to admit that Wallenberg is dead but to question the Soviet interpretation. An official Swedish Government declaration stated, "It must be regretted that the Soviet reply contained such meager information." A whitebook on the entire case is expected soon. Wallenberg's mother and other relatives doubt that he is dead and both hope and insist he is still alive.

Comment: (CONFIDENTIAL) The Foreign Office indicated to the Ambassador that since it had no proof that Wallenberg was alive after 1947, it was inclined to believe the Soviet story. An official Government release indicated, however, that the Soviet reply was not fully satisfactory because it was so meager. The entire Swedish nation is moved by what it considers an act of Soviet barbarism.

2. Cabinet Reconstruction: Further Comment: (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

Discussion of the significance of the Cabinet shifts of February 1 (see Joint Weekly No. 5, February 1) has continued to occupy a prominent position in the Swedish press during the past week. The Government maintains that the

WORKING PARTY/mk
REPORTER

CONFIDENTIAL

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Retain in divisional files or destroy in accordance with security regulations.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING

2	4
3	5
	6

DATE : 3-6/MS/MFL/CG
8 FEB 57

FEB 9 0224 Z 57

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : [redacted]

ACTION : [redacted]

INFO : [redacted]

ROUTINE

PRECEDENCE

TO DIR [redacted]

INFO [redacted]

CITE [redacted]

1. ALTHOUGH NOT FAMILIAR ALL TRAFFIC RE [redacted] FEEL SOV NOTE TO SWEDES RE RAOUL WALLENBERG WARRANTS RECONSIDERATION PARAS 1 AND 2 OF REF. IN TERMS OVERALL [redacted] OBJECTIVES AND PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT CONSTANT STREAM SOV PROPAGANDA SINCE HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION CONCERNING WESTERN SUBVERSION, SABOTAGE AND ESPIONAGE, DO NOT BELIEVE SWEDE GOVT IF SO INCLINED SHOULD BE PERMITTED GLOSS OVER WALLENBERG AFFAIR PERMIT SOVS GET AWAY WITH RIDICULOUS CLAIM ALL ABAKHUMOV'S FAULT. THEREFORE SUGGEST FOLLOWING FOR DIR [redacted] CONSIDERATION:

201-5922

A. [redacted] REOPEN QUESTION WITH SWEDES ON BASIS INHUMAN ILLEGAL SOV TREATMENT WALLENBERG PLUS ARROGANT INSULTING ATTITUDE SOV GOVT TOWARDS SWEDEN FOR PAST 12 YEARS SHOULD HAVE CHANGED SWEDISH ATTITUDE [redacted]

B. IF SWEDES REMAIN ADAMANT [redacted] PROCEED EFFORTS OBTAIN OTHER SITE, INDICATE SWEDISH OBJECTIONS AND FRANKLY PUBLICIZE THESE AS INCOMPREHENSIBLE IN LIGHT WALLENBERG CASE.

C. [redacted] ARRANGE PICKUP THIS ITEM OTHER MEDIA WEST EUROPE.

2. OUR UNDERSTANDING ONE OF ORIGINAL OBJECTIVES [redacted] WAS COUNTERACT SOV COEXISTENCE DRIVE AND REQUEST USE SWEDEN FOR FRONT MEETINGS, AWAKEN

S-E-C-R-E-T

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE Copy No.

Orig filed
Jof 61-753/98
Box 24 Fol 3

201-5925

SWEDISH PUBLIC OPINION TRUE NATURE SOV THREAT AND CREATE POPULAR OPPOSITION TO SOV USE SWEDEN FURTHER PURELY SOV AIMS. IF THIS STILL ONE OF [redacted] OBJECTIVES FEEL COMBINATION WALLENBERG CASE AND SWEDISH REFUSAL [redacted] SHOULD BE EXPLOITED TO UTMOST.

END OF MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER NOTE: BEING SERVICED FOR REFERENCE.

SECRET

AIR

[redacted]

21-5-36/3

14 Feb 57

[redacted]

Chief, WX

INFO [redacted]

[redacted]PERATIONS

Proposed [redacted] Operation

REFERENCE [redacted] 1 February 1957

ACTION REQUIRED For your and the NEROS' information and comment

1. The [redacted] Press Review of 8 February 1957 stated that the Wallenberg affair has removed every other topic from the editorial pages of the Swedish press. The following excerpts from Swedish newspapers were cited as examples of the editorial reactions to the Soviets' announcement of Wallenberg's death:

"According to the liberal 'Dagens Nyheter,' it was to the interest of the Soviet leaders to wash their hands of the matter. And from their points of view, of course, their version of what happened is the best possible. 'Dagens Nyheter' continues: 'At the same time the statement from Moscow shed a terrible light on the Soviet regime itself, a factor of which the Russians seem to be entirely unaware. They did not grasp the likelihood that other people will inevitably conclude that Russian declarations are not to be relied upon. A year ago we were given brusquely worded statements that the Russians had no knowledge of Wallenberg's whereabouts. Now, the same authorities declare that he has been dead for 10 years and that his fate was in the hands of liars and traitors. What will we hear the next time? That the men who now rule the Soviet Union are also liars and traitors?'

"The leading Conservative paper, 'Svenska Dagbladet,' does not find the Soviet communique satisfactory either, but concludes that Wallenberg is no longer alive. 'Svenska Dagbladet' goes on to say: 'As pointed out by the Swedish Foreign Office, the Soviet note is meagerly worded and cannot be regarded as final. However, it is far better to know this much than be tormented by uncertainty, and the

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201-5915
Wallenberg
file

fact that the Russians assume responsibility for Wallenberg. Their written regret is a welcome improvement on their previous attitude which caused so much sorrow and anxiety in Sweden. Public opinion in this country, however, is not going to forget what has happened.'

"According to the trade union newspaper, 'Stockholms-Tidningen,' the Russians worded their note in such a way that they can always say later that they had picked the wrong man. On the other hand, all that we know of Soviet methods and conditions up to now would seem to confirm the accuracy of the Russian version.

"'Stockholms-Tidningen' writes: 'Irrespective of how the delayed Russian reply is judged, we can hardly write off the matter as closed. We are entitled to demand better and more detailed information on why Wallenberg was arrested, of what he was accused, and what happened to him during his imprisonment. We may assume that the Swedish government will be receptive to all new evidence that may help to clarify this matter, not least because of the (unreserved) wording of the Russian communique.'

"We do not know what to believe, writes the Liberal paper, 'Handels-Tidningen,' which continues: 'The Russians have not told us everything. It would be just as well to have them give us the rest of the story. Whichever individuals were responsible for Wallenberg's imprisonment and death, in the eyes of the world the Soviet government is responsible for them all. Are we to believe that the present leaders who like to impress the world with their authority were overruled by some minor authorities within arms length?'"

2. It occurred to Headquarters that the current feelings over the Wallenberg Case might present an opportune time to exploit the disappearance of Arne Munch-Petersen. The above listed reactions of the Swedish press should give some indication on how the Danes might react to a reopening of Munch-Petersen's disappearance. We realize that it has been twenty years since Munch-Petersen disappeared in the Soviet Union and that he is probably just about forgotten by the Danish people, but Ad's reference to him in referenced dispatch indicates that his disappearance is still in the minds of some people. We suggest that you discuss this with the NIROB. Perhaps they can offer some additional background information which will determine the practicability of such an idea.

[redacted]

[redacted]

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted] S
1 - [redacted] C/WE
2 - [redacted]

SECRET [redacted] C/WE-1

H. Farmer admitted under questioning last week that, if elected, he would vote against at least that clause of his party's bill which promises complete decontrol of 800,000 higher-priced dwellings.

The Psychological Emigrant

Great Britain has a high standard of living, full employment, political freedom, womb-to-tomb medical care, and as much peace as most nations in the world. Why should a Briton want to leave home? Yet when the Gallup poll (published last week) asked, "If you were free to do so, would you like to go and settle in another country?", 41% of the Britons polled answered yes, and another 12% said they were not sure.

This is no sudden mood. In 1948, when Britain was still suffering from war-spawned austerity, 42% of Britons answered yes to the same question. When 35% were still saying yes in 1950, many thoughtful Britons concluded that sentiment on emigration was gradually returning to normal. Today, in the aftermath of the Suez debacle, emigration sentiment is once again on the rise.

According to Gallup's analysis, the wishful emigrants spread across all levels of politics, income and education. A recent poll of Cambridge undergraduates in their last two years showed that among men students 11.3% had definitely decided to go, and another 27.6% were seriously considering leaving. Among women students, 34.1% had made up their minds to leave. Most favored goals: Canada 39%, Africa 10.5%, the U.S. and Australia about 8% each. Said one student: "I want to go to a country where new ideas are needed, so that I can give something to that country rather than just live off it."

Except during the Depression years, actual migration from Britain has always been high (an average 150,000 a year), but the vast majority of those who now say they want to go will never leave. They will go on, as now, behaving on the job as if "there's no future in it"; they have given up hope of making for themselves in Britain the kind of life they want. In short, the main limiting factor on opportunity in Britain's welfare state is that so many of its people believe there is no real opportunity. The debilitating mood of the psychological emigrant pervades the country.

RUSSIA

Down With the *Piatiletki*

To change horses—the peasant plow horse for the horse of heavy industry—that is the goal . . . of the Five-Year Plan.
—Stalin (1933)

At the beginning of Soviet Russia's leap from a plow-horse to a horsepower economy, the Five-Year Plan, or *Piatiletka*, was a dramatic slogan as well as an effective method of primitive state planning. But when the sixth *Piatiletka* arrived last year, the word had lost its power for millions of Russian workers, case-hardened by 30 years of ceaseless urging to achieve ever higher production norms. Last week the Soviet leaders indicated that they were ready to drop the old *Piatiletki* for a more relaxed method of planning and executing the progress of their national economy.

At a joint session of the Supreme Soviet (Russia's rubber-stamp legislature), Economic Boss Mikhail Pervukhin admitted that scores of economic targets set for 1956 had not been achieved. Then Pervukhin made, for a Soviet leader, a surprising statement: instead of scolding the workers, he blamed the *Piatiletka* planners. They had placed too much emphasis on oversized industrial complexes, particularly in the coal, steel and chemical industries. Pervukhin promised that industrial targets for 1957 would be lowered by nearly 4% on previous planning, with continued emphasis on heavy industry. More important than the substance of Pervukhin's announcement was the principle involved: the Soviet leaders were scrapping the rigid Five-Year-Plan system for a realistic *ad hoc* economy more in line with the West.

One reason for the sought-after economic flexibility is the crisis in the satellites. Pervukhin ordered new efforts to be made in coal, fuel and cement production in western Russia, to compensate for deliveries no longer coming from Poland and Hungary. Another reason is the need for a new approach to the problem of defense. The declaration that the 1957 defense appropriation is $24 billion (down 5.6% from 1956) was an obvious attempt to invite comparison with the U.S. defense budget (estimated for 1957 at $41 billion). Actually, there has been no reduction in the Soviet's armed forces, and the trend, as in the U.S., has been toward more highly specialized equipment (e.g., guided missiles and submarines)—suggesting increased rather than decreased defense spending.

Only one hint of the Soviet Union's vastly stepped-up nuclear program (five bombs exploded since August 1956) was given by Pervukhin: an order to rush work on big electric-power projects—essential to atomic development—at Kuybyshev, Saratov and Stalingrad (on the Volga) and Kairak-Kum, Irkutsk and Novosibirsk (in Siberia). Something speedier and more pliable than the old *Piatiletki* was needed to harness these horses.

The Wolves

With hundreds of key operators working under diplomatic immunity in foreign embassies, the Soviet MVD's foreign-intelligence section has long been the world's biggest and busiest espionage organization. But allied counter-espionage agencies are beginning to lox in the Russians. Since 1950 the U.S. has declared 13 Soviet diplomatic employees *persona non grata*. The practice has spread to Holland, Denmark and Sweden, which have recently demanded the withdrawal of suspected Soviet embassy spies. Last month the FBI, arresting Jacob Albam and Myra and Jack Soble on charges of being Soviet agents (TIME, Feb. 4), hinted that it had evidence of a vast spy network "involving Soviet officials."

No one expected Russia's MVD to take this kind of treatment lying down. In December the Soviet U.N. delegate laid the basis for a counterattack by charging that the U.S. was using subversive tactics in the satellite nations and Russia. While

ACCUSED SPIES IN MOSCOW
Too much Munich.

the U.N. deferred the debate, the MVD planned other reprisals. A fortnight ago the Soviet Foreign Office ordered the expulsion of two U.S. assistant Army attaches from the U.S. embassy in Moscow. Last week it followed this up by demanding the withdrawal of two U.S. assistant naval attachés. To substantiate its clumsy charge that the naval aides were spies, the MVD had arranged for them to be assaulted by a civilian mob in an open Leningrad street, under pretense that they had been caught red-handed in subversive activity against the Soviet regime.

The MVD's biggest surprise reprisal was strictly a TV spectacular. Called to Moscow's House of Journalists one morning last week, 200 foreign and Communist correspondents found batteries of klieg lights and TV cameras focused on four pale men surrounded by a curious array of pistols, explosives, maps, Soviet currency, miniature radio transmitters, parachutes and poison pills. Soviet Foreign Ministry Press Chief Leonid Ilyichev identified the four men as Russian refugees, recruited as spies by the U.S. and parachuted into the Soviet Union in 1954 and 1955.

As the TV cameras bore down on their white faces, each man in turn told his fantastic tale. Said one: "In order to turn us into obedient servants and make us forget our love for our mother country, the Americans encouraged drinking, gambling and bad language among us and even took us to Munich to visit immoral houses to enjoy ourselves." Beetle-browed Press Chief Ilyichev tied the show to the Soviet maneuver in the U.N. with a long commercial charging the U.S. with waging a "secret war" of subversion and espionage against the peace-loving Soviet Union. Said Ilyichev: "When you live with wolves, you must be a wolf."

"Well Taken Care Of"

For almost twelve years Russia and its Baltic neighbor, Sweden, have been in a bitter dispute over the disappearance of Raoul Wallenberg, a slender, balding Swedish-legation attaché who was picked up by Russian secret police in Budapest near the end of World War II. When the NKVD drove him off to Marshal Malinovsky's headquarters on Jan. 17, 1945, Wallenberg said: "I'm going to Malinovsky's . . . whether as a guest or prisoner I do not know yet." Those were the last words ever heard from him.

Raoul Wallenberg was no ordinary diplomat. The polylingual, much-traveled son of a wealthy Swedish banker, he had begun his diplomatic career only some six months earlier after a quiet meeting in Stockholm with U.S. Minister Herschel Johnson and Iver Olson, representative of Franklin Roosevelt's War Refugee Board in Sweden. Olson and Johnson put the mission to Wallenberg simply: Would he go to Budapest as a member of the neutral Swedish-legation staff and, using U.S. funds, try to save Hungary's remaining 300,000-odd Jews (prewar Hungarian Jewish population: 800,000) from Nazi gas chambers or slave-labor camps? Wallenberg was warned that if the Germans or the Hungarian puppet government learned of his work, nothing could be done to save him. "If I can help," said Raoul Wallenberg, "if I can save a single person, I will go."

With Zeal & Energy. Wallenberg went. He arrived in Budapest listed officially as third secretary of the Swedish legation, his luggage bulging with information on Hungarian underground agents and secretly pro-Allied officials of the Hungarian government. Operating with enormous zeal and energy, he persuaded Hungarian officials that if a Jew claimed neutral citizenship he should not be deported until the truth of his claim had been established. This done, he promptly affixed to

THE LATE RAOUL WALLENBERG
Not as a guest.

the homes of some 20,000 such Jews signs that read, "Under the Protection of the Swedish Legation." He rented 32 houses in Budapest in the name of the Swedish legation, packed them with other Jews; he issued thousands of "protective passports" to still others, finally became so bold that on several occasions he bluffed Gestapo or SS guards into releasing Jews already loaded aboard freight cars for deportation or worse.

Inevitably, the purposeful young (32) diplomat came under Gestapo surveillance. Just before the Russians entered Budapest in January 1945, he went underground. When the Russians arrived, he made contact with Marshal Malinovsky, Red Army commander on the Hungarian front, who advised Stockholm, via Moscow: ". . . Diplomat Raoul Wallenberg well taken care of by army authorities."

Without Post-Mortem. Then the curtain descended. Shortly after Wallenberg was picked up by the NKVD, a Russian official in Stockholm declared: "Wallenberg is not really a prisoner. He committed some follies after liberation therefore he had to be taken care of. He will return soon safe and sound."

After that, while the Swedish Foreign Office kept up a steady barrage of protests, and Swedish public opinion angrily demanded Wallenberg's release, Moscow said nothing. Last week the Soviets finally broke the silence. Raoul Wallenberg, Soviet officials told the Swedish government, died of a heart attack in Lubianka prison on July 17, 1947, nearly ten years ago. His arrest and detention, they said, were undoubtedly the result of "the criminal activities" of then State Security Chief Viktor Abakumov, who was executed in 1954 for "crimes against Soviet laws" as an accomplice of his boss, Lavrenty Beria. There was, the Russians said, a report to Abakumov from Colonel A. L. Smoltsov, chief of the Lubianka medical service, certifying Wallenberg's death, and adding that the body had been ordered cremated without a post-mortem.

Best guess as to why the Russians really had imprisoned Wallenberg in the first place was that he had worked out an elaborate plan for the restoration of Jewish property seized by the Germans, and the Russians wanted to seize it for themselves. What had actually caused his death could only be inferred from the fact that the Soviets blamed all on that old scapegoat, Security Chief Abakumov, without benefit of post-mortem.

RED CHINA

A Many-Fingered Thing

Classic poetry, a favorite preoccupation of scholars, has been in low repute in China since the advent of Communism. The subtle ideograms of the poet's traditional language have little in common with the blunt ideologies of modern Marxism, and for that reason China's top Communist, Mao Tse-tung, has long had to dissemble the fact that he is a workaday poet himself.

In recent months, however, Mao's China, desperately in need of brain power, has spread the word that the old, traditionally trained scholars it used to hector are not so bad after all. "Let diverse schools of thought contend," was the way the official policymakers put it. Last week, in line with the effort to make the classics acceptable, humble Chinese were getting a look at 18 of Mao's own classic poems, all set out in a new poetry magazine. "There is nothing outstanding about them," said Mao modestly, "but since you consider the poems publishable, let us proceed."

Sample Mao classic, written during the famed Red "long march" to Yenan.

Skies high and clouds sparse,
The eye encompasses the end of the horizon.
He who does not reach the great wall is not a man.
A mere count of the fingers reveals twenty thousand miles covered.

Wallenberg File.

19/2/57

NY DAG

Grönvall och Sohlman intervjuade av Ny Dag

Wallenberg under förhören [illegible]

— Från vår korrespondent KARL EZAF —

[illegible]

[illegible] Ny Dags [illegible] att [illegible] Wallenberg [illegible]

[illegible] Wallenberg [illegible] i det [illegible] material [illegible] i [illegible] tagit [illegible] i [illegible] i [illegible] i



19 Feb 59

201-592.5

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA AIR (Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. [redacted]

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO: [redacted]

DATE 20 FEB 57 10 27z

FROM Chief, WE

INFO [redacted]

SUBJECT { GENERAL HERO/OPERATIONS
SPECIFIC Proposed [redacted] Operation

REFERENCE [redacted] February 1957

ACTION REQUIRED For your and the [redacted] information and comment

Raow

1. The KUCLAM Press Review of 8 February 1957 stated that the Wallenberg affair has removed every other topic from the editorial pages of the Swedish press. The following excerpts from Swedish newspapers were cited as examples of the editorial reactions to the Soviets' announcement of Wallenberg's death:

"According to the liberal 'Dagens Nyheter,' it was to the interest of the Soviet leaders to wash their hands of the matter. And from their points of view, of course, their version of what happened is the best possible. 'Dagens Nyheter' continues: 'At the same time the statement from Moscow shed a terrible light on the Soviet regime itself, a factor of which the Russians seem to be entirely unaware. They did not grasp the likelihood that other people will inevitably conclude that Russian declarations are not to be relied upon. A year ago we were given brusquely worded statements that the Russians had no knowledge of Wallenberg's whereabouts. Now, the same authorities declare that he has been dead for 10 years and that his fate was in the hands of liars and traitors. What will we hear the next time? That the men who now rule the Soviet Union are also liars and traitors?'

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(Releasing officer) (Coordinating officer) (Authenticating officer)

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-29
JUN 1949

[redacted]

fact that the Russians assume responsibility for Wallenberg. The written regret is a welcome improvement on their previous attitude which caused so much sorrow and anxiety in Sweden. Public opinion in this country, however, is not going to forget what has happened

"According to the trade union newspaper, 'Stockholm-Tidningen' the Russians worded their note in such a way that they can always say later that they had picked the wrong man." On the other hand, all that we know of Soviet methods and conditions up to now would seem to confirm the accuracy of the Russian version.

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[redacted]

14 Feb 57

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
2 - [redacted]

21/2/57

Svensk svarsnot om Wallenberg
UD hoppas på nya klarläggande

Den svenska svarsnoten på Sovjetunionens memorandum angående Raoul Wallenbergs död överlämnades på tisdagen av ambassadör Rolf Sohlman till utrikesministeriet i Moskva. Noten var av följande lydelse:

» I sitt memorandum den 6 februari 1957 har Sovjetunionens regering förklarat, att av dess utredningar rörande den svenske beskickningssekreteraren Raoul Wallenberg den slutsatsen bör dragas, att Wallenberg avled i ett fängelse i Moskva natten till den 17 juli 1947. Ansvaret för den svenske diplomatens kvarhållande i fängelse och för de oriktiga uppgifter, som sålesedan den 18 augusti 1947 under en lång följd av år lämnats den svenska regeringen, läggas på de sovjetiska säkerhetsorganen och Sovjetunionens regering uttalar sitt uppriktiga beklagande av vad som har inträffat. Tillika meddelas, att den person i säkerhetstjänstens ledning, som varit den närmast ansvarige för övergreppet mot Wallenberg, har för grova brott dömts till döden och avrättats.

Svensk opinion upprörd

Svensk opinion är med rätta upprörd över vad som förekommit i denna ask. Om den sovjetiska säkerhetstjänsten kunnat handla så egenmäktigt, att den gjort ett neutralt lands diplomatiska tjänsteman till fånge och hållit honom i fängelse under 2½ år utan att rapportera därom till sovjetregeringen eller till utrikesministeriet, så är detta i och för sig ett förhållande, för vilket sovjetregeringen icke kan avlasta sig ansvaret. Genom sitt beklagande har sovjetregeringen också erkänt sitt ansvar. Härtill kommer att så länge Wallenberg var internerad i olf fängelse i Moskva, sovjetregeringen icke kan ha varit ur stånd att i anledning av de många demarcherna från svensk sida skaffa sig tillförlitliga upplysningar i saken, ifall den hade verkställit de noggranna undersökningar, som den försäkrat svenska regeringen upprepade gånger att den företagit.

Påminnelser

Det får i detta sammanhang erinras om att ambassadören Sohlman senast dagen före den, som uppgivits för Raoul Wallenbergs död, i Sovjetunionens utrikesministerium påminde om Wallenberg. Dessförinnan hade omkring tjugo svenska påminnelser gjorts i denna fråga i Moskva, efter det vice utrikesminister Dekanosov den 16 januari 1945 skriftligen meddelat den svenska beskickningen i Moskva, att Wallenberg påträffats och ställts under sovjetryskt beskydd.

Nytt material?

att tro, att all annan dokumentation rörande Wallenbergs vistelse i sovjetiska fängelser än den rapport, som omnämnes i sovjetregeringens memorandum, skulle vara helt utplånad. Den förväntar därför att, om ytterligare material framkommer i Sovjetunionen, som kan klarlägga vad som hänt Wallenberg, detta delgives det svenska utrikesdepartementet. Å sin sida förbehåller sig den svenska regeringen att ställa till förfogande det ytterligare material rörande Wallenberg, som av den svenska regeringen bedömes vara av betydelse för fortsatta undersökningar i Sovjetunionen.»

21 Feb 57

201-9022

211635 STOCKHOLM, FE[illegible]Y 21 - (SPECIAL BY CAB[illegible] AUR) - FOLLOWING ISTEXT OF NOTE DELIVERED TO SOVIET FORIEGN MINISTRY BY SWEIDSH AMBASSADOR ROLF SOHLMAN ON FEBRUARY 19:

RFE 17 2·21· 5

"IN A MEMORANDUM OF FEBRUARY 6TH 1957 THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT DECLARED THAT FROM THE INVESTIGATION REGARDING THE SWEDISH SECRETARY OF LEGATION RAOUL WALLENBERG THE CONCLUSION OUGHT TO BE DRAWN THAT WALLENBERG DIED IN A PRISON IN MOSCOW DURING THE NIGHT JULY 16TH-17TH 1947. THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR DETAINING THE SWEDISH DIPLOMAT IN PRISON AND FOR THE INCORRECT INFORMATION WHICH HAS BEEN GIVEN THE SWEDISH GOVERNMENT FOR MANY YEARS SINCE AUGUST 18TH, 1947 IS LAID ON THE SOVIET SECURITY AGENCIES. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAS EXPRESSED THEIR SINCERE REGRET AT WHAT HAS HAPPENED. THEY HAVE FURTHER STATED THAT THE PERSON AMONG THE TOP OFFICIALS OF THE SECURITY SERVICE WHO WAS PRIMARILY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE AGGRESSION AGAINST WALLENBERG WAS SENTENCED TO DEATH, AND EXECUTED ON ACCOUNT OF SEVERE CRIMES. SWEDISH PUBLIC OPINION IS JUSTLY SHOCKED BY WHAT HAS OCCURRED IN THIS MATTER.

IF THE SOVIET SECURITY SERVICE WAS ABLE TO ACT IN SUCH AN AUTOCRATIC WAY AS TO MAKE A DIPLOMAT OF A NEUTRAL COUNTRY A PRISONER AND KEEP HIM IN PRISON FOR TWO AND A HALF YEARS WITHOUT REPORTING THE CASE TO THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT OR TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY THIS FACT IS NOT IN ITSELF A CIRCUMSTANCE FOR WHICH THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT CAN DISCLAIM RESPONSIBILITY. BY EXPRESSING THEIR REGRET THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAS ALSO ADMITTED THEIR

RESPONSIBILITY. TO THIS IS ADDED THE FACT THAT WHILE WALLENBERG WAS CONFINED IN A MOSCOW PRISON THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT CANNOT, CONSIDERING THE NUMEROUS SWEDISH APPEALS HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO OBTAIN RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE MATTER IF THEY HAD REALLY UNDERTAKEN THE THOROUGH INVESTIGATIONS THEY HAVE REPEATEDLY ASSURED THE SWEDISH GOVERNMENT THAT THEY HAD MADE.

IN THIS CONNECTION IT SHOULD BE RECALLED THAT AS LATE AS THE DAY BEFORE THE ONE REPORTED AS THE DAY OF WALLENBERGS DEATH, AMBASSADOR SOHLMAN REMINDED OF WALLENBERG IN THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY. BEFORE THAT OCCASION MOSCOW HAD BEEN REMINDED OF THIS MATTER SOME TWENTY TIMES AFTER JANUARY 16TH 1945 WHEN DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER DEKANOSOV INFORMED THE SWEDISH LEGATION IN MOSCOW THAT WALLENBERG HAD BEEN FOUND AND TAKEN IN SOVIET RUSSIAN CUSTODY.

THE SWEDISH GOVERNMENT FINDS IT DIFFICULT TO BELIEVE THAT ALL FURTHER DOCUMENTATION CONCERNING WALLENBERGS STAY IN SOVIET PRISON WITH EXCEPTION OF THE REPORT MENTIONED IN THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT MEMORANDUM SHOULD HAVE BEEN COMPLETELY OBLITERATED. THEY EXPECT THEREFORE THAT IF ANY FURTHER MATERIAL IS FOUND IN THE SOVIET UNION DESTINED TO CLARIFY WHAT HAPPENED TO WALLENBERG IT WILL BE COMMUNICATED TO THE SWEDISH MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS. THE SWEDISH GOVERNMENT ON THEIR SIDE RESERVE THE RIGHT TO COMMUNICATE FURTHER MATERIAL CONCERNING WALLENBERG THAT THE SWEDISH GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS OF IMPORTANCE FOR CONTINUED INVESTIGATIONS IN THE SOVIET UNION."

END MSG

1737

Wallenberg fei

DOXI rengör allt
Säljes hos NK
o. färghandlare
TEKN. FABR. NITOR AB

DAGENS NY
Fredagen den 22 Feb

Erlander...

(Forts. från sidan 1)

”Inte den bestulnes sak berätta var tjuvgodset finns”

Repliken återgavs i fru Bellanders minnesprotokoll från sammanträdet, som publiceras i senaste numret av Vecko-Journalen.

Protokollet innehåller en rad uppgifter om vad som yttrades under mötet utöver vad som tidigare framgått av advokat Yngve Scharfatts uttalande för Dagens Nyheter. Det visar sig bl a att statsminister Erlander fick en skarp tillrättavisning av hr Undén för att han i utrikesministerns frånvaro vågat uttala sig positivt om Wallenbergaktionens verksamhet.

Enligt protokollet förklarade hr Undén att Raoul Wallenberg mycket väl kunde ha omkommit under striderna vid Budapest, ett påstående som kommittén sondrev med att den genom sina vittnen visste att Raoul Wallenberg var i ryssfångenskap. Fru Bellander påpekade dessutom att ryssarna själva gett ett kvitto på att de har tagit Raoul Wallenberg.

Undén: "Men kan man förstå då varför de skulle hålla honom fängslad, fru Bellander?"

Fru Bellander: "De misstänkte honom för att vara spion. Ryssarna förstår ju inte något sådant som humanitärt arbete. De tyckte väl att det var något misstänkt med en människa som utsatte sig för den största livsrisk för att rädda främmande människor."

Ur det fortsatta samtalet kan följande repliker återges.

Undén: "Men hur kan ni begära att ryssarna skall kunna ta reda på var Raoul Wallenberg finns, om ni inte själva vill tala om det för dem?"

Fru Bellander: "Det är inte den bestulnes sak att berätta för tjuven var han lagt sitt tjuvgods! Det är ryssarna som har redovisningsskyldighet för oss, inte vi för dem. Och för resten, om vi skulle säga dem var Wallenberg fanns — i det fängelset och den cellen för fjorton dagar sedan — skulle de självklart förflytta honom till ett annat fängelse och säga: Han var tyvärr inte där."

Undén: "Den här så kallade Wallenbergaktionen vad ska den nu vara bra för? Den är bara till för att jaga upp en känslostorm hos allmänheten."

Fru Bellander: "Vi jagar inte upp en känslostorm. Vi stöder oss på fakta och bevis. Men det skulle nog inte skada med lite mera känsla i den här saken från er sida. Här tålas i ex hela tiden om 'fallet Wallenberg'. Det är inte ett fall utan en människa det gäller. För resten har vi nått ett resultat som det hittills inte lyckats UD att få. Vi har fått svar från ryssarna i augusti."

Undén: uppbragt: "Det var inte ett svar till aktionen, utan till UD efter vårt outtröttliga arbete, efter Söderbloms förfrågningar i Moskva."

Fru Bellander: "Vi får väl räkna det som femtio procent till oss var då."

Undén: "Femtio procent! Nej, vet fru Bellander, det är ju löjligt, femtio procent!"

Fru Bellander: "Jag citerar bara det statsministern sade till ingenjör von Dardel och mig då vi efter det ryska svaret besökte honom."

Undén vände sig häftigt mot Erlander: "Har du sagt det?"

Erlander generad: "Jo, det var när du var borttest i augusti som fru Bellander och ingenjör von Dardel var uppe hos mig, och då kom vi överens om att betrakta det så."

Undén mumlade förargat, och Erlander såg mycket deprimerad ut, heter det i protokollet.

Fru Bellander: "Vi kommer inte att uppge arbetet förrän vi nått ett resultat. Vi tror mer på uttalandet av fyra trovärdiga, aktade svenska medborgare, dvs undersökningskommitténs utsagor, är på svaret av en representant från en diktaturstat, som har all anledning att dra sig ifrån ansvaret."

Undén: "Menar fru Bellander att Vyshinskij ljuger?"

Fru Bellander: "Ja, det menar jag."

Undén: "De är ju oerhört! Det är ju oerhört!"

När vi bröl upp sade Anders Örne till Undén:

"Vi hoppas och tror att det skall komma den dag då svenska regeringen och UD ej skall kunna underlåta att kräva Raoul Wallenberg tillbaka."

22 F

VYN
22 Februari 1957

A EISI

'ÄTT

EPOTT

Erlander fick skrapa av Undén

Kan man förstå varför ryssarna skulle hålla Raoul Wallenberg fängslad?" frågade utrikesminister Undén fru Birgitta de Vylder-Bellander vid det beryktade sammanträdet på Kanslihuset den 3 november 1947 mellan å ena sidan stats- och utrikesministrarna och å andra sidan representanter för Raoul Wallenbergaktionen. Forts. sista sidan, spalt ett.

22 Feb 57

261-5,42 3

Referat av Wallenbergsamtal tendentiöst, säger hr Unden

Den framställning som Wallenbergsaktionen givit i Vecko-Journalen och som efter denna tidning i går återgavs i Dagens Nyheter av ett samtal 1947 mellan utrikesminister Unden och Wallenbergsaktionen betecknar hr Unden i ett uttalande i Morgon-Tidningen som "i hög grad tendentiös". Morgon-Tidningen frågar om advokat Schartaus referat av samtalet är riktigt och utrikesministern svarar:

— Naturligtvis inte, svarar hr Unden. Det är i hög grad tendentiöst. Men min ståndpunkt är att det var fråga om ett förtroligt samtal och att samtalet alltså inte varit avsett för offentligheten. Det har tydligen också varit hr Schartaus åsikt. Annars skulle han inte ha hållit sina anteckningar gömda i sitt kassaskåp i tio år.

Bakgrunden till samtalet var att regeringen ville i all vänlighet förmå Wallenbergskommitten att ställa sitt förment viktiga material till UD:s förfogande. Man klagade på UD:s bristande energi, men undanhöll departementet sitt material. Denna inställning hos kommitténs medlemmar förklarar att det var de som hade aggressivitet under samtalet. De bemötes förutom av mig av utrikesrådet Grafström som tvärtemot vad hr Schartau påstår gjorde flera inlägg under sammankomsten.

Kommitténs vägran att ge UD del av sitt material motiverades bland annat med att en tjänsteman i UD skulle ha sagt att vissa påstådda bevis inte var tillfredsställande. Detta uttalande skulle ha skadat saken gentemot Sovjet. Det är underligt att kommitten inte tycktes ha reflekterat över vilken skada som kunde vållas saken av sådana uttalanden som dess betrodde medhjälpare hr Philipp gjort i sin bok. Han hade skrivit om Wallenbergs mission i Budapest bland annat att Wallenberg tog alla den illegala kampens risker, tvekade aldrig inför en sådan kallad förfalskning eller ett så kallat bedrägeri osv.

Betecknande för hr Schartaus objektivitet är att han som stöd för [illegible]ligheten av hans eget och andras [illegible]g 1947 om bevisvärdet av det hemlighållna materialet åberopar de bägge justitieradens intyg 1956, som var grundat på ett helt annat material.

Morgon-Tidningen frågar hr Unden om han tagit del av det så [illegible]ade minnesprotokoll som fru Bellander återgett i Vecko-Journalen.

— Ja, jag har just ögnat igenom detta nya dokument. Anteckningarna är författade i ett högt känsloläge, för att uttrycka mig milt. Mina inlägg är till skillnad från de flesta andras karaktäriserade med varjehanda subjektiva uttryck, till exempel att jag rött till och blängde ilskt på hr Örne, att jag var generad, att jag yttrade mig i ironisk ton, att jag var häftig, uppbragt, påtagligt irriterad, att jag skrattade hånfullt. En replik av fru Bellander till statsministern kom honom att se deprimerad ut. Fru Bellander säger på min fråga om hon menade att Vysjinskij hade ljugit att det var hon som kommit med den berömda repliken: "Ja, det menar jag." I fru Mia Lecho-Lötgrens version var det Örne som yttrad detta. Fru Bellander förbättrar skildringen med förklaringen att jag efter repliken skulle ha sagt: "Det är ju oerhört. Det är ju oerhört." Vilket nonsens, slutar artikeln i MT.

Man kan undrar sig om att hr Unden i sitt uttalande uppehåller sig vid "tendenser" och "känsloläge", därmot kan utrikesministern inte bestrida att han fått de av såväl advokat Schartau som fru Bellander återgivna replikerna. Tvärtom bekräftar hr Unden att han ställde frågan om kommitten trodde att "Vysjinskij hade ljugit" — en fråga som numera inte heller utrikesministern skulle villa uppge.

Vad beträffar advokat Schartaus av hr Unden kritiserade intyg av 1947 ligger det i sakens natur att det var grundat på ett annat material än justitieradens uttalande av 1956. Men slutsatsen — att Wallenberg tillfångatagits av ryssarna och förts till Ryssland — var i bägge fallen densamma. Justitieradens uttalande kan endast bekräfta värdet av 1947 års intyg.

Att hr Unden uppträtt på ett för honom själv ytterst kompromettterande sätt blir alltså än en gång bestyrkt.

RUDOLPH PHILIPP:
"Mina skildringar kunde ej försvåra befrielsen"

Från skriftställare Rudolph Philipp har Dagens Nyheter mottagit följande:

I ett uttalande i Morgon-Tidningen fredagen den 22 februari kommenterar utrikesexcellensen Unden det i senaste numret av Vecko-Journalen publicerade protokollet från sammanträdet om Raoul Wallenberg i Kanslihuset den 3 november 1947. I detta sammanhang anför hr Unden för att visa att från UD:s sida inget gjorts som kunde ha skadat saken gentemot Sovjet:

"Det är underligt att kommitten inte tycktes ha reflekterat över vilken skada kunde vållas saken av sådana uttalanden som dess betrodde medhjälpare hr Philipp gjort i sin bok. Han hade skrivit om Wallenbergs mission i Budapest bl a att W tog alla den illegala kampens risker, tvekade aldrig inför en s k förfalskning eller ett s k bedrägeri osv."

Jag vill härtill erinra om att dessa s k förfalskningar bestod i skyddsdokument för tusentals av nazisterna till livet hotade ungerska medborgare, i vilka bl a förklarades att innehavaren av detta papper inom kort skulle repatrieras till Sverige i sammelinnsnport. Detta "bedrägeri" visade sig vara ett effektivt vapen i Raouls kamp för sina skyddslingar. Raouls legala och illegala aktioner var riktade mot den ungerska pilkorsregimens terror och mot Himmlers bödlar i Budapest.

Min bok "Raoul Wallenberg — kämpe, diplomat, samarit" utkom i november 1944, alltså tjugo månader efter att Raoul Wallenberg tillfångatagits av ryska militära myndigheter och förts till NKVD:s fängelse i Moskva. Hur skulle mina skildringar av Raouls kampmetoder ha kunnat försvåra hans befrielse eller eljest — som hr Unden säger — vållat saken skada?

Varken i Moskva eller inför svensk eller internationell opinion kan det väl ha ansetts diskrediterande att Raoul som en humanitärens politiskt använt sig av "olagliga" medel mot banditer och mördare.

Hr Unden förklarade vidare i sitt uttalande för MT att regeringen ville i all vänlighet förmå Wallenbergskommitten att ställa sitt förment viktiga material till UD:s förfogande.

Det är minst sagt förvånansvärt att utrikesexcellensen alltjämt söker misstänkliggöra — jag syftar på uttrycket "förment" — det bevismaterial på vilket den s k Örnekommitten grundade sitt uttalande i oktober 1947 enligt vilket Raoul Wallenberg beviljigen till för kort tid sedan befann sig i rysk fångenskap. Den senaste sovjetnoten bör ha rätt undan all tvetsamhet i varje fall på den punkten.

Tyvärr gick UD först i december 1951 med på att använda detta bevismaterial med de villkor vi måste ställa, nämligen att UD och regeringen, representerad av kabinettssekreteraren Arne Lundberg, i samråd och på jämställd fot med mig skulle kontrollera och använda vittnesmaterialet. Dessförinnan hade UD genom slarv och indiskretion avslöjat namn på vittnen bakom järnridån för ungerska respektive ryska hemliga polisen.

Rudolph Philipp

FRU BELLANDER:
"Vysjinskij ljög"

Från ledamoten av Wallenbergaktionen fru Birgitta de Vylder-Bellander har Dagens Nyheter mottagit följande inlägg:

Utrikesminister Unden har i ett uttalande i Morgon-Tidningen den 22 februari kommenterat det i senaste numret av Vecko-Journalen publicerade protokollet från sammanträdet om Raoul Wallenberg i Kanslihuset den 3 november 1947.

Bl a förmodar han att detta protokoll tillkommit i "ett högt känsloläge". Detta uttryck karaktäriserar i stället hans egen attityd under sammanträdet, något som vi alla fyra frapperades av. Men då det var första gången jag sammanträffade med hr Unden hade jag ej möjlighet att avgöra huruvida hans upprördhet och häftiga uppträdande var speciellt inöt hr Örne — var [illegible] för honom vänligt och naturligt beteende, då han blir motsagd eller kritiserad. Om så är fallet, förstår jag att han inte kan finna sin egen attityd anmärkningsvärd.

Vidare betecknar hr Unden mitt återgivande av replikskiftet angående Vysjinskijs svar som nonsens. Men den enda plausible förklaringen till att UD och regeringen under tiden 1945—1951 ej nedlagt ett kraftigt arbete i denna sak och ej förrän i februari 1952 i en officiell not kravt Raoul Wallenbergs befriande är ju just den att man från UD:s sida på den tiden ansåg att Raoul Wallenberg ej fanns i Sovjet och man alltså accepterade Vysjinskijs svar — vilt [illegible] som sant.

Man bol[illegible] jag endast [illegible] riksdagen [illegible] av den 21 maj 1951, där hr Unden ger uttryck åt samma åsikt. Hade hr Unden verkligen ansett — såsom vi gjorde — att Vysjinskij ljög (vilket ju nu visat sig vara riktigt), skulle UD:s oraktsamhet att de åtminstone med kraft arbeta för Raoul Wallenbergs befrielse varit än mer oförsvarlig än den är. Den skulle varit omänsklig.

Ett protokoll blir inte mindre trovärdigt därför att det är 9½ år gammalt. Tvärtom har ju händelserna 1947—1951 bestyrkt hr Undens negativa inställning i denna sak. För övrigt har hr Unden helt undvikit att gå in på fakta i mitt protokoll och bestrider ej sanningshalten av det sakliga i protokollet. Vi har kallat det jag nedskrev under och renskrev efter sammanträdet för "minnesprotokoll" därför att jag ej av deltagarna valts till sekreterare och man ej utsett justeringsmän.

Birgitta de Vylder-Bellander

AIR POUCH

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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM Amembassy STOCKHOLM 964 DESP. NO.

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, February 25, 1957 DATE

REF : Joint Weeka No. 6, February 8, 1957.

For Deptl Use Only	ACTION	DEPT.
	RECD	OTHER

SUBJECT: Soviet Union Alleges Raoul WALLENBERG Died in 1947.

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Summary

No story in contemporary Swedish history has received the press and radio play given the Soviet allegation that missing Swedish diplomat Raoul Wallenberg died in a Moscow prison in July 1947. Deputy Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko handed a note to Swedish Ambassador SOHLMAN on February 6, 1957, explaining that after an intensive investigation "the conclusion should be drawn" that Raoul Wallenberg died of a heart condition on July 17, 1947, according to a physician's report to Minister of State Security ABAKUMOV (liquidated in the Beria purge). The Soviets blamed Abakumov for concealing Wallenberg's fate and expressed their regrets. Prime Minister Erlander presided over a press conference at 4 p.m. on February 7 at which Foreign Minister Undén and former Foreign Office Secretary General Arne Lundberg were present to give the details of the Soviet reply on Wallenberg to the Swedish press. The news was first released to the Swedish public by radio at 7 p.m. on February 7. An official Swedish Government declaration issued on February 7 stated, "It must be regretted that the Soviet reply contained such meager information." Strong doubts were voiced throughout the Swedish press about the veracity of the Soviet account which was deprecated as "too convenient" in fixing Wallenberg's death at the point Swedish evidence concerning his whereabouts in Russia stopped. A white paper is to be published amplifying the material given to the press on February 6, (this press background material forms the basis of the main story that follows).

1. The Soviet Memorandum of February 6, 1957.

The Soviet reply of February 6, 1957, was the first definite news from Moscow on Wallenberg's fate since his disappearance in 1945. A long series of Swedish notes and inquiries over the past eleven years had gone either unanswered by the Soviet Government or resulted in flat disclaimers of any knowledge of Wallenberg's whereabouts or fate. This long overdue Soviet reply of February 6, 1957, was based

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Wallenberg file
201-5925

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exclusively on a report said to have been found in the archives of a Moscow prison hospital and addressed to the former Soviet Minister of State Security Abakumov according to which Wallenberg was believed to have died from myocardiac infarct (coronary thrombosis). The body was said to have been cremated without autopsy. Wallenberg's imprisonment and the false information concerning him that had previously been supplied to the Soviet Foreign Ministry and from it to the Swedish Government was said to have been the result of Abakumov's "criminal activities". (Abakumov was executed in the Beria purge in 1954). The medical officer of the Ljubljanka Prison who reported Wallenberg's death to Abakumov died in May 1953, according to the Soviet memorandum. No more documents or testimony on the Wallenberg case could be traced in the Soviet Union, the memorandum stated and it concluded with a few words of regret and sympathy addressed to the Swedish Government and to Wallenberg's next of kin. (Enclosure No. 1).

A Swedish Government declaration published simultaneously with the release of the text of the Soviet memorandum strongly regretted the meagerness of the information on Wallenberg's fate. Furthermore, the Swedish Government declared it expected that any further material in the case that might be found in the Soviet Union would be immediately communicated to Stockholm. (Enclosure No. 2).

2. Background Material Summarizing Swedish Government's Material on Wallenberg.

The essence of the huge amount of material in the Swedish Government's possession - mainly in the form of testimonies by German, Austrian and Italian prisoners of war released from Russia in recent years - tracing Wallenberg's whereabouts in Russia up to the middle of 1947 was handed to the press at the Government's press conference, and the full material will appear in the form of a white paper to be published toward the end of February. This material, previously submitted to the Soviet Government in connection with Prime Minister Erlander's and Interior Minister Hedlund's visit to Moscow in March-April 1956, does not include testimonies kept secret because of wishes expressed by those having testified who still have relatives or friends in Soviet-controlled countries, nor does it include material which, in the opinion of the Swedish Foreign Office, is of a nature as to cause serious consequences to other people in the Russians.

The files [illegible] case are reported to be the largest on any [illegible] by the Foreign Office.

A list of [illegible] diplomatic actions taken by Sweden in recent years [illegible] and the Soviet replies is attached. [illegible]

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Since February 1952, after more concrete material on Wallenberg's imprisonment in Russia had been obtained through testimonies by former prisoners of war, at least 15 written and 34 oral notes and reminders had been delivered by Sweden in Moscow, without result until the Soviet note of February 6, 1957.

The material made public by the Foreign Office includes testimonies by 19 ex-prisoners of war, mainly German, Austrian and Italian, who either shared prison cells with Wallenberg and/or his Hungarian chauffeur LANGFELDER (also missing since January 1945) or who claim they were in communication with him by prison code ("tapping") in the Ljublanka and Lefortovskaya prisons in Moscow. These various testimonies have been checked and correlated, but they all end in July 1947, the last date any of these prisoners had any contact with Wallenberg.

Two Justices of the Swedish Supreme Court testified on March 2, 1956, that they had studied these various testimonies and had come to the conclusion, independently of one another, that Raoul Wallenberg was taken into custody by the Russians and had been kept prisoner in the Soviet Union. Their testimony coincided to such a degree on essential points that under Swedish law, it constitutes binding evidence. This finding by the two Swedish Justices was included in the material supplied by Prime Minister Erlander to the Soviet Government in Moscow in March-April 1956.

Of special significance, and underscored by the Foreign Office, all of those who shared cells with Wallenberg and/or Langfelder at different times were especially questioned by the Russians during the month of July 1947 concerning their knowledge of Wallenberg and his experiences, in Budapest and in Soviet captivity; after these interrogations they were all placed in isolated cells with no means of communication with other prisoners. In the words of the Foreign Office: "The treatment accorded these prisoners after they had been questioned suggests that the Soviet authorities sought to prevent as far as possible any further spreading of knowledge of the Swedish diplomat."

Testimony given by other ex-prisoners of war claiming contact with Wallenberg even after July 1947 is also known to be in the possession of the Swedish Foreign Office but has not been included in the material released for publication because of lack of full and definite proof of its accuracy. Also, numerous alleged testimonies have been discarded as falsifications.

The unparalleled Swedish public and press concern over Raoul Wallenberg's fate kept alive over the past twelve years demands explanation, for it has been a significant factor in Swedish-Soviet relations.

Wallenberg's special mission in Budapest - he was not a career diplomat, but enjoyed diplomatic status as Secretary of Legation was to seek to save Hungarian Jews threatened with annihilation by the Szalasi regime. By his energy, initiative and courage, it is estimated he saved the lives of some 20,000 people. "No other Swede in our history has had the opportunity in such a direct and personal way to save human lives by the thousands", said former Secretary General of the Foreign Office Arne Lundberg in his commentary over the Swedish radio on February 8, 1957.

Neutral during the war, Sweden did not experience, as many of the belligerent nations did, mass disappearance of nationals, so that the fate of one single Swedish citizen, particularly one engaged in humanitarian relief work, went to the heart of the general public.

Sweden acted as protective power for the Soviet Union in Hungary during the war and for that reason expected sympathetic treatment of her diplomatic personnel by the Russians, (for a short time, when the Red Army marched into Budapest, Wallenberg appears to have acted as Swedish Chargé d'Affaires).

The blunt Soviet denials, over all these years, of any knowledge of Wallenberg's whereabouts or very existence aroused to an increasing extent Swedish indignation as belief turned into conviction that Wallenberg was held prisoner in Russia, with all that this entailed of suffering and horror.

Another aspect of this growing indignation among the Swedish public concerned the implied suspicion that the Foreign Office had not at an early stage conducted its investigations concerning Wallenberg with the necessary concern. Apparently on this assumption, a special committee of private citizens was formed (including relatives and friends of Wallenberg's) to conduct its own search for the missing diplomat and, in general, to speed up and activate the official investigations. Swedish officialdom did not relish this implied criticism of its efforts, and there were occasions of direct clashes between the Wallenberg Committee and, notably, Foreign Minister Undén who appears to have attached more faith in the Soviet assurances that could discover no information about Wallenberg than subsequent events warranted. In any event, public impatience with the negative Soviet attitude increased through Undén's apparent inclination, at least until 1951/52, to accept the Soviet version that Wallenberg was not to be found on Russian territory.

As Italian, German and other prisoners of war began to be released from Russia toward the end of 1951, reports came through which appeared accurate about Wallenberg being or having been in Soviet imprisonment, and from then on, apparently with the Wallenberg Committee as a driving force, the Foreign Office pursued the case with added energy. Pri[illegible] for this renewed [illegible] was

Arne Lundberg, who became Secretary General of the Foreign Office in 1951, and who is known to have taken on the Wallenberg case with strong personal interest and resourcefulness. A new series of notes were addressed to Moscow, beginning with a démarche of February 11, 1952, but the Soviet reply, when given at all, was always a reference to Vice Foreign Minister Vishinsky's note of August 18, 1947, disclaiming any knowledge of Wallenberg and his whereabouts.

A turning point occurred in April 1956 when Prime Minister Erlander visited Moscow. He had then occasion to present the Swedish views in person to Bulganin, Khrushchev and Molotov, and he extracted from them the promise that an exhaustive investigation would be made to ascertain Wallenberg's fate.

Again, however, the Russians saw fit to try the Swedish patience, for despite repeated reminders it was not until ten months later, on February 6, 1957, that the Soviet reply was given, stating that Wallenberg, on the strength of the meager evidence supplied, could be expected to have died in the Ljubljanka Prison in Moscow on July 17, 1947.

3. Swedish Press Skepticism Toward Veracity of Soviet Explanation of February 6.

The long-overdue Soviet reply definitely did not satisfy Swedish opinion. Press commentaries were unanimous in describing the Soviet evidence, comprising one single document issued by a person now deceased and addressed to another also deceased (executed), as inadequate. The press also pointed to the vague, almost non-committal wording of the Soviet note, which stated there was "reason to look upon the document as referring to Raoul Wallenberg" and that "the conclusion should be drawn that Wallenberg died in July 1947". Main emphasis in the commentaries, however, was placed on the "convenient" timing of Wallenberg's alleged death with the testimonies in Swedish possession whereby Wallenberg was last heard of in July 1947, when prisoners of war had been interrogated by the Russians concerning Wallenberg and thereafter placed in isolated cells. The timing was also held to be interesting in view of the fact that in July 1947 Swedish Ambassador Sohlman in Moscow had made a renewed démarche to the Soviet Foreign Office, to which Vishinsky had replied by his negative note of August 18, 1947.

Although few commentators doubted that Raoul Wallenberg must now be dead, the Soviet version as to the timing and other circumstances met with profound skepticism and dissatisfaction in all quarters. Even the alleged cause of death - "myocarditic infarct" - was strongly questioned, and prominent Swedish heart specialists immediately declared this type of heart ailment highly improbable in a man of Wallenberg's age (he would have been 36 in

July 1947).

The attempt on the part of the present Soviet rulers to cast all the blame for Wallenberg's arrest and imprisonment on the Stalinist regime and its hirelings was neither accepted by the press, which held that the treatment of an innocent neutral diplomat in the described fashion cast reflection on the whole Soviet system, with its inherent terror and disregard for human life, irrespective of who may for the moment be the rulers.

For all of the above reasons, there was a strong press urge that the Swedish Government not let the matter rest but that investigations continue in search of new evidence on Wallenberg's fate and that, meanwhile, new representations be made in Moscow demanding more information on why Wallenberg was imprisoned and what treatment he had been given.

Obviously, the Swedish Government is resolved to pursue its efforts to bring about full clarity in the Wallenberg case. This was implied in the immediate Government declaration following publication of the Soviet note on February 7 as well as by statement to the press by the Foreign Office that a Swedish reply to Moscow was under preparation.

Pending such a new Swedish démarche, Communist Ny Dag on February 19 featured an interview w[illegible]n its Moscow correspondent had with Gromyko, the new Soviet Foreign Minister, in which the latter was quoted as having declared that nothing further could be obtained concerning Wallenberg's fate beyond what was contained in the Soviet note of February 6, and that " the Wallenberg case should be considered closed".

Rather than quieting Swedish public opinion, this statement by Gromyko has further activated the demand here for the full story on the fate of an almost idolized Swedish citizen fallen the victim of a totalitarian police state. END OFFICIAL USE ONLY

BEGIN CONFIDENTIAL

4. The Mystery of the Wallenberg Mission

Raoul Wallenberg, a cousin once removed of Jacob and Marcus Wallenberg, the bankers, was assigned to the Swedish legation in Budapest in 1945 in a special capacity to exercise good offices on behalf of the Jews who were being subjected to Nazi atrocities. All accounts claim that he issued Swedish documents and passports to many Jews in Hungary in order to aid them in escaping the Nazi terror. He was supplied with 260,000 Swedish crowns some time in 1945 by the United States War Refugee Board in Stockholm, (according to informal [illegible] the [illegible] of Embassy Stockholm which was

conveyed to the Swedish Government by note from the Department of State in Washington on May 1, 1951). A sum of 10,000 Swedish crowns was given Wallenberg through a third person in Stockholm to finance his travel to Budapest. Subsequent payments of 50,000 and 200,000 Swedish crowns were deposited to his account in the Stockholm Enskilda Bank. The 200,000 Swedish crown payment was given by the American Joint Distribution Committee and since Wallenberg used "very little of it, the remainder was later returned to the Committee".

A current explanation of why Wallenberg was liquidated by the Russians was because they believed he was an American spy. Rudolph PHILIPP, the Secretary of the Wallenberg Committee, (a group of distinguished Swedish citizens), once claimed that Wallenberg had been on a secret mission for President Roosevelt. Many Swedish officials have noted to the reporting officer that Wallenberg was a close friend of former American Minister Herschel JOHNSON and that he was the one who is supposed to have picked Wallenberg for his "dangerous mission".

In any event, there is no concrete evidence available so far to clarify whether or not Wallenberg was engaged in espionage activities or a secret or confidential mission for any foreign power.

5. Foreign Office Reactions on Soviet Reply.

In a general discussion of the Wallenberg case, the Assistant Director of the Political Section of the Foreign Office explained that three things about the Soviet reply of February 6, 1957, had surprised the Foreign Office. The first surprise was that any answer had been given; there existed a strong suspicion in the Foreign Office at the working level that the Soviet Union would never give any detailed sort of reply and was not expected to go beyond its previous notes saying it had no information. The second surprise concerned the language of the Soviet memorandum. Obviously, according to the Foreign Office, every word of the Soviet message had been weighed and undoubtedly went through many drafts. For such a note to use such vague language as "the conclusion should be drawn" and the lack of precision in identifying the prisoner who died as Raoul Wallenberg, means, as the Foreign Office interprets it, that the Soviet Government is still free to adopt another interpretation if it chooses. The third surprise to the Foreign Office was that the Soviet memorandum seeks to align the Swedish Government on the side of the present Kremlin regime in its denunciation of Beria.

The Foreign Office was far from satisfied with the Soviet reply to the many inquiries concerning Wallenberg. However, the Foreign Office believes it has no rational alternative now but to believe that Wallenberg is dead. It would still like to obtain more

MEMORANDUM SUBMITTED FEBRUARY 6, 1957, BY SOVIET VICE FOREIGN MINISTER ANDREI GROMYKO TO SWEDISH AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW ROLF SOHLMAN IN THE RAOUL WALLENBERG CASE

(Translation of text as released by the Swedish Foreign Office to the press February 7, 1957)

In pursuance of the Swedish Government's request, the Soviet Government instructed the pertinent Soviet authorities to peruse the material concerning Raoul Wallenberg which had been received from Swedish quarters at the Swedish-Soviet negotiations in Moscow in March - April 1956 and also in May 1956. In the course of perusal and testing of the said material, the Soviet authorities have made a careful search of the archives which refer to the accounting for prisoners and to investigation questions ("Sledstvenye Dela"), for the purpose of finding possible information on Wallenberg. Similarly, many persons have been questioned who could have had anything to do with the circumstances mentioned in the material received from Sweden.

As a result of these measures, however, it has not been possible to find any information whatsoever concerning Wallenberg's sojourn in the Soviet Union. It has transpired that none of those heard knew any person by the name of Wallenberg. In this connection, the competent Soviet authorities have undertaken a search page by page of the archive documents from all wards in certain prisons. As a result of such search of archive documents from the health service in the Ljublanka Prison, a document has been found which there is good reason to consider as referring to Raoul Wallenberg.

This document has the form of a hand-written report, addressed to the former Minister of the State Security in the Soviet Union, Abakumov, and written by the head of the health service at the said prison, A.L. Smoltsov, reading as follows:

"I report that the prisoner Wallenberg, who is well known to you, died suddenly in his cell this night, probably as the result of a heart attack. Pursuant to instructions given by you that I personally have Wallenberg under my care, I request approval to make an autopsy with a view to establishing the cause of death.

"July 17, 1947.
"Smoltsov,
"Chief of the Prison's Sanitary Ward,
"Colonel in the Medical Service."

On this report, the following notation is found, in Smoltsov's handwriting: "I have personally notified the Minister and it has been ordered that the body be cremated without autopsy. July 17. Smoltsov."

It has not been possible to find any other information whatsoever having the character of document or testimony, all the more since the aforementioned A. L. Smoltsov died on May 7, 1953. On the strength of what has been cited above, the conclusion should be drawn that Wallenberg died in July 1947.

Raoul Wallenberg was apparently arrested along with other persons in the area for military operations by Soviet troops. At the same time, it may be considered indisputable that Wallenberg's subsequent detention in prison as well as the incorrect information about him supplied by certain former leaders of the security organs to the Soviet Union's Foreign fMinistry over a period of years comprised the result of Abakumov's criminal activities. In connection with gross crimes committed by him, it will be recalled that Abakumov, who had engaged in activities implying violation of the laws of the Soviet Union and who had sought to inflict upon the Soviet Union all kinds of damage, was executed in accordance with verdict handed down by the Supreme Court of the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Government presents its sincere regrets because of what has occurred and expresses its profound sympathy to the Swedish Government as well as to Raoul Wallenberg's relatives.

Translation: NMöller

OFFICIAL COMMENTARY BY THE SWEDISH GOVERNMENT TO THE SOVIET MEMORANDUM ON RAOUL WALLENBERG, ISSUED FEBRUARY 7, 1957.

The Soviet Government has drawn the conclusion from its investigations that Wallenberg died in a Russian prison in July 1947. The responsibility for his having been detained in prison and for the false information previously supplied is placed on the Soviet security organs and the Soviet Government expresses its sincere regrets for what has occurred.

Concerning the reply, it can be established that it is now being admitted on Russia's part that Wallenberg has been held imprisoned in the Soviet Union. In that respect, the reply tallies with the Swedish evidence material. It must be strongly regretted, however, that the reply contains such meager information. Nothing is said about the motives for Wallenberg's arrest or about his fate during the years that followed. We expect that if any new material should appear in the Soviet Union we shall immediately have it communicated to us.

To Raoul Wallenberg's mother and relatives, who for so many years have had to live in horrible uncertainty, the Russian reply must imply yet another hard blow. They have our profound sympathy.

Translation: NMöller

EXCHANGES BETWEEN SWEDEN AND THE SOVIET UNION CONCERNING RAOUL WALLENBERG 1945 - 1957.

Among the numerous inquiries and reminders, formal as well as informal, made by the Swedish Minister in Moscow to the Soviet Government, and by the Foreign Office in Stockholm to the Soviet Minister since 1945 concerning Wallenberg's whereabouts, the following major exchanges took place:

11/31/1945 Swedish note submitted to Vice Foreign Minister DEKANOSOV requesting an exhaustive account of the results of the search made by the Soviet authorities concerning Wallenberg.

12/12/1946 Démarche made by the Swedish Legation in Moscow giving a list of previous Swedish inquiries concerning Wallenberg.

8/18/1947 Soviet Foreign Ministry, following renewed Swedish representations, stated that investigations had produced no result, and that it could be presumed that Wallenberg had either been killed during the fighting in Budapest in January 1945 or had been taken prisoner by Hungarian Fascists.

12/11/1951 Swedish Government demanded that the Soviet Union take the necessary measures for Wallenberg's early return to Sweden.

4/16/1952 Soviet Government replied by stating that it possessed no further information beyond that contained in its note of 8/18/1947.

5/23/1952 Note submitted to Soviet Ambassador RODIONOV in Stockholm, and simultaneously through Swedish Embassy in Moscow to Vice Foreign Minister Zorin, inquiring whether Soviet Government prepared to make further inquiries if supplied with material collected in the course of Swedish inquiries.

8/5/53 The two Swedish démarches in Stockholm and Moscow replied to by Ambassador Rodionov advising that earlier Soviet information in the case had been "confirmed" and that any attempt to connect Wallenberg's fate with his alleged sojourn in the Soviet Union would be wholly futile.

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7058

Incl. No. 3
Desp. No. 964
From Stockholm

9/29/1954	Extensive memorandum on results of Swedish search for Wallenberg submitted to Soviet Government, based amont other things on new evidence in the possession of the Swedish Foreign Office confirming earlier conclusions that Wallenberg was a prisoner in the USSR.
3/10/1956	Foreign Minister Undén handed Soviet Ambassador Rodionov in Stockholm a note detailing new material obtained following inquiries among Austrian and German citizens returned from Soviet prisons.
3/19/1956	Soviet note to Swedish Embassy in Moscow "confirming" that all statements previously made that Wallenberg was not to be found on Soviet territory were final, and declaring that nothing further could be added.
3/29 - 4/5/1956	Prime Minister Erlander and Interior Minister Hedlund conferred in Moscow with Soviet leaders and Soviet Government agreed to Swedish request for renewed investigation concerning Wallenberg on basis of new evidence and other material submitted to Moscow.
7/14/1956	Ambassador Rodionov advised the Swedish Foreign Office that information resulting from new Soviet investigations concerning Wallenberg could be expected "shortly".
9/29/1956	Swedish Embassy in Moscow instructed to lodge a new reminder with the Soviet Foreign Office, pointing out that six months had elapsed since the Soviet Government undertook to investigate new material on Wallenberg.
11/13/1956	Sharp Swedish reminder lodged with Soviet Foreign Office expressing surprise and great disappointment that Soviet promises had not yet been implemented.
2/6/1957	Soviet reply stating that Wallenberg died in a Moscow prison in July 1947.

AIR POUCH
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SF 7059

FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM : Amembassy STOCKHOLM 989
DESP. NO.

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON. March 5, 1957
DATE

REF : Embassy Despatch No. 964, Feb. 25, 1957;
Joint Weeka No. 8, Feb. 21, 1957.

For Dept. Use Only	ACTION	DEPT.
	REC'D	OTHER

SUBJECT: Sharp Swedish Note to Soviet Union Regarding Russian Memorandum of February 6, 1957, on Wallenberg Case.

BEGIN UNCLASSIFIED

WALLENBERG, RAOUL

The Swedish Government sent a sharply worded note to the Soviet Union on February 19, 1957, in answer to the Russian memorandum of February 6th which contained the information that Wallenberg had died in a Soviet prison. In unusually strong critical language the Swedish Government implied that it did not consider the Soviet Union's answer satisfactory. To make sure that there could be no misunderstanding of its positon, the Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs released the full text of the Swedish note to the Soviet Union to the press on February 20, 1957, a copy of the translation of this note distributed by the press section of the Foreign Office is attached as Enclosure No. 1.

The Swedish note of February 19 laid full responsibility for detaining Raoul Wallenberg in a Soviet prison and for giving incorrect information to the Swedish Government about Wallenberg on the Soviet Government. It pointedly denied that the Soviet Government could shift responsibility for these actions onto any now deceased Soviet Security Agency officials. Furthermore, the note made a specific point of the fact that "Swedish public opinion is justly shocked by what has occurred in this matter". Expressing doubt that all traces of Wallenberg in Soviet imprisonment had been obliterated, as the Soviets claimed, the Swedish Government's note requested that any further details obtained be communicated to it, and it reserved the right to send additional material concerning Wallenberg to the Soviet Government.

The entire Swedish press, including the Communist Ny Dag, on February 21st headlined the story of the Swedish note, (although delivered in Moscow on February 19th by Ambassador Sohlman, publicity did not result until the evening of February 20). The overwhelming majority of the press commended the Government for the sharp tone of its note and ran editorials again deploring the Soviet treatment of Wallenberg.

END UNCLASSIFIED

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REPORTS

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Page 2 of
Encl. No.
Desp. No. 989
From Stockholm

BEGIN CONFIDENTIAL

The Assistant Director of the Political Section of the Foreign Office, R. Hichens BERGSTRÖM observed that this was one of the strongest notes that Sweden has ever sent to the Soviet Union. He explained that it could be freely translated from its diplomatic language as saying on Sweden's part to the Soviet Union: "We think you are lying!"

If the Foreign Office had not put out a strong note and given publicity to it, there is little question but that there would have occurred a public disagreement between the Wallenberg Committee (made up of distinguished Swedish citizens) and the Foreign Office which would in turn have placed a political strain on the Government. As it turned out, the Government has had the support of a remarkably united public opinion in insisting that the last word has not been said on the Wallenberg case and that further and more energetic Soviet investigations are required to shed full and accurate light on Wallenberg's disappearance.

A concommittant of this press reaction, otherwise so decidedly in the Government's favor, has been a revived campaign by the Opposition press against Foreign Minister Undén for his alleged passiveness and lack of interest at an earlier stage of the search for Wallenberg. Testimonies by members of the Wallenberg Committee, released in Veckojournalen and similar weeklies told how Undén in 1947 reportedly took the Soviet assurances of that time as evidence that Wallenberg was not to be found on Russian territory. Several Opposition papers contained attacks on Foreign Minister Undén for his cynical attitude at that time. However, these attacks are all based on an alleged attitude that took place some ten years ago and must contend with the fact that Foreign Minister Undén is now responsible for this sharp note to the Soviet Union. On balance, therefore, it does not appear that these Opposition attacks have materially damaged Undén's unique political position in Sweden.

Foreign Office officials at the Bureau Chief level have made the point, and it is evident in terms of press reaction, that the Soviet reply finally telling of Wallenberg's death has led to a decided worsening of Swedish-Soviet relations. The present sharp note deprecating the accuracy of the Soviet Memorandum of February 6 is still another indication that Swedish-Soviet relations are at a low ebb.

For the Ambassador:

Joseph Sweeney
First Secretary of Embassy

Enclosure:
Translation of note

CONFIDENTIAL

"Inofficial (sic) translation" released by Foreign Office

Foreign Office Press Release Wednesday, February 20th, 1957
Concerning Swedish Note to Soviet Union

A note of the following content was delivered to the Soviet Foreign Ministry by the Swedish Ambassador Rolf Sohlman on February 19th, 1957:

"In a Memorandum of February 6th, 1957, the Soviet Government declared that from their investigations regarding the Swedish Secretary of Legation Raoul Wallenberg the conclusion aught to be drawn, that Wallenberg died in a prison in Moscow during the night July 16th-17th, 1947. The responsibility for detaining the Swedish diplomat in prison and for the incorrect information which has been given the Swedish Government for many years since August 18th, 1947, is laid on the Soviet Security Agencies. The Soviet Government has expressed their sincere regret at what has happened. They have further stated, that the person among the top officials of the Security Service who was primarily responsible for the aggression against Wallenberg, was sentenced to death and executed on account of severe crimes.

"Swedish public opinion is justly shocked by what has occurred in this matter. If the Soviet Security Service was able to act in such an autocratic way as to make a diplomat of a neutral country a prisoner and keep him in prison for 2 1/2 years without reporting the case to the Soviet Government or to the Foreign Ministry, this fact is not in itself a circumstance, for which the Soviet Government can disclaim responsibility. By expressing their regret, the Soviet Government has also admitted their responsibility. To this is added the fact that, while Wallenberg was confined in a Moscow prison, the Soviet Government cannot, considering the numerous Swedish appeals, have been unable to obtain reliable information in the matter, if they had really undertaken the thorough investigations they have repeatedly assured the Swedish Government that they had made.

"In this connection it should be recalled, that as late as the day before the one reported as the date of Wallenberg's death, Ambassador Sohlman reminded of Wallenberg in the Soviet Foreign Ministry. Before that occasion Moscow had been reminded of this matter some twenty times after January 16th, 1945, when the Deputy Foreign Minister Dekanosov informed the Swedish Legation in Moscow, that Wallenberg had been found andtaken in Soviet Russian custody.

The Swedish Government find it difficult to believe that all

further documentation concerning Wallenberg's stay in Soviet prisons, with exception of the report mentioned in the Soviet Government Memorandum, should have been completely obliterated. They expect, therefore, that if any further material is found in the Soviet Union, destined to clarify what happened to Wallenberg, it will be communicated to the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The Swedish Government, on their side, reserve their right to communicate further material concerning Wallenberg that the Swedish Government consider of importance for continued investigations in the Soviet Union."

VIA: AIR
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. [redacted]
21-6-26/3

Secret
CLASSIFICATION

TO: Chief, WE

DATE: 8 March 1957

FROM: [redacted]

SUBJECT: GENERAL [redacted]
SPECIFIC

REFERENCE: [redacted] 20 February 1957

ACTION REQUIRED: None

1. As Headquarters will have noted from "Danish Politics" numbers 26 and 32 and "News of the Day" numbers 25, 26 and 33, the Danish press gave considerable space to the Wallenberg story and followed a line similar to that pursued by the Swedish press.

2. Although it is not evident from the press reviews forwarded to Headquarters, the Danish press also used considerable wordage on the Munch-Petersen affair at this time. Most stories were carried as an attack on Aksel Larsen rather than directed toward USSR. The fact that Larsen continued to remain silent on this subject only further infuriates the free press. This series of press stories on the Munch-Petersen case culminated in a story that his "widow" had written to the Prime Minister requesting a government investigation of her husband's disappearance. To date the Prime Minister has made no statement so far as we know.

3. As a matter of fact the Danish press, particularly the Social Democratic press, never misses an opportunity to bring up Munch-Petersen in its columns. It is quite possible that when, and if, the government makes a statement concerning Mrs. Munch-Petersen's plea, the [redacted] can further exploit this matter. In any case, we have asked the [redacted] to be alert for any such opportunity.

[redacted]

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2 - [Copenhagen]

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FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR. 1949

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[redacted]

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(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
[redacted] - POSSIBLE LEAD FOR INFORMATION ON SWEDISH DIPLOMAT RAOUL WALLENBERG	2. 61 FILE NO. [redacted] 006 107 [redacted]
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. [redacted] 4. DATE 05 APR 57
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM 8. DATE OF INFO. 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

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201-005925	

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

WALLENBERG, RAOUL (201-005925)
ON 19 FEB 1957, [redacted] MET IN MUNICH TWO ESTIONIANS, ROMULUS MANDEL AND ELMAR LIPPING, FROM THE ESTIONIAN LABOR SERVICE COMPANY STATIONED IN NUERNBERG. BOTH MUST BE PRESUMED AWARE OF [redacted] MANDEL REPORTED TO [redacted] THAT HE HAD RECENTLY MADE THE ACQUAINTANCE OF ONE E (?) WALLENSTEIN, GERMAN NATIONAL AND LATE RETURNEE FROM SOVIET CAPTIVITY IN FALL 1956, NOW RESIDING EITHER IN HEIDELBERG OR FRANKFURT/MAIN AND WORKING FOR A TELEPHONE EQUIPMENT PRODUCER. WALLENSTEIN TOLD MANDEL HE HAD FORMERLY SERVED WITH THE GERMAN EMBASSY IN BUKAREST/RUMANIA; THAT HE WAS ARRESTED BY THE SOVIETS AFTER THEY ARRIVED IN RUMANIA (TIME NOT GIVEN); THAT HE WAS SENTENCED BY THE SOVIETS TO 25 YEARS IN PRISON IN 1947; THAT HE SERVED SOME OF HIS SENTENCE IN VORKUTA. WALLENSTEIN THEN TOLD MANDEL THAT HE HAD MET THE SWEDISH DIPLOMAT RAOUL WALLENBERG IN VORKUTA IN 1955 OR 1956. WALLENSTEIN SAID THAT THIS WAS THE SAME RAOUL WALLENBERG WHO WAS ARRESTED BY THE SOVIETS IN BUDAPEST/HUNGARY IN 1945. WHILE UNABLE TO ASSESS THE VALIDITY OF THE ABOVE, [redacted] NOTED THE BIG DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE WALLENSTEIN STORY ABOUT RAOUL WALLENBERG AND THE RECENT OFFICIAL SOVIET NOTIFICATION OF THE SWEDISH GOVERNMENT THAT WALLENBERG HAD DIED IN THE LUBYANKA IN MOSCOW IN 1947.

15.

FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.	201-005925		

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA AIR
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. [ODCW-4092]
[21-6-26/3]

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO [redacted]

DATE 19 APR 57

FROM Chief, WE

SUBJECT { GENERAL / SPECIFIC } [redacted] Exploitation of Anti-Soviet Attitudes in Scandinavia

ACTION REQUIRED For your information and appropriate action

1. The recent Soviet threats against the governments of Denmark, Norway and Sweden; Izvestia's protestations against "renascent militarism" in Finland; the sudden tragic end of the Wallenberg case in Sweden; renewed interest in Denmark in the fate of Arne Munch-Pedersen; renewed espionage revelations in Sweden and Denmark--all these have served to make the population of Scandinavia suspicious of Soviet activities and objectives and responsive to additional general charges of Soviet espionage and subversion.

2. In order to take advantage of current anti-Soviet feeling in Scandinavia (perhaps also to set the stage for appropriate replay in Iceland to attack the Communist position there), would it be possible for the NEROS to arrange for an "expose" on Soviet espionage and subversion? We suggest that an attempt be made to draw an analogy between the Soviet espionage-subversive system and an iceberg, indicating that the part that becomes obvious to the public is only a very small portion of the total. If this idea has already been used by [redacted] or by independent Danish editorialists, we leave it to the Station's discretion as to whether or not its additional use would be advantageous.

[redacted]

17 April 1957

Distribution:
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(Coordinating Officer)

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FORM NO. 51-29
JUN 1949

[redacted]

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FBIS 61-L

STOCKHOLM SWEDISH HOME SERVICE 1800 4/24/57

(TEXT) THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY HAS HANDED THE SWEDISH EMBASSY IN MOSCOW A NOTE IN ANSWER TO THE SWEDISH NOTE OF FEB. 19, THIS YEAR ON THE WALLENBERG AFFAIR.

THE RUSSIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY STATES THAT IN THE MEMORANDUM FROM THE MINISTRY ON FEB. 6, ALL AVAILABLE INFORMATION COLLECTED DURING A CAREFUL AND ALL-ROUND INVESTIGATION BY THE SOVIET ORGANS CONCERNED HAD BEEN PUT FORWARD. UNFORTUNATELY, THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION WHATEVER, THE NOTE ADDS.

AA 4/24-620P

Wallenberg file

24 Apr 57

VIA AIR
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. [redacted]

Secret
CLASSIFICATION

67-2-5/3

TO Chief, WE

DATE 7 June 1957

FROM: [redacted]

INFO: Chief, SR [redacted]

SUBJECT: GENERAL OPERATIONAL [redacted]
SPECIFIC Information on Raoul WALLENBERG

REF: [redacted] 21 May 1957

ACTION REQUIRED: As indicated in Paragraph 2, below

1. The information in reference dispatch concerning the identification of Raoul WALLENBERG in Vorkuta by a recent German returnee is being passed to [redacted] today, and obviously he will be keenly interested to obtain any further information which can be provided by [redacted].

2. The source description in paragraph 2 of reference dispatch is puzzling in its implication that the source [redacted] but clarification of this point would render the initial report much greater value. I would therefore welcome such clarification as well as any additional information that [redacted] may be able to forward.

[redacted]

6 June 1957

Distribution:
3 - WE
2 - SR
2 - [redacted]

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FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR. 1949

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Reference Document
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WALLANBERG, RAOUL
DOB ?

[redacted]
9 Dec 58

CIT ?
201-59250

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EMIL BRUGGER [redacted] STATES THAT SUBJ.
THE SWEDISH DIPL. WHO DISAPPEARED IN BUCHA-
REST IN 45, HAD NOT DIED IN LJUBLJANA PRISON
IN MOSCOW IN 47, AS THE SOV. CLAIMED, BUT WAS
IN FACT ALIVE IN VLADIMIR PRISON AS OF 54.

15.

FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. → 21 | 59250

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FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (7-46)
6-SA
OP #3

[redacted]

4 Dec 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subj: Emil [redacted] A. Asst Cit: Switzerland

DOB: 1903 in Bern, Switzerland

CIC agent returned from Soviet prison REQUEST FOR INFO. FROM

On 3 December 1958, Mr. Erik Braunerhielm, First Secretary of the Swedish Embassy in Vienna and apparently charged with screening and security duties (at least), advised me that Brugger had reported to the Swedish Embassy in Vienna to the effect that he, Brugger, had evidence that indicated that Raoul WALLANBERG, the Swedish diplomat who disappeared in Bucharest in 1945, had not died in Ljubljana prison in Moscow in 1947, as the Soviets claimed, but was in fact alive in Vladimir prison as of 1954. Brugger allegedly told the Swedes that Wallanberg had communicated his presence to Brugger, also a prisoner in that prison at that time, by means of pipe rapping. Braunerhielm said his Government is constantly trying to find traces of Wallanberg's possible existence, and wished to evaluate Brugger's reliability. He said that Brugger claimed to have worked for CIC in Vienna up until 1948, when he was arrested and imprisoned by the Soviets. I told him that there appeared to be no derogatory information on him.

EMIL BRUGGER [redacted]
STATES THAT WALLENBERG

[redacted]

4 Dec 58

[redacted]

VIA AIR POUCH | OFFICIAL USE ONLY (Security Classification) | DO NOT TYPE IN THIS SPACE

FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM : Amembassy, STOCKHOLM 1138 (Despatch No.)

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON. June 2, 1959 (DATE)

REF :

For Dept. Use Only	ACTION	DEPT.
	REC'D	OTHER

SUBJECT: Notes Exchanged Between Swedish and Soviet Governments Concerning Raoul Wallenberg.

On May 28, 1959, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a statement that there had been a new exchange of notes between the Swedish and Soviet Governments concerning Raoul WALLENBERG.

The most recent of the earlier Swedish notes on this subject was dated February 17, 1957, and delivered to the Soviet Foreign Ministry on February 19, 1957. The text of this note, as well as an extensive review of the circumstances surrounding the mysterious disappearance of Mr. Wallenberg in Budapest in 1944, after the Red Army entered the city, were reported in Embassy despatches No. 964, February 25, 1957, and No. 989, March 5, 1957. A recent conversation on this subject between an Embassy officer and an officer in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs was reported in despatch No. 1042, April 28, 1959.

The press release from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (English translation enclosed) stated that on February 9, 1959, the Swedish Government requested that the Soviets investigate whether Wallenberg had been held in the Vladimir prison, which is located some 200 kilometers east of Moscow. The Soviet Government's reply of March 6, 1959, stated that the investigation had been made as requested by the Swedish Government, but that nothing had been revealed and that the information of the Swedish Government concerning Wallenberg's presence in Vladimir had not been confirmed.

The Swedish press release did not indicate how long after 1947--the date the Soviet Government reported that Mr. Wallenberg had died--Wallenberg is believed to have been alive. The press reported that one of the persons who reported knowing of Mr. Wallenberg after 1947 was a Swiss, Emil BRUGGER, who stated that he had been in contact with Wallenberg in the Vladimir prison on August 4, 1954. Brugger stated that, by means of knocking on the wall, Wallenberg had given him this message: "Wallenberg--First Secretary in the Swedish Mission in Budapest, taken in 1945." Brugger stated that he replied, giving his name and stating that he had been taken from Vienna in 1948. Brugger reported that Wallenberg asked him to contact Swedish authorities if he (Brugger) was released, since Wallenberg was not permitted to have any correspondence. Another returning prisoner, unidentified, except as a German was reported to have stated that he had been in the Vladimir prison from spring to fall of 1956, during which time he had been in contact with a Soviet citizen who had been in the Vladimir prison since 1945. The Soviet citizen reported that Wallenberg had been in the Vladimir prison after 1947, the date that Wallenberg had been reported dead by the Soviet authorities.

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DST-7060, 2 June 59

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Page 2 of
Encl. No.
Disp. No. 1138
From Stockholm

A spokesman of the Raoul Wallenberg Committee, made up of friends and relatives of Mr. Wallenberg, has informed the press that there are a number of witnesses who have given testimony proving that Wallenberg was interned in various Russian prisons several years after his alleged death in 1947, and that the committee is confident that, with the help of the Swedish Government, Wallenberg will soon be back in Sweden.

In addition to the press release issued by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Foreign Minister UNDÉN made the following statement to the press: "It is difficult to judge the value of statements made by former Soviet prisoners. However, we will continue to take cognizance of any clues that may present themselves. It is an open question whether the matter will be taken up with the Soviet Chief of Government during his visit here. There is nothing to prevent this from being done. We have systematically sought to question people who have returned from imprisonment in Russia, regardless of their nationality, about Wallenberg. Some of them have made certain statements to the effect that Wallenberg was in a prison in Vladimir at a later time than that which the Russians have given as the day of his death, namely July 17, 1947. These statements caused us to turn to the Soviet Government with the request for an investigation whether Wallenberg could have been in the prison mentioned at any time after 1947. However, no new information resulted from the Russian investigation."

The Swedish press had been unaware of the renewed efforts on the part of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to learn about Wallenberg's fate and whereabouts and commended the Government for not having been satisfied with the many negative replies which it had received from Moscow. Conservative "Svenska Dagbladet" considered the latest Soviet denial to be less categorical than previously, and stated that the Swedish Government was justified in continuing to press the case. The paper suggested that Khrushchev's forthcoming visit to Stockholm in August will present "a ready opportunity once again to impress upon the Soviet rulers the burden created for Swedish-Russian relations by the unsolved Wallenberg affair." The statement on this subject by Foreign Minister Undén given above is somewhat less categorical but it is probable that the whereabouts and fate of Wallenberg will be one of the questions raised by the Swedish Government during Khrushchev's forthcoming visit.

For the Chargé d'Affaires, a.i.:

G. Alonzo Stanford
Second Secretary

Enclosure:

Press Release.

Department please pass:

Amembassies Moscow, Helsinki, Oslo, Copenhagen;
Amlegation, Budapest.

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(Classification)

Page 1 of
No. 1
No. 1138
From Stockholm

UST 7060

Ministry for Foreign Affairs Press Release, May 20, 1959.

In its note of February 17, 1957, to the Soviet Government the Swedish Government stated that it reserved the right to present further material concerning Raoul Wallenberg, which was considered to be of importance for continued investigations in the Soviet Union.

The Swedish authorities have continued to examine carefully all traces concerning Wallenberg's stay in the Soviet Union. In this connection there have been brought to their knowledge several accounts from persons, who have returned from Soviet imprisonment, implying that after 1947 Wallenberg had been in a prison at Vladimir, some 200 kilometers east of Moscow.

Because of this information the Swedish Government requested in a note, which was handed over to the Soviet Ministry for Foreign Affairs on February 9, 1959, that an investigation be made to establish whether Wallenberg had been in the Vladimir prison.

The reply of the Soviet Government, dated March 6, 1959, stated that the investigations which had been requested in the Swedish note had been carried out, but had not revealed anything new in the matter and that the information of the Swedish Government concerning Wallenberg's stay in Vladimir had not been confirmed.

Translator: MLHaijlen Rylander

Encl. 5

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FORM 807 SECRET

Vorwaerts, Bonn
26 June 1963

SEE IF HE IS STILL ALIVE

By R. Philipp

STOCKHOLM. -- After the return of the Swedish Foreign Minister Torsten Nilsson from his state visit in Moscow, almost all the Swedish dailies -- from the Social-Democratic main organ Stockhoms-Tidningen to the opposition Svenska Dahbladet -- published on the first page: "The Wallenberg Affair Has Not Been Settled".

Foreign Minister Nilsson had specifically summoned Wallenberg's mother and guardian and the representatives of the struggle for the liberation of this diplomat who, as the "Hero of Budapest" has not yet been forgotten in his homeland and told them, "The most important purpose of his Soviet trip had been the repatriation of Wallenberg. In connection with the great Kremlin conference referred to in the press he therefore had sought a clear answer from Mr. Khrushchev with respect to Wallenberg at a special interview in the presence of the oldest colleagues of an interpreter. Mr. Khrushchev stated: 'His government could only refer to the information which had been communicated by Foreign Minister Gromyko in the memorandum of 6 February 1957 to the Swedish Government.'"

Until 1957 the Government of the USSR had always replied to all Swedish notes that Wallenberg was never a Russian prisoner, he had never been on Soviet soil, and that he had probably lost his life due to German bombs or in any case in the battle area in Hungary.

In actuality Wallenberg, who was sent by the Swedish Government in July 1944 as First Secretary of Legation to Budapest with the special order to rescue if possible the rest of the Jews who had not been deported to the gas chambers, remained as the only foreign diplomat in the Pest part of the city, which had a population of 1,000,000, when the German troops abandoned Pest and retreated to the Buda part of the city on the other side of the Danube and the Gestapo fled by airplane with Eichmann to the Austrian border.

When the Swedish Minister summoned him to come to Buda, where all missions and consulates remained in relative security, Wallenberg asked permission to await the arrival of the Red Army in Pest and to be permitted to deal with the Soviet High Command as Charge d'Affaires in the interests of those under his protection.

On 15 January the first Soviet patrol came to Wallenberg's Legation. Wallenberg asked to be taken to the city commander. The latter, General Chernishev, "took him under his protection". Raoul asked to be permitted to drive to Debrecen beforehand, where the headquarters of Marshal Malinowski (now Defense Minister of the USSR) and the High Commissioner of the Allies, Voroshilov, were. Wallenberg received permission on 17 January to drive to Debrecen. Under escort of military police he was permitted to say goodbye to his personnel. He said to witnesses, "I am driving to Debrecen. Whether as a prisoner or a free man, I don't know."

On 10 January 1945 -- one day before this trip -- the Soviet Foreign Office informed the Swedish Minister in Moscow in a note that the military authorities had taken Wallenberg and his property under their protection.

On 30 January 1945 Wallenberg was brought to a cell in Moscow's Lyubyanka prison, where the German Attache was. After his return home the latter transmitted to us a long message of Wallenberg immediately after his transfer at Friedland.

Despite these official Russian "receipts", the Soviet authorities have denied for 12 years that Wallenberg was a Soviet prisoner. And when we had collected overwhelming evidence from many prominent returnees who

Vorwaerts, Bonn
26 June 1963

IMMER NOCH HOFFNUNG

Gucken, ob er noch lebt

Schwedischer Diplomat im Kreml verschwunden / Von R. Philipp

STOCKHOLM. — Nach der Rückkehr des schwedischen Außenministers Torsten Nilsson von seinem Staatsbesuch in Moskau publizierten fast alle schwedischen Tageszeitungen — vom sozialdemokratischen Hauptorgan Stockholms-Tidningen bis zum oppositionellen Svenska Dagbladet — auf ihrer ersten Seite: „Die Wallenberg-Affäre ist nicht erledigt."

Außenminister Nilsson hatte nämlich Wallenbergs Mutter und Vormund und die Repräsentanten des Kampfes für die Befreiung dieses nicht nur in seiner Heimat als „Helden von Budapest" unvergessenen Diplomaten zu sich gerufen und ihnen erklärt: „Das wichtigste Ziel seiner Sowjetreise sei die Heimsendung Wallenbergs gewesen. Deshalb habe er im Anschluß an die große in der Presse referierte Kremlkonferenz in einer Sonderaudienz im Beisein der allernächsten Mitarbeiter und eines Dolmetschers Herrn Chruschtschow um klare Antwort betreffend Wallenberg ersucht. Herr Chruschtschow habe erklärt: Seine Regierung könne leider nur auf jene Informationen hinweisen, die Außenminister Gromyko im Memorandum vom 6. Februar 1957 der schwedischen Regierung mitgeteilt hatte."

Bis 1957 hatte die Regierung der UdSSR auf alle schwedischen Noten konsequent erklärt: Wallenberg sei niemals russischer Gefangener gewesen, er hätte sich niemals auf sowjetrussischem Boden befunden, er sei wahrscheinlich durch deutsche Bomben, jedenfalls im Kampfgebiet in Ungarn ums Leben gekommen.

In Wirklichkeit war Wallenberg, der im Juli 1944 von der schwedischen Regierung als 1. Legationssekretär nach Budapest geschickt wurde — mit der Spezialorder, den Rest der noch nicht in die Gaskammern deportierten Juden womöglich zu retten — als einziger ausländischer Diplomat in dem Millionen-Stadtteil Pest geblieben, als am 24. Dezember 1944 die [illegible] Truppen Pest verließen und in den [illegible] jenseits der [illegible] zurückzogen und die Gesandten Eichmann per Flugzeug an die [illegible] ungarische Grenze geflohen waren.

Als ihn der schwedische Gesandte aufforderte, nach Buda zu kommen, wo sich alle Missionen und Konsulate in relativer Sicherheit befanden, bat er um die Erlaubnis, in Pest die Ankunft der Roten Armee abwarten zu dürfen und als Chargé d'affaires (Geschäftsträger) mit dem sowjetischen Oberkommando im Interesse seiner Schützlinge verhandeln zu dürfen.

Am 13. Januar kam gegen die erste sowjetische Patrouille in Wallenbergs Legation. Wallenberg bat, zum Stadtkommandanten geführt zu werden. Der „unter seinen Schutz" Raoul bat, vorher nach Debrecen fahren zu dürfen, wo sich das Hauptquartier des Marschalls Malinowski (jetzt UdSSR-Verteidigungsminister) und des Hochkommissars der Alliierten Woroschilow befand. Wallenberg bekam am 17. Januar die Erlaubnis nach Debrecen zu fahren. Unter Eskorte von Militärpolizisten durfte er von seinem Personal Abschied nehmen. Er sagte zu Zeugen: „Ich fahre nach Debrecen. Ob als freier Mann oder Gefangener, weiß ich nicht".

Am 16. Januar — also einen Tag vor dieser Reise — teilte das sowjetische Außenamt dem schwedischen Moskauminister in einer Note mit, daß die Militärbehörden Wallenberg und sein Eigentum unter ihren Schutz genommen hatten.

Am 30. Januar 1945 wurde Wallenberg in eine Zelle des Moskauer Ljubljankagefängnisses gebracht, wo sich der deutsche Attaché befand, der uns nach seiner Heimkehr unmittelbar nach seiner Übergabe in Friedland eine ausführliche Botschaft Wallenbergs überbrachte.

Trotz dieser offiziellen russischen „Quittungen" leugneten die sowjetischen Behörden 12 Jahre lang, daß Wallenberg Sowjetgefangener sei. Und als wir erdrückendes Beweismaterial von vielen prominenten Heimkehrern, die in Gefängnissen mit Wallenberg Kontakt gehabt hatten, gesammelt hatten, das Ministerpräsident Erlander bei seinem Staatsbesuch 1956 in Moskau übergab, ließ sich die Sowjetregierung fast ein Jahr Zeit, um im Februar 1957 in einem Memorandum mitzuteilen: In keinem Gefängnis habe man irgendeinen Beweis für Wallenbergs Haft gefunden. Nur zufällig einen handgeschriebenen Zettel eines inzwischen verstorbenen Gefängnisarztes, in welchem dieser den inzwischen als Sowjetfeind liquidierten Sicherheitschef Abakumow fragt, was er mit der Leiche eines verstorbenen Häftlings anfangen solle. Abakumow habe auf diesen Zettel geschrieben: Nicht obduzieren, kremieren! Dieser Gefangene, so schloß der Memorandumverfasser, müsse Wallenberg gewesen sein.

Mündlich erklärten die Sowjetsprecher: Zweifelten wir an der Richtigkeit dieses Schlusses, dann gäbe es eben keinen Beweis dafür, daß der Diplomat überhaupt jemals in russischer Gefangenschaft befunden habe.

Schwedens Außenminister wies auf die Zeugenaussagen hin, laut denen Wallenberg sich zu viel späteren Zeitpunkten, als dem im Memorandum von 1957 genannten „Tode", ja noch in den 1960er Jahren in sowjetischen Gefängnissen befand. „Die Arbeit für Wallenbergs Rettung geht weiter", erklärte Schwedens neuer Außenminister.

Erlander handed them over during his state visit in Moscow in 1956, the Soviet Government waited almost a year before stating in a memorandum that they had found no evidence of Wallenberg's detention in any prison. Only by chance a handwritten slip of a since deceased prison doctor, in which the latter asks Security Chief Abakumov, since liquidated as an enemy of the state, what he should do with the body of a dead prisoner. Abakumov wrote on this slip: "Hold no inquest. Cremate!" This prisoner, concluded the memorandum's author, must have been Wallenberg.

Orally the Soviet spokesman stated: "We doubted the correctness of this conclusion, since there is no evidence that the diplomat was ever in Russian captivity.

The Foreign Minister of Sweden referred to the eyewitnesses, according to whom Wallenberg was in Soviet prisons at much later dates than "date of death" named in the memorandum of 1957, even in the sixties. "The work for the rescue of Wallenberg goes on," said Sweden's now foreign minister.

(cont. from page 19)

second-class nuclear Power, Britain will always be clinging to America's coat-tail. As the first Power to have renounced nuclear weapons, this country would be in a position to take an independent initiative.

In particular, Britain could insist that what really matters is for members of the Western Alliance to have a voice in the shaping of *American* policy. So long as it appears that only the possession of nuclear weapons guarantees such an influence, the Gaullist argument may sound convincing in German ears. Once it becomes apparent that it is possible to have influence without necessarily owning nuclear weapons, it will sound far less persuasive.

Britain could thus challenge the whole Gaullist approach at its weakest point: the anachronistic assumption that, whether in military, diplomatic or economic matters, there is a European interest which can be pursued independently from the interests of the Atlantic Alliance as a whole. Britain should be urging a realistic Atlantic strategy which would recognise America's supremacy within the alliance while seeking ways of giving its other members a voice in decision-making.

London Observer
4 August 1963

COMING UP FOR AIR

IN retrospect, many of the issues that have occupied public attention for the past six months, since the collapse of Britain's negotiations to enter the Common Market, seem largely trivial and irrelevant.

It has been a hectic period of scandal, speculation and intrigue; at times it has almost seemed as though the preoccupation with home politics was a deliberate attempt to postpone the day when the problems thrown up by the breakdown of the Brussels talks would have to be faced. Now, however, there are signs that the Government is coming up for air. With Mr. Macmillan reasserting his authority, and with a Labour landslide at the next general election no longer looking quite so inevitable as it did even a few weeks ago, the real issues of economic, foreign and military policy may at last receive the attention they deserve.

The need to look at British policy, in the light of the failure to become a member of the European Community, is made all the more urgent by the signs of a thaw in international relations. If Britain is to play an active role in exploiting the opportunities created by the Moscow test-ban agreement, we cannot go on acting as though Brussels had never happened.

At his Press conference on Monday President de Gaulle once again spelt out the basic, unresolved conflict between his view of the Western Alliance and that held by the "Anglo-Saxons." For British policy to be conducted on the assumption that this conflict can be ignored can lead only to another disillusioning fiasco.

The European Community, if it develops along the lines sketched out by President de Gaulle, is going to become increasingly self-contained. Militarily, it will dispose of its own nuclear deterrent—that of France. Economically, it will become more and more self-sufficient—with France gaining an outlet for her agricultural surpluses. Diplomatically, it will sit back sceptically watching negotiations between Russia and America.

That, at any rate, is how President de Gaulle sees it. It does not follow that the other members of the Community agree with him: his plans arouse much hostility, if only because they seem to be a means of asserting French hegemony in Europe. But it would be dangerous to count on the willingness of the Five to risk smashing the Community in order to block President de Gaulle's plans—the ultimate threat which he holds out. As in the case of Britain's application, the Five may be forced to give way.

• • •

BUT if French policy to any extent prevails, certain clear and dangerous consequences follow. On grounds of expense alone, France may be tempted to involve West Germany in her H-bomb programme: this would bring about precisely the proliferation of nuclear weapons which Britain and the United States want to prevent. It is far from certain that even the offer of American nuclear know-how or equipment, now being discussed in Washington, would stop President de Gaulle. America is insisting that, in return, France would have to accept some measure of integration with American policy—as Britain has done: and President de Gaulle has so far shown no sign whatever of accepting such conditions.

Economically the Gaullist concept of the Common Market runs counter not only to the ideas of its founders but also to the needs of the Western world. If Europe is to move towards self-sufficiency, at least as far as agriculture is concerned, present plans for increasing trade may be threatened; already America is feeling nervously defensive about the dollar, as President Kennedy's attempts to restrict investment abroad have shown. Hopes for tariff cuts—the "Kennedy round"—could well fade away if Europe starts niggling too much about letting in American agricultural products.

If this were to happen Britain, who had hoped to extend her markets by joining the Community, would instead find them shrinking. Equally important, the underdeveloped countries would be seriously affected if Western trading policy were to become restrictionist instead of expansionary.

Diplomatically, too, the Gaullist approach contradicts that of Britain and the U.S. It may not matter all that much if France remains aloof from any negotiations with Russia. But it would matter if, in this respect, France were able to speak for Western Europe—and, in particular, for Germany—which is what President de Gaulle would hope to do. The effect of this would be to relegate negotiations to that far-distant day when, so de Gaulle believes, Russia will "rejoin Europe."

In all this it is Germany's role which is central to President de Gaulle's calculations. If the policies of France are more appealing to Germany than those of the U.S. and Britain he may get his way. Otherwise, he will be isolated and powerless.

• • •

IF, in the last resort, Germany were forced to choose between protection by the French or by the American nuclear deterrent, the issue could not be in doubt. But this is a difficult card for the U.S. to play: by threatening to withdraw from Europe she would reinforce the Gaullist argument that she cannot be relied upon to stay indefinitely.

In an attempt to reassure Germany and to prevent the growth of a Bonn-Paris nuclear alliance, America has put forward the proposal for a multilateral nuclear force. This would, it is argued, give Germany equal status with other members of the alliance and create an atmosphere of confidence. But it may well be that the same results can be achieved at less risk to the hopes of negotiating further agreements with Russia. And it is here that Britain could have an important role to play.

Even if Mr. Macmillan's argument that only Britain's nuclear deterrent guaranteed her a place at the Moscow talks could be accepted at face value, it does not follow that it will be a useful piece of diplomatic equipment in future negotiations. As a

DAGENS NYHETER
3 June 1964

DA

”Wallenberg dömdes 1947 till 25 år”

Från DN:s speciella medarbetare Inge Santner

WIEN, tisdag.

Raoul Wallenberg fick 1947 i Ljubjankafängelset i Moskva meddelande om att han av en rysk specialdomstol dömts till 25 års fängelse utan att han själv fått vara närvarande och utan möjlighet att försvara sig. Detta omtalar wienaren Franz L. som på tisdagen framträdde i Wientidningen Express och berättade om sitt möte med den svenske diplomaten i fängelseborgen Verchneuralsk i oktober 1953.

Franz L hållades som verksam i den österrikiska statspolisen av den sovjetiska ockupationsmakten och fördes till Sovjet. Han fick uppleva åtta fruktansvärda år i Stalintidens läger. I oktober 1953 skulle Franz L få en sinnla omväxling i sin enformiga fängelsevistelse. Han hämtades av hemliga polisen ur sin cell i specialfängelset Verchneuralsk vid Tjeljabinsk och flyttades till en annan cell. Men man hade i förväg preparerat honom: L, som sedan 1947 inte hade träffat sin familj, kunde nu ”förtjäna” sin hemresa.

Han skulle föras till en annan fånge och försöka vinna dennes förtroende och därefter utfråga honom om vad han hade haft i Budapest att göra, vilka kontakter han hade där och vilka som var hans uppdragsgivare. Denne man var den svenske diplomaten Raoul Wallenberg.

Forts. sidan tjugu, spalt tre.

Wallenberg svårt misshandlad

Wallenberg . . .

(Forts. från sid. 1)

— Jag vill naturligtvis fara hem — det var min innerligaste önskan. Men kunde jag göra vad ryssarna begärde av mig? säger Franz L. Jag beslöt mig för att försöka med en list, tillägger han för Express.

L lovade att ta sig an Wallenberg och hemart stod han ansikte mot ansikte med honom i cellen. Diplomaten befann sig synbarligen i god kroppslig kondition, men föreföll själsligt bruten. Efter 24 timmar hade de båda lärt känna varandra så pass att wienaren tänkte sig kunna få Wallenbergs förtroende.

Under faran av att själv bli förrådd talade han om sitt uppdrag för svensken. De båda rådslog om vad L skulle säga till polisen när man återkom för att hämta honom.

Svår misshandel

Wallenberg berättade för L vad han hade haft för sig sedan 1945, och rara framställning har Frans L efter sin hemkomst lätt myndigheterna ta del av.

Wallenberg bedyrade, enligt Express, att han inte gjort sig skyldig till något spioneri. Han hade blott sysslat med uppgifter för Röda korsen sedan han efter krigets slut kommit till Budapest. Men snart enhölls han av NKVD (den hemliga ryska polisen) och inspärrades i de mest skiftande källarvalv. Dagslånga förhör och svår misshandel skulle få honom att tala. Men diplomaten hade ingenting att säga. År 1946 överförde man honom till Baden vid Wien, det beryktade säte för ryska ockupationsmaktens hemliga polis. I slutet av samma år kom han till Sopron i Ungern, och till slut via Lwow till Moskva.

I den ryska huvudstaden lärde han efter hand känna de flesta fängelser inifrån. Sommaren 1947 erhöll han i Ljubjankafängelset meddelandet om att en specialdomstol dömt honom till 25 års fängelsestraff utan att han själv fått vara närvarande, utan möjlighet att försvara sig. Vid den tiden — sades det från rysk sida — hade Wallenberg dött.

Enligt vad Frans L vidare fick veta av Wallenberg hade man kort därefter fört honom till ett "tyst" läger. År 1950 kom han till specialfängelset Verchne Uralsk. Det är en fästningsliknande byggnad på en höjd, som många där internerade österrikare ännu har i bittert minne.

Wallenberg förbjöds där på det strängaste att skriva något och kunde inte heller träda i kontakt med några myndigheter. Han var död för världen. Har han sedan dess verkligen blivit det?

I fyra dagar stannade Franz L i cellen. Sedan hämtade man ut honom därifrån. Hemliga polisen ogillade dock att L fått dessa uppgifter av Wallenberg. Wienaren sattes under strängare kontroll och placerades i en cell tillsammans med fem ryska mördare.

Raoul Wallenberg är sedan dess försvunnen.

Ovanstående redogörelse bekräftar att Raoul Wallenberg levde år 1953, alltså sex år efter det att han skulle ha avlidit, enligt vad som påstods från rysk sida i februari 1957. Det bör emellertid påpekas att svenska regeringen har erhållit — och till ryska regeringen överlämnat — ett detaljerat material, av vilket framgår att Wallenberg var vid liv omkring 1960, med noggrann ortsangivelse.

Flera detaljer i det nu publicerade vittnesmålet är nya. Viktigast är meddelandet att Wallenberg 1947 skulle ha dömts till 25 års fängelse, ett straff som fastställdes samtidigt som han enligt rysk uppgift skulle ha avlidit. Det har av tidigare — i en svensk vitbok publicerade — vittnesmål framgått att de ryska fängelsemyndigheterna just sommaren 1947 visade ett speciellt intresse för alla som hade varit i kontakt med Wallenberg. Detta intresse får nu sin förklaring i att Wallenberg vid denna tidpunkt dömdes till ett hårt straff.

Man utgår från att svenska regeringen inför och i samband med Chrustjevs besök med kraft inskärper det svenska kravet att få veta den fulla sanningen om Raoul Wallenberg samt att denne får återvända till Sverige. Mycket starka skäl talar för att Wallenberg alltjämt är i livet.

2

201-S

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

ROUTING

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : VIENNA

ACTION : [redacted]

INFO : [redacted]

S E C R E T 191417Z

DIR INFO [redacted]

[redacted]

19 JUN 64 IN 10847

1. VIENNA DAILY KURIER 19 JUN CARRIES TWO PAGE ARTICLE ON SWEDISH DIPLOMAT RAOUL WALLENBERG. SUBSTANCE IS THAT WALLENBERG STILL ALIVE AND THAT FORMER CELL MATE OF HIS IN MOSCOW PRISON, NOW LIVING IN VIENNA, WAS THREATENED BY SOVIET MILITARY ATTACHE ON 3 JUN NOT TO REVEAL ANY INFO RE WALLENBERG. THIS ALLEGEDLY IN CONNECTION WITH KHRUSHCHEV VISIT SCANDINAVIA.

2. SOURCE OF KURIER ARTICLE IS FRANZ LAUFER [redacted] NOTORIOUS INTEL FABRICATOR, ONE TIME AGENT OF AMERICAN ARMY INTEL AND OF AUSTRIAN STAPO, ARRESTED BY SOVIETS 47 AND JAILED TIL 55. AUSTRIANS ISSUED BURN NOTICE 1959, SUGGESTING LAUFER PSYCHO.

3. WE DISCOUNT ABOVE KURIER ARTICLE BECAUSE IT CONTAINS MANY ALLEGED DETAILS TO WHICH LAUFER COULD NOT POSSIBLY HAVE HAD ACCESS IN MOSCOW AND BECAUSE INCONCEIVABLE LAUFER WOULD HAVE KEPT INFO ON WALLENBERG, IF HE HAD ANY, SECRET AFTER HIS RETURN AUSTRIA AND DURING PROLONGED LEGAL BATTLE ON HIS RESTITUTION CLAIM AGAINST AUSTRIAN GOVERNMENT.

END OF MESSAGE

S E C R E T

201-59225

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Copy No.

Chief, WE

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION	
		MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO: Chief, WE Division	X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM: [redacted]		MICROFILM
SUBJECT: [redacted] Operations Raoul WALLENBERG		

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

A.R. For Your Information

1. On 2 February 1965, Swedish TV presented a documentary on the Raoul WALLENBERG case. This program has again caused some interest in the case and has led to a statement by the Government that the case will never be considered closed as long as any aspect of WALLENBERG's fate remains subject to question. The TV program's disclosure of an American offer to intervene on behalf of the Swedish government with Soviet authorities in an effort to develop information concerning WALLENBERG's fate, has been the basis for renewed press and public comment on this case. This has been sharpened with the concurrent disclosure that the Swedish Government apparently turned this offer down.

2. Forwarded herewith for WALLENBERG's 201 are press resumes of the latest intermezzo.

[redacted]

Attachment:
Press clippings

Distribution:
3 - Chief, WE w/att
2 - [redacted] w/att

CS COPY

201-59125

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	[redacted]	10 February 1965
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER: [redacted]

DAGENS NYHETER 9 FEB 65

Oklart om svenskt nej till Wallenbergaktion

Utrikesdepartementet har nu fått tillgång till den telegramväxling som ägde rum i april 1945 mellan State Department i Washington och de amerikanska ambassaderna i Stockholm och Moskva angående diplomatisk hjälp från USA i forskningarna efter Raoul Wallenberg. Av ett telegram från dåvarande ambassadör Averell Harriman till Washington framgår att den svenska legationen i Moskva inte ansåg att en amerikansk framställning till sovjetiska utrikesministeriet skulle vara önskvärd.

På utrikesdepartementet framhåller man att det är fortfarande oklart hur det svenska avböjandet gått till — och om avböjandet över huvud taget kom från svenskt håll.

Dåvarande svenske ambassadören i Moskva, Staffan Söderblom, rapporterade i efterhand till UD om kontakterna i Moskva, som kommit till stånd efter ett telegram från dåvarande amerikanske ambassadören i Stockholm, Herschel Johnson. I ambassadör Söderbloms rapport heter det att amerikanska ambassaden i Moskva torde ha svarat Herschel Johnson "att den utgår ifrån att man genom State Departement vänt sig till USA:s representation i Ungern. Ambassaden torde i övrigt svårligen anse något vara att göra från amerikansk sida."

I ambassadör Harrimans rapport till State Departement den 12 april 1945 heter det däremot att svenska legationen förklarat sig inte ha anledning att tro att sovjetiska vederbörande inte gjort vad de kunde i fråga om efterforskningarna. Legationen ansåg inte amerikansk framställning önskvärd, rapporterade Harriman.

På UD:s pressbyrå framhöll man på måndagskvällen att det kan förhålla sig så att ambassadör Söderblom inte bedömde amerikansk hjälp i fallet Wallenberg som fruktbar. Ambassadören hade tidigare själv gjort flera framstötar till sovjetiska myndigheter utan resultat. Men det kan å andra sidan, framhåller pressbyrån, ha varit den amerikanska ambassaden som ansåg att eventuell USA-hjälp inte skulle tjäna mycket till.

Sveriges ambassadör i Moskva 1944—46 Staffan Söderblom.

Innehållet i telegrammen återgavs i ett TV-program den 2 februari i år.

De tre telegrammen har i översättning följande lydelse:

Secretary of State, Washington.

Stockholm den 4 april 1945.

Svenska utrikesdepartementet är mycket bekymrat över att attachén vid legationen, Raoul Wallenberg, försvunnit. Enligt obekräftade radiomeddelanden har han mördats. Svenska legationen i Moskva har instruerats att begära ryska regeringens bistånd att fastställa Wallenbergs öde.

Den 4 april kl 17 sändes detta till Moskva:

Vi hade särskilt intresse av Wallenbergs verksamhet i Ungern och skulle mycket uppskatta varje stöd som vår ambassad i Moskva kan lämna den svenska legationen i Moskva i denna sak.

JOHNSON

Am. Embassy,

Washington 9 april 1945.

Följande till Harriman från departementet och krigsflyktingsstyrelsen (War Refugee Board):

Departementet och styrelsen skulle uppskatta om ni gåve allt möjligt stöd åt svenska legationen i Moskva vid dess hemställan till ryska regeringen om bistånd att fastställa attachéns vid svenska legationen i Budapest, Raoul Wallenbergs, öde. Krigsflyktingstyrelsen hade särskilt intresse av Wallenbergs verksamhet i Ungern på grund av hans utomordentliga arbete för att skydda judar och andra offer för fiendens förtryck under fiendens ockupation av Ungern.

STETTINIUS

*

Secretary of State, Washington.

Moskva 12 april 1945.

Svenska legationen i Moskva informerades sent i december av sovjetiska utrikesministeriet att Wallenberg var i säkerhet i Budapest. Legationen mottog senare en rapport från den svenska representationen i Bukarest att Wallenberg hade lämnat Budapest ensam med bil med okänt färdmål och att han försvunnit. Legationen i Moskva ombad därpå sovjetiska myndigheterna att söka spåra honom, vilket de lovade att göra. Svenskarna säger, att de icke ha någon anledning tro att ryssarna inte gör vad de kan, och att de inte anse att en framställning till sovjetiska utrikesministeriet från vår sida skulle vara önskvärd. Medlemmarna av den svenska representationen i Budapest förväntas anlända till Moskva inom några få dagar på väg till Stockholm och de kan möjligen ha ytterligare upplysningar om Wallenberg.

HARRIMAN

Att OSSA-13732
10 Feb 65

STOCKHOLMS TIDNINGEN
9 FEB 65

Telegramväxlingen om Wallenberg frisläpps av UD

I TV-programmet om Raoul Wallenberg 2 februari visades och återgavs innehållet av en telegramväxling i april 1945 mellan State Department i Washington och de amerikanska ambassaderna i Stockholm och Moskva om möjligheten av amerikanskt diplomatiskt stöd vid efterforskningarna av Wallenberg. Texterna till tre meddelanden som ingick i telegramväxlingen har numera ställts till svenska utrikesdepartementets förfogande.

I ett telegram av 4 april 1945 till State Department hemställde dåvarande amerikanske ambassadören i Stockholm, Herschel Johnson, att amerikanska ambassaden i Moskva måtte stödja svenska legationen i Moskva i dess strävanden att genom de sovjetiska myndigheterna fastställa Wallenbergs öde.

I ett telegram av 9 april 1945 instruerade State Department sin ambassad i Moskva att ge allt erforderligt stöd åt svenska legationen.

Dåvarande amerikanske ambassadören i Moskva, Averell Harriman, rapporterade i ett telegram av 12 april 1945 att svenska legationen förklarat sig inte ha anledning att tro att sovjetiska vederbörande inte gjorde vad de kunde i fråga om dessa efterforskningar. Legationen ansåg inte att en amerikansk framställning till sovjetiska utrikesministeriet skulle vara önskvärd.

Telegrammen avspeglar kontakter som under krigets slutskede förekom mellan utrikesdepartementet och amerikanska ambassaden i Stockholm samt mellan de svenska och amerikanska beskickningarna i Moskva angående de pågående efterforskningarna av Wallenberg, framhåller UD. Svenska legationen rapporterade i efterhand till utrikesdepartementet om kontakterna i Moskva.

Legationen framhöll i sin rapport att amerikanska ambassaden i Moskva torde ha svarat Herschel Johnson "att den utgår ifrån att man genom State Department vänt sig till Amerikas representation i Ungern. Ambassaden torde i övrigt svårligen anse något vara att göra från amerikansk sida".

Av utrikesdepartementets vitbok om Raoul Wallenberg framgår att en svensk demarche gjordes den 25 april 1945 hos de sovjetiska myndigheterna i ärendet.

De tre telegrammen har i översättning följande lydelse:

*

Secretary of State, Washington
1351, 4 april kl 5 e m.
Stockholm 4 april 1945.

Svenska utrikesdepartementet är mycket bekymrat över att attachen vid legationen i Budapest, Raoul Wallenberg, försvunnit. Enligt obekräftade radiomeddelanden har han mördats. Svenska legationen i Moskva har instrueras att begära ryska regeringens bistånd att fastställa Wallenbergs öde.

I mitt 14 den 4 april kl 5 e m sändes detta till Moskva.

Vi hade särskilt intresse av Wallenbergs verksamhet i Ungern och skulle mycket uppskatta varje stöd som vår ambassad i Moskva kan lämna svenska legationen i Moskva i denna sak.

JOHNSON

*

Embassy, Moskva,
Washington 9 april 1945.

Följande till Harriman från departementet och krigsflyktingstyrelsen (War Refugee Board).

Vi hänvisar till Stockholms nr 14 den 4 april till er, sänt till departementet som nr 1251 den 4 april.

Departementet och styrelsen skulle uppskatta om ni gåve allt möjligt stöd åt svenska legationen i Moskva vid dess hemställan till ryska regeringen om bistånd att fastställa attachéns vid svenska legationen i Budapest, Raoul Wallenberg, öde.

Krigsflyktingstyrelsen hade särskilt intresse av Wallenbergs verksamhet i Ungern på grund av hans utomordentliga arbete för att skydda judar och andra offer för fiendens förtryck under fiendens ockupation av Ungern.

STETTINIUS

*

Secretary of State, Washington
1137, 12 april kl 10.
Moskva 12 april 1945.

Svenska legationen i Moskva informerades sent i december av sovjetiska utrikesministeriet att Wallenberg tedert 124 9 april kl 7 e m vore i säkerhet i Budapest. Legationen mottog senare en rapport från den svenska representationen i Bukarest att Wallenberg hade lämnat Budapest ensam med bil med okänt färdmål och att han försvunnit. Legationen i Moskva ombad därpå sovjetiska myndigheterna att söka spåra honom, vilket de lovade att göra. Svenskarna säger, att de icke ha någon anledning tro att ryssarna inte gör vad de kan, och att de inte anse att en framställning till sovjetiska utrikesministeriet från vår sida skulle vara önskvärd. (Sänt till departementet som nr 1137; Sänt till Stockholm som nr 16)

Medlemmarna av den svenska representationen i Budapest förväntas anlända till Moskva inom några få dagar på väg till Stockholm och de kan möjligen ha ytterligare upplysningar om Wallenberg.

HARRIMAN

2

AH 055A-15732
10 Feb 65

201-5925
19 Feb 65

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

	MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
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	MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WE

INFO.

FROM: [redacted]

SUBJECT: [redacted] Operations
Raoul WALLENBERG

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

For your information

Forwarded for the record is the DAGENS NYHETER report of 12 June 1965 which quotes Prime Minister ERLANDER that the Russians continue to claim that they are unable to find WALLENBERG. ERLANDER took up the WALLENBERG case again with Soviet authorities during his current State Visit [redacted]

Attachment:
News Article

Distribution:
3 - Chief, WE w/att
2 - [redacted] w/att

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201-5925

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	[redacted]	16 June 1965
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-5925

Oförändrad Sovjetattityd i fallet Raoul Wallenberg

Från DN:s Moskvakorrespondent Lars Bringert

MOSKVA fredag.

Maktskiftet i Kreml har av allt att döma inte inneburit någon föränd rad sovjetisk inställning till fallet Wallenberg. Statsminister Erlander tog på fredagen vid ett två och en halv timme långt samtal med den sovjetiske regeringschefen Alexej Kosygin åter upp frågan, men utan att nå några nya resultat.

— Vårt samtal ger ingen anledning till stor optimism, förklarade hr Erlander efteråt. På ryskt håll anser man sig fortfarande inte kunna finna Wallenberg.

Frågan är dock ännu inte utagerad. Herrar Erlander och Kosygin skall fortsätta fredagens samtal på torsdag, när statsministern kommer tillbaka från Krim, och då avser man åtminstone på svenskt håll att ta upp Wallenberg igen. Samma dag skall statsministern också utanför det officiella programmet träffa den sovjetiske partichefen Leonid Brezjnev.

Med sig till Moskva hade hr Erlander inget direkt nytt Wallenbergmaterial, men väl nya synpunkter på det gamla. Vid fredagens samtal bad han också att få ta del av de ryska undersökningar som på svensk anmodan gjorts i Sovjet, men något svar tycks man dock ännu inte ha fått.

Samma synpunkter

Mycket tyder alltså på att de synpunkter Kreml kommer att framföra i stort blir desamma som Nikita Chrustjev förde med sig till Stockholm i fjol sommar.

Utöver Wallenberg togs på fredagen inga andra fall med försvunna svenskar upp, eftersom man från svensk sida inte hade något nytt material att presentera.

Däremot uttryckte hr Erlander sin stora tillfredsställelse med det ökade antal utresetillstånd som sedan Chrustjevbesöket gjyits sovjetiska medborgare med svensk anknytning. Bara de senaste dagarna har 25 nya ansökningar beviljats.

Sedan juli 1961 har 137 balter fått utresetillstånd för att besöka svenska släktingar och 18 för att bosätta sig i Sverige. Som bekant har också elva Svenskbybor lämnat Sovjetunionen. För 18 vuxna och 18 minderåriga invånare i den lilla svenskbyn Verbivka i Ukraina ligger alltjämt ansökningar inne.

Fredagens samtal med Kosygin blev en halvtimme längre än beräknat, och under tiden fick Sovjets president Anastas Mikojan sitta på sitt ämbetsrum i Kreml och vänta på den svenske statsministerns planerade artighetsvisit. Men trots programöverdraget hann man ändå inte gå igenom allt, utan tid för ett nytt samtal bestämdes alltså till nästa torsdag. För säkerhets skull antecknade Kosygin egenhändigt tillägget i hr Erlanders personliga program.

Den avgjort största delen av tiden i Kosygins arbetsrum — han har övertagit Stalins och Chrustjevs gamla — ägnades åt FN:s finansiella kris. Från svensk sida hävdades att man bör bortse från förflutna strider och i stället inrikta sig på att finna en metod för att lösa betalningsproblemen, samtidigt undvika debatter om tolkningsfrågor och skapa regler som i framtiden effektivt förhindrar kriser som denna.

Hr Erlander förklarade efteråt att den svenska attityden går ut på att man borde stryka ett streck över hela den juridiska debatten.

Såvitt man ännu vet gav Kosygin inga direkta svar och framförde heller inte några nya konstruktiva ryska förslag i anslutning till den svenska propån. Men i sitt tal vid den ryska regeringens stora lunch i Kreml något senare sade han:

— Vi är övertygade om att man inte kan stärka Förenta nationerna endast genom fromma önskningar...

På båda sidor förklarade man sig dock tillmäta Förenta nationerna stor betydelse.

En annan av de frågor som kom att dominera samtalet i Kreml var nedrustningsförhandlingarna i Genève. Hr Erlander betonade vikten av att nya sammanträden snarast inleds och förklarade att man på svensk sida anser att tanken på partiella framsteg bör accepteras. Ett mindre framsteg är ju också ett steg i rätt riktning, eftersom det kan medföra att båda blocken får ansvar för att ytterligare steg följer.

Från rysk sida betonade man att även ett litet framsteg kräver ömsesidigt förtroende, och därmed framgick alltså att Kreml i dag inte anser att något sådant existerar stormakterna emellan.

Förhandlingar

Man kom också in på kriget i Vietnam. Den svenska regeringen anser, hävdades det, att snara förhandlingar med sikte på en fredlig lösning framstår som ytterst angelägna. Liknande synpunkter framförde den norske utrikesministern Einar Gerhardsen vid sitt besök i Kreml för två veckor sedan. Men den ryska attityden är alltså, vilket framgick av Kosygins intervju med de svenska journalisterna något senare, att sådana förhandlingar inte kan föras med någon annan än "det vietnamesiska folket självt".

Det svensk-sovjetiska handelsutbytet togs så upp och bl a uppehöll man sig en stund vid de pågående förhandlingarna om stora leveranser till Sovjetunionen där många svenska industrier, bland dem Karlstads Mekaniska Werkstad, är inblandade. Men om hur förhandlingarna fortlöper, när de kan tänkas bli avslutade och hur stort belopp kontraktet kommer att löpa på ville statsministern på fredagskvällen inte uttala sig.

Däremot nämndes aldrig Kekkonenplanen om en atomvapenfri zon i Skandinavien, som normalt är ett kärt sovjetiskt spörsmål, men det är möjligt att tidsnöden avgjorde. När samtalet avslutades hade ju president Mikojan som sagt redan suttit en halvtimme och väntat på hr Erlanders formella artighetsvisit.

Den genomfördes dock på traditionellt sätt och sedan bjöd allså sovjetiska staten på jättelunch i Kreml med kaviar, piroger, hemsaltad lax, vjltsallad, pärlhönssoppa, fiskfilé i champagne, kalvstek med grönsaker, jordgubbsglass, kaffe med småkakor, frukt, vodka, grusiska viner, champagne och konjak.

Omkring 50 personer var närvarande, bland dem partichefen Leonid Brezjnev, Kosygin förstås, försvarsminister Rodion Malinovskij, utrikesminister Alexej Gromyko, Moskvas nye borgmästare Vladimir Promyslov, handelsminister Patolitjev, vice regeringschefen Kirill Mazurov och Ukrainas partichef Pjotr Sjelest. Däremot var president Mikojan inte med.

ATT # : 40 CISSA 14077 CS CUT 201-5925

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 301-5425

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

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FROM [redacted]

ACTION

INFO

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FILE, VR, FI, FINT 2, C, C/SB

US embjunde re RW & Söderblom

S E C R E T

DIR CITE [redacted]

1. [redacted] REPORT SWEDISH FORMO OR YASH FOR ANY PREVIOUSLY UNDISCLOSED REQUEST WE MAKE PARALLEL CHECK AND INF

2. SOS WILL RELEASE WHITE PAPER ON [redacted] STORY 16 SEPT.

S E C R E T

[redacted] STATE [redacted] D RE ALLEGED [illegible]

ET

SECRET

301-5425
15 Sept 65

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-[illegible]

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

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4		8	

FROM

[redacted]

ACTION

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ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TURED

UNIT

TIME

FILE

S E C R E T [redacted]

DIR CIA [redacted]

ISSUE 52371

1. [redacted] REPORT SWEDISH FORNOFF TO ASK STATE [redacted] EITHER HERE OR WASH FOR ANY PREVIOUSLY UNDISCLOSED INFO RE WALLENBERG. THEY REQUEST WE MAKE PARALLEL CHECK AND INFORM THEM ASAP.

2. SOS WILL RELEASE WHITE PAPER ON WALLENBERG STORY 16 SEPT.

S E C R E T

[redacted] STATE [redacted] RE WALLENBERG [illegible]

ET

SECRET

201-5925
15 Sept 63

[redacted]

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE : 21 SEPTEMBER 65

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 18

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. [redacted] 201-5925

☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☒ FILE NO

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3	1097	7	
4		8	

21 SEP 65

TO : [redacted]

FROM: DIRECTOR

SIG GEN

CONF: WOB INFO: VR , FILE [redacted] RID COPY C1, C1/OS, C1/C2, FI, [illegible]

FI/INT 2

TO [redacted] INFO CITE DIR

[redacted]

DIR 44521

21 Sep 65

REF: [redacted] (IN 52371)*

C/O [redacted] HAS NO INFO NOT ALREADY KNOWN TO SWEDES.

END OF MESSAGE

AN	FI	
PS		
ABSTRACT	X	INDEX

WE COMMENT: [redacted] asked for a parallel check of MIDARK records to be made as a complement to the check with State being made by the Swedish Foreign Office.

[redacted]

MICROFILMED
DEC 21 1965
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copy filed in [redacted]

201-005925

[redacted]

[redacted]

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SECRET

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DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

TO: Chief, WE Division

INFO:

FROM: Chief, [redacted]

SUBJECT: [redacted] Operations
Raoul WALLENBERG

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES: A.R. FYI

Forwarded herewith is some of the Swedish news coverage of the Government of Sweden's White Paper on the Raoul WALLENBERG case upon its release to the public. A copy of the White Paper has been ordered and will be forwarded to you as soon as it is received.

[redacted]

Distribution:
3 - Chief, WE w/att
2 - Chief, [redacted] w/o/att
2 - [redacted] w/o/att

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GT

VITBOKEN

När regeringen nu lägger fram en vitbok i fallet Raoul Wallenberg, betyder detta, att man på basis av nuvarande bevismateriel och vittnesmål inte kan vänta sig några framsteg i frågan. Detta hindrar inte, att frågan på nytt kan bli aktuell, regeringen kommer att ta upp fallet så snart något nytt faktum blir känt, enligt statsministerns deklaration.

Det nya i vitboken är vittnesmålet från professor Nanna Svartz. Det kan komma att tolkas så att professor Svartz i förtroende fick ränna upplysningar av en ryske kollega, men att denne därefter på grund av påtryckningar från de ryska myndigheterna tvingades ta tillbaka vad han sagt under hänvisning till språkliga missuppfattningar.

De ryska ledarna hänvisar till att det inte kan finnas något begripligt skäl för dem att kvarhålla Wallenberg i Sovjet, om han vore i livet.

Det är inte någon beskyllning mot professor Svartz, om man trots allt tillmäter den ryska versionen av hennes samtal med sin ryske kollega en viss plausibilitet; hon kan trots allt ha uppfattat dennes yttranden som mera kategoriska än de var menade, samtidigt som den ryske vetenskapsmannen, ovetande om vilken betydelse hans ord hade, uttryckte sig slarvigare än han annars skulle gjort.

Ändå kvarstår att episoden är ytterst svårbegriplig. Man frågar sig, vilka skäl den ryske vetenskapsmannen hade att påstå eller förmoda något om Wallenberg, dennes eventuella vistelse på mentalsjukhus och hans hälsotillstånd, om det i själva verket var så, som senare påstods, att han inte visste något alls i frågan och inte ens kände till Wallenbergs namn.

I fyra och ett halvt år har svenska regeringen arbetat med detta vittnesmål utan att nå något resultat. På högsta politiska nivå har professor Svartz samtal tagits upp vid samtliga statsbesök, och vid ett flertal tillfällen har de båda vetenskapsmännen fått träffas på nytt. Något mer synes nu inte kunna göras, tyvärr har vitboken inte förmått skingra mystiken kring fallet Wallenberg.

Vitboken ger ett mycket starkt intryck av vilka energiska ansträngningar regeringen gjort. Ett stort antal av utrikesdepartementets mest kvalificerade krafter har nästan dagligen arbetat med fallet i flera år. Frågan har tagits upp med de ryska myndigheterna till den grad att varje statsbesök mest handlat om Wallenberg. De svensk-ryska förbindelserna har i över ett decennium dominerats och förbittrats av denna fråga.

Från rysk sida har man vid flera tillfällen visat avsevärd irritation. Ryssarna har givit ett besked, enligt vilket Wallenberg dog 1947. Sedan svenskarna inte godtagit detta, utan fortsatt sina framställningar, har man frågat varför vi förutsätter att ryssarna ljuger och varför vi tror att de skulle kvarhålla Wallenberg, om han fanns i Sovjet; Chrusjtjov förklarade vid sitt senaste besök i Sverige, att han inte skulle ha kommit, om han vetat att vi på nytt skulle ta upp fallet Wallenberg.

Ryssarna har också uttryckt sin irritation över att Sverige förpestar de svensk-ryska förbindelserna med att ta upp en enda människas försvinnande, när Sovjet, som jämförelse, förlorade 20 miljoner människor i kriget mot nazisterna, som Sverige stod utanför.

Oberoende av tyngden i sådana argument, har svenska regeringen med rätta sett det som en humanitär åtgärd att försöka klarlägga Wallenbergs öde.

Som läget nu är, tycks alla möjligheter ha blivit uttömda. Det är till synes omöjligt att nu komma längre, något som inte hindrar att nya ansträngningar måste göras i den mån nya fakta kommer i dagen.

☐ *Svenska regeringen har gjort allt vad den kan klarlägga hans öde.*

DAGENS NYHETER. DEL 1

Onsdagen den 15 September 1965

Wallenbergsbok Cellkamrat kron

Vitboken om Raoul Wallenberg kommer att offentliggöras på torsdagen, sedan den presenterats för ledamöterna i utrikesnämnden. Den blir på 55 stencilerade kvartsidor och innehåller endast dokumentation i form av vittnesmål och skriftväxlingar med de ryska myndigheterna. Vitboken torde däremot inte innehålla någon avslutande eller sammanfattande redogörelse för fallet. Det svenska kronvittnet är en österrikisk medborgare som uppger att han suttit i samma cell som Wallenberg i Vladimirfängelset.

Utrikesnämndens sammanträde, som leds av kungen, börjar kl 11, och ledamöterna har fått varsel om att det kan pågå hela dagen. Utöver vitboken om Wallenberg väntar man att även Vietnamfrågan skall tas upp till diskussion, medan instruktionen till den att behandlas av nämnden. I sina huvuddrag var materialet till vitboken om Wallenberg klart redan i juni när statsminister Tage Erlander återkom från Moskva med det sista negativa beskedet. Sedan dess har ett omfattande arbete med kontroll m m av mate-

... det förslagsverksamhet ingår även i kampanjen.

”Fallet kan aldrig avskrivas”

Wallenbergs-

(Forts. från sid. 1)

Boken är ännu inte klar men kommer eventuellt kommer ytterligare två sidor att tillfogas boken innan den tenutgörs.

Från regeringens sida menar man att fallet aldrig kan betraktas som helt avskrivet i varje fall som det inte torran mån att skriftliga be- Wallenbergs avlidit. Beträffande Wallenbergs öde i Ryssland hänvisar man till Wallenbergs hustru i Stockholm den 27 juni och där det bl a förklarades att vissa upplysningar i svensk press i maj detta år var felaktiga. UD understryker att man som svar på frågor från pressen gav den upplysningen att den efterfrågan som den svenska ambassaden fått den 6 februari samt det svar som ryska UD lämnat den 6 mars 1959. Det finns ingen anledning för UD, heter det, att avge någon kommentar rörande vad som stått i svenska tidningar. För att undvika missförstånd rörande det material på vilket den svenska efterfrågan var baserad ansåg UD det nödvändigt att ge följande mer exakt information om några av de vittnesmål som finns tillgängliga.

Österrikaren ej namngiven

① Schweiziske medborgaren, Brugger, född 22/1 1903, som vistades i fängelse i Sovjet under åren 1948—1959 har meddelat att han i Wladimirfängelset, corpus 2, haft knackningskontakt med Raoul Wallenberg vid månadsskiftet juli/augusti 1954. Ett antal andra fångar, som återvänt från Sovjet, har förklarat att Brugger har talat om kontakt med Wallenberg under fängenskapen.

② En österrikisk medborgare, som vistades i fängelser i Sovjet under tiden 1945—1955, har förklarat att han delat cell med Wallenberg i corpus 2 i Wladimirfängelset. När en högre fängelsetjänsteman uppmärksammade österrikaren att Wallenberg fortfarande var i cellen omgående och uppmanade österrikaren att inte av tillfällen att svara på att inte av- [illegible] medborgare [illegible] ③ Ivy [illegible] Reichsmann [illegible] Mulle och [illegible] 11/6 1917 respektive 19/6 1908 som [illegible] vistades i fängenskap i Sovjet under [illegible] 1950—1956 har förklarat att de vid flera tillfällen i Wladimirfängelset i corpus 2 i Wladimir hört från medfångar i vistades i fängelset att Wallenberg [illegible] i corpus 2 i Wladimirfängelset [illegible] jan på 1950-talet.

Det är oförklarligt att svenska UD måste tillmäta de upplysningar betydelse UD har inte jun ledning tro att dessa försäkringar avgivits för att sprida missförstånd. Inte heller förefaller det troligt att försäkringarna skulle bero på misstag eller minnesfel. UD tar Skalet till att svenska boken, upp frågan är, heter det, Wallenbergs att vi önskar klarhet i de öde. Om detta kan ske skulle ett allvarligt irritationsmoment i de svensk-sovjetiska relationerna bortfalla.

Sedermera har ambassadör Rolf Sohlman också fått upplysningar av den högre sovjetisk ämbetsman av innebörden att Wallenberg skulle ha varit i livet omkring år 1960.

Från högerns och folkpartiets sida torde man också vid sammanträdet ta upp Vietnamfrågan. Den är för utrikesnämnden inte fördes i nest aktuella frågeställningen är: Olof Palme och utrikesminister Torsten Nilsson gjorde sina dekla- rationer.

Ryska UD svarade i en not 6 mars att alla informationer som Gromyko överlämnat år 1957. Den 28 juni 1959 förklarade ryska UD att vissa uppgifter som publicerats i pressen var gripna ur luften. Den 18 juli 1959 preciserade svenska UD uppgifter om de vittnesutsagor som gällde Wallenbergs vistelse i Wladimirfängelset.

I noten av den 18 juli 1959 erkänner svenska UD mottagandet av de upplysningar som överlämnats av ambassadör Sohlman den 27 juni 1959 samt det svar som ryska UD lämnat den 6 mars 1959. Det finns ingen anledning för UD, heter det, att avge någon kommentar rörande vad som stått i svenska tidningar. För att undvika missförstånd rörande det material på vilket den svenska efterfrågan var baserad ansåg UD det nödvändigt att ge följande mer exakt information om några av de vittnesmål som finns tillgängliga.

KUNGL. UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET

Raoul Wallenberg

DOKUMENTSAMLING

RÖRANDE EFTERFORSKNINGARNA

EFTER ÅR 1957

STOCKHOLM 1965

Att to [redacted]

AKTSTYCKEN

UTGIVNA AV KUNGL. UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET

Ny serie II:16

RAOUL WALLENBERG

DOKUMENTSAMLING

RÖRANDE EFTERFORSKNINGARNA

EFTER ÅR 1957

STOCKHOLM 1965

INNEHÅLLSFÖRTECKNING

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INLEDNING

År 1957 publicerade utrikesdepartementet en dokumentsamling jämte kommentarer förande Raoul Wallenbergs fångenskap i Sovjetunionen (Aktstycken utgivna av Kungl. Utrikesdepartementet. Ny serie II: 9). Den föreliggande volymen i samma serie omfattar dokumentation förande efterforskningarna efter 1957. Den inleds med texten till ett uttalande, hållet av statsminister Tage Erlander i anslutning till offentliggörandet av materialet från efterforskningarna. Detta material redovisas i den därefter införda redogörelsen jämte bilagor. Vidare ingår en särskild redogörelse av professor Nanna Svartz för de kontakter hon haft i Sovjetunionen i Wallenberg-ärendet.

Anförande av statsminister Tage Erlander
den 16 september 1965

Raoul Wallenbergs öde har starkt engagerat svensk opinion. Han blev fängslad och bortförd av främmande makt under utövande av diplomatisk tjänst för Sverige. Hans hjältemodiga insatser för att rädda ungerska judar undan de tyska och ungerska nazisternas brutala förföljelser har väckt djup beundran och tillgivenhet. Vi har haft visshet om att han befunnit sig i fängelse i Sovjetunionen. Detta är bakgrunden till de intensiva ansträngningarna från svensk sida att utröna hans vistelseort och få honom hemsänd.

År 1957 framlade utrikesdepartementet en utförlig dokumentsamling rörande Raoul Wallenberg jämte kommentarer rörande hans fångenskap i Sovjetunionen. Låt mig göra en kort återblick.

I mars 1944, sedan de tyska trupperna marscherat in i Ungern, inleddes en svensk hjälpaktion för de ungerska judarna. Raoul Wallenberg sändes till beskickningen i Budapest i juli 1944 för att närmast under beskickningschefen, envoyén Danielsson, leda hjälpaktionen. Han hade svenskt diplomatpass och åtnjöt diplomatisk immunitet. Outtröttligt arbetade han med fara för eget liv för att rädda judar undan nazisternas förföljelse. Han räddade människoliv i tusental.

I mitten av januari 1945 föll den del av Budapest, där de genom den svenska hjälpaktionen skyddade judarna bodde, i sovjettruppernas händer. Den 16 januari meddelade sovjetiska utrikesministeriet, att Wallenberg befann sig under de ryska truppernas beskydd.

Den förra vitboken innehåller ett utförligt material om alla de svenska démarcher som gjordes vid denna tid och åren därefter för att klarlägga Wallenbergs uppehållsort och få honom överförd till Sverige. De blev samtliga resultatlösa. Jag vill särskilt erinra om att sovjetregeringen i augusti 1947 meddelade, att som resultat av en noggrann undersökning hade fastställts, att Wallenberg inte fanns i Sovjetunionen och att han var okänd för de sovjetryska myndigheterna.

Mellan 1947 och 1951 ingick inte till svenska utrikesdepartementet några väsentliga nya fakta i Wallenberg-ärendet. Men allteftersom ut-

ländska fångar började sändas hem från Sovjetunionen, framkom beslämda uppgifter om att Wallenberg hölls i fängsligt förvar i Moskva. Detta föranledde en ny lång serie svenska démarcher, likaledes utan resultat. I april 1956 besökte jag och inrikesminister Gunnar Hedlund Sovjetunionen. Vi hade därvid tillfälle att direkt till den sovjetiska regeringen lämna en utförlig redogörelse för de svenska synpunkterna. I själva verket kom överläggningarna att i första rummet kretsa kring Wallenberg-ärendet. Vid slutet av samtalen lovade sovjetregeringens representanter — bl. a. herrar Bulganin, Chrustjov och Molotov — att en ny omfattande utredning rörande Wallenbergs öde skulle företagas med anledning av det bevismaterial som insamlats och framlagds från svensk sida.

Den 6 februari 1957 kom det ryska beskedet. Dess innehörd var följande: under de omfattande sovjetiska undersökningarna hade man påträffat ett dokument, enligt vilket Raoul Wallenberg skulle ha avlidit i Ljubljanskaja-fängelset i Moskva den 17 juli 1947. Detta hade meddelats av chefen för sjukvårdstjänsten i fängelset, Smolisov, till chefen för den ryska säkerhetstjänsten, Abakumov. Den sistnämnde hade, framhöll man i det ryska beskedet, tidigare lämnat det sovjetiska utrikesministeriet orikliga upplysningar. Abakumov avrättades i samband med uppresningarna inom säkerhetspolisen efter Stalins död.

Den svenska regeringens reaktion på detta besked gick ut på att det syntes svårt att tro, att all annan dokumentation rörande Wallenbergs vistelse i sovjetiska fängelser är det omnämnda dokumentet skulle vara utplånad. Svenska regeringen förbehöll sig att överlämna det ytterligare material rörande Wallenberg som kunde vara av betydelse för ett fortsatt undersökningsarbete i Sovjetunionen.

Under de år som förflutit sedan dess har vi fullföljt våra efterforskningar och ansträngningar. Vi har inte lämnat något spår oprövat, hur svagt det än må ha synts. Vi har begagnat alla tillfällen att på diplomatisk väg eller genom personliga kontakter ta upp frågan. En intensiv prövning av allt material och ingående interna överväganden har hela tiden ägt rum.

Den dokumentsamling som nu offentliggöres avser att ge en samlad bild av vad som förekommit sedan den föregående vitboken publicerades. Den innehåller sålunda texterna till de noteväxlingar som ägt rum med sovjetregeringen sedan 1957. Den redovisar de olika samtal som vi haft med medlemmar av sovjetregeringen under denna tid, framför allt mina samtal med Chrustjov sommaren 1964 och med Kosygin i

juni i år. Vitboken innehåller dessutom material angående de vittnesmål som vi byggt våra framställningar på under de senaste åren. Dessa vittnesmål hänför sig till två olika tidpunkter.

För det första gäller det uppgifterna om att Wallenberg under 1950-talet skulle ha befunnit sig i fängelse i Vladimir. Vi har sökt nå kontakt med de från Sovjetunionen hemvändande krigsfångar, som kunde tänkas ha befunnit sig i Vladimir under denna tid. Alla de uppgifter, som därvid framkommit och som kunnat sättas i direkt eller indirekt samband med Raoul Wallenberg, har varit föremål för prövning. En samlad bedömning av dessa uppgifters bärkraft gjordes år 1959 av f. d. justitieråden Gyllenswärd och Santesson. Yttrandet, som ingår i det framlagda materialet, går ut på att enligt deras mening måste efter svensk rätt den föreliggande utredningen, ehuru den icke innefattar full bevisning i förevarande hänseende, anses göra sannolikt, att Wallenberg varit vid liv åtminstone i början av 1950-talet och då befunnit sig i fängelse i Vladimir.

För det andra ingår i vitboken ett vittnesmål som framkom på nyåret 1961. Professor Natna Svartz hade vid ett besök i Moskva ett samtal om Raoul Wallenberg med en framstående sovjetisk vetenskapsman. Enligt hennes utsaga gjorde denne därvid på hennes direkta fråga uttalanden som innebar, att Wallenberg alltjämt skulle vara i livet. Professor Svartz har skrivit en särskild redogörelse, som ingår i vitboken, om detta uttalande och om sina senare kontakter med den sovjetiske vetenskapsmannen.

Dessa vittnesmål har bildat grundvalen för våra återkommande framställningar till sovjetregeringen. Vi har koncentrerat ansträngningarna till de tillfällen då möjligheter erbjudit sig till kontakter på högsta nivå. Ett initiativ från allra högsta håll i Sovjetunionen har nämligen tett sig som den oundgängliga förutsättningen att nå klarhet om Wallenbergs öde och få honom återförd till Sverige. Vi har vid dessa kontakter redovisat vårt material och våra synpunkter. Vi har sökt övertyga Sovjetunionens ledning om det utomordentliga allvar, med vilket man från svensk sida betraktar denna fråga. En väsentlig del av våra överläggningar med sovjetledarna under denna tid har kommit att gälla fallet Wallenberg.

Resultatet har tyvärr blivit negativt. Sovjetledningen hävdar bestämt, att Raoul Wallenberg inte finns i Sovjetunionen i varken i fängelse, på sjukhus eller på någon annan plats. Den vidhåller, att intet som helst material finns angående Wallenberg utöver den korta anteckning om hans död år 1947 som vi fick del av i det ryska beskes-

det är 1957. Man säger sig ha vidtagit upprepade nya undersökningar med anledning av våra framställningar, men intet som helst nytt material har därvid framkommit. Man förklarar, att Wallenberg aldrig funnits i Vladimir och att den sovjetiske vetenskapsmannens uttalanden till professor Svartz missuppfattats. Man framhåller, att det inte finns något som helst skäl, varför Sovjetunionen skulle kvarhålla Wallenberg, i vilket tillstånd han än måtte befinna sig, och hänvisar därvid till alla de krigsfångar och andra som fått återvända från Sovjetunionen under senare år. Man uttrycker sitt beklagande över Raoul Wallenbergs öde och för därvid i erinran alla de tragedier som följde i krigets spår.

Vi har inte nått det resultat som vi eftersträvat. Vi lägger idag fram vår redovisning för offentligheten.

Alla de ansträngningar som från svensk sida gjorts i denna sak har varit självklart motiverade av Raoul Wallenbergs insats för att hjälpa lidande människor och av hänsynen till hans familj. Men detta engagemang och dessa ansträngningar har också en vidare aspekt. I ett demokratiskt land skall den enskilde medborgaren kunna lita på att samhället inte sparar några ansträngningar till hans skydd. Så länge möjlighet finns, måste denna strävan fortsätta och fullföljas. Regeringen har i sin strävan att nå en lösning av fallet Wallenberg känt stödet av en enhällig svensk opinion.

Redogörelse för efterforskningarna jämte bilagor

1. År 1957 publicerade utrikesdepartementet en dokumentsamling jämte kommentarer rörande Raoul Wallenbergs fångenskap i Sovjetunionen (Aktstycken utgivna av Kungl. Utrikesdepartementet. Ny serie. H. 9). Offentliggörandet av materialet skedde, sedan det besked i ärendet ingått som utlovats från sovjetisk sida vid statsminister Erlanders och utrikesminister Hedlunds besök i Moskva månadsskiftet mars-april 1956. Beskedet, som mottogs i form av ett memorandum den 6 februari 1957, innebar i huvudsak, att Sovjetunionens regering med anledning av ett påträffat dokument från Ljubljanskaja-fängelset i Moskva ansåg dels att det fanns grund betrakta detta dokument som hänförande sig till Wallenberg, dels att av dokumentets innehåll den slutsatsen borde dras, att Wallenberg avled i Ljubljanskaja-fängelset i juli 1947.

2. Med anledning av sovjetregeringens memorandum av den 6 februari 1957 överlämnades den 19 februari 1957 en svensk svarsnote, vari bland annat förklarades, att svensk opinion med rätta var upprörd över vad som förekommit i ärendet. Den svenska regeringen hade svårt att tro, att all annan dokumentation rörande Wallenbergs vistelse i sovjetiska fängelser än den rapport som omnämnts i sovjetregeringens memorandum skulle vara helt utplånad. Regeringen förväntade sig därför, att om ytterligare material skulle framkomma i Sovjetunionen, som kunde klarlägga vad som hänt Wallenberg, detta skulle delgivas det svenska utrikesdepartementet. Den svenska regeringen förbehöll sig å sin sida att ställa till förfogande det ytterligare material rörande Wallenberg, som av den svenska regeringen bedömdes vara av betydelse för fortsatta undersökningar i Sovjetunionen.

3. Den svenska noten den 19 februari 1957 besvarades från sovjetisk sida med en note den 17 april 1957, som överlämnades av vice utrikesminister Zacharov till Sveriges t. f. chargé d'affaires i Moskva. I svars-

noten meddelades, att i Sovjetunionens memorandum den 6 februari 1957 alla upplysningar framlagts, vilka erhållits som resultat av en omsorgsfull och allsidig undersökning, verkställd av vederbörande sovjetiska organ om Wallenberg. Det framhölls även att den sovjetiska regeringen tyvärr icke förfogade över några som helst ytterligare upplysningar. Svarsnotens innehåll offentliggjordes i ett pressmeddelande den 23 april 1957.

4. För den svenska regeringen stod det klart, att även i fortsättningen alla existerande eller nya spår måste prövas. De fortsatta efterforskningarna, vilka bedrevs med samma noggrannhet och efter samma principer som de tidigare undersökningarna om Wallenbergs vistelse i Ljubljanskaja- och Lefortovskaja-fängelserna, pekade mot att Wallenberg någon gång efter år 1947 överförts till fängelset i Vladimir, beläget nordost om Moskva. I början av 1959 hade arbetet på det nya bevismaterialets insamling hunnit så långt, att underlag fanns för en ny framställning av den svenska regeringen. Denna fick formen av en note, som överlämnades av ambassadören Sohlman till vice utrikesminister Zacharov den 9 februari 1959 (*bilaga A*). I noten erinras inledningsvis om att svenska regeringen i sin note den 19 februari 1957 förbehållit sig att till Sovjetunionens regering ställa ytterligare material till förfogande. De svenska myndigheterna hade fortsatt att pröva alla spår som hade avseende på Wallenbergs vistelse i Sovjetunionen. Därvid hade till de svenska myndigheternas kännedom kommit ett flertal utsagor av från sovjetisk fångenskap återvända personer av innebörd att Wallenberg efter år 1947 överförts till fängelset i Vladimir. Dessa av varandra oberoende utsagor hade alla erhållits vid direkt kontakt mellan vederbörande och representanter för svenska myndigheter. Noten utmynnade i en anhållan att sovjetregeringen måtte företa en skyndsam undersökning i syfte att fastställa om Wallenberg vistats i Vladimir-fängelset.

5. Det sovjetiska svaret på denna framställning mottogs den 6 mars 1959 (*bilaga B*). I svaret meddelades, att i sovjetregeringens memorandum den 6 februari 1957 alla de informationer rörande Wallenberg samlats, vilka erhållits som resultat av en noggrann och allsidig kontroll och vilka ledde till slutsatsen att Wallenberg avlidit i juli 1947. Svaret avslutades med förklaringen, att en förnyad undersökning, som företagits i enlighet med svenska regeringens önskan, icke bringat i dagen några nya uppgifter i frågan. De i den svenska noten omnämn-

da informationerna om Wallenbergs vistelse i Vladimir hade icke bekräftats.

Med anledning av pressförfrågningar offentliggjorde utrikesdepartementet den 28 maj 1959 en kommuniké angående noteväxlingen (*bilaga C*).

6. Under våren och sommaren 1959 pågick förberedelserna för det sedermera inställda svarsbesöket i Sverige av ministerpresidenten Chrustjov, vilket planerats att äga rum i augusti 1959. Från svensk sida underrättades den sovjetiska ambassaden den 8 maj om att Wallenberg-ärendet skulle komma att upptagas under överläggningarna i samband med besöket.

7. Den 27 juni 1959 lämnade det sovjetiska utrikesministeriet till ambassadören Söhlman ett muntligt meddelande till svar på ett brev, som Wallenbergs moder, fru Maj von Dardel, skrivit till ministerpresidenten Chrustjov. I meddelandet hemställdes, att fru von Dardel måtte hänvisas till sovjetregeringens besked av den 6 februari 1957 (*bilaga D*).

8. Oberoende av de avvisande sovjetiska besked ett fullföljdes den svenska framställningen av den 9 februari 1959 genom överlämnande den 17 juli 1959 av en sammanfattning av de huvudsakliga vittnesutsagor, som ingick i det svenska materialet angående Wallenbergs vistelse i Vladimir (*bilaga E*).

9. Såsom även framgår av de under juni och juli 1959 utväxlade meddelandena innehöll den svenska pressen särskilt under maj månad 1959 ett stort antal artiklar i Wallenberg-ärendet. I samband härmed utfärdade utrikesdepartementet, såsom redan nämnts, den 28 maj 1959 en presskommuniké angående den noteväxling som ägt rum i början av året. Även under senare hälften av 1959 och början av 1960 förekom talrika artiklar i pressen, vilka föranledde förfrågningar i departementet. Den 23 januari 1960 lämnades ett nytt pressmeddelande (*bilaga F*), vari ånyo framhölls, att de svenska myndigheterna noggrant prövade alla existerande och nytillkommande spår i Wallenberg-ärendet och att något nytt vid tillfället ej fanns att tillägga utöver vad som redovisats i pressmeddelandet den 28 maj 1959.

10. I 1957 års dokumentsamling angående Wallenberg-ärendet redovisas den granskning av då föreliggande bevismaterial om Wallen-

bergs fängelsevistelse i Sovjetunionen, som verkställts av f. d. justitieråden Eklund och Lind. Justitieradens arbete ledde till ett skriftligt uttalande, som överlämnades till den sovjetiska ambassaden i Stockholm den 10 mars 1956 såsom en del av det material som från svensk sida vid denna tidpunkt ställdes till de sovjetiska myndigheternas förfogande. En motsvarande granskning beträffande det material, som framkommit till stöd för att Wallenberg befunnit sig i Sovjetunionen efter juli 1947 och därvid vistats i fängelse i Vladimir, genomfördes på departementets uppdrag av f. d. justitieråden Gyllenswärd och Santesson. De uttalade i yttrande den 25 april 1960, att enligt deras mening måste efter svensk rätt den föreliggande utredningen, ehuru icke innefattande full bevisning i förevarande hänseende, anses göra sannolikt, att Wallenberg varit vid liv åtminstone i början av 1950-talet och då befunnit sig i fängelse i Vladimir (*bilaga G*).

14. Under hela denna tid pågick ansträngningarna att bygga ut bevisningen som underlag för en förnyad framställning till sovjetregeringen. Ett viktigt nytt vittnesmål framkom i januari 1961 i samband med ett besök i Moskva av professor Nanna Svartz. Vid samtal med en framstående sovjetisk vetenskapsman hade hon på direkt förfrågan erhållit svaret, att denne kände till Wallenberg, som var i mycket dåligt tillstånd och mentalsjuk. Sedan professor Svartz sagesman tillkallat en kollega, hade hon av denne fått rådet att sätta sig i förbindelse med den sovjetiske vice utrikesministern Semjonov – som professor Svartz sagt sig känna sedan länge – för att söka utverka att Wallenberg måtte få föras hem – som han fortfarande är vid liv.

Professor Svartz har i en promemoria redogjort för detta samtal och för sina senare kontakter i Moskva.

12. Professor Svartz, som förgäves försökt att i Moskva personligen få träffa vice utrikesminister Semjonov, underrättade skyndsamt den svenska regeringen om det inträffade. Efter ingående överväganden i regeringen avlät statsminister Erlander ett brev direkt till ministerpresidenten Chrustjov, utmynnande i en begäran att en svensk läkare omedelbart skulle få resa ut till Moskva och tillsammans med sina sovjetiska kolleger bestämma om transportsätt, läkarvård m. m. i samband med ett överförande av Wallenberg till Sverige (*bilaga H*). Brevet, som är daterat den 9 februari 1961, överlämnades den 25 februari 1961 av ambassadören Sohlman vid personligt företräde hos ministerpresidenten Chrustjov. Denne, som på förhand underrättats om att

samtalet gällde Wallenberg-ärendet, förklarade omedelbart och kategoriskt, att han icke hade något nytt att tillägga till tidigare lämnad besked.

13. Professor Svartz vidtog för sin del olika ansträngningar att återknyta kontakten med sina kolleger i Moskva. Vid ett besök i Moskva i mars 1961, varvid hon på nytt sammanträffade med sin sagesman, tog hon med denne åter upp frågan om Wallenberg. Sagesmannen hävdade därvid, att professor Svartz missförstått honom. Han förklarades att han före samtalet i januari ej känt till Wallenberg.

Sedan någon tid gått utan att något skriftligt svar på statsminister Erlanders skrivelse mottagits, instruerades ambassadör Sohlman att i det sovjetiska utrikesministeriet uttrycka en allvarlig förvåntan, att ett sådant svar snart skulle lämnas. Denna muntliga påminnelse skedde den 10 juli 1961. Från utrikesministeriets sida gjordes härvid gällande, att svar på brevet redan lämnats, vartill ambassadör Sohlman genmälde, att statsminister Erlander efter en skriftlig hänvändelse av detta slag ansåg sig ha rätt vänta sig ett skriftligt svar.

14. Under månaderna efter denna påminnelse, som icke heller ledde till något svar från sovjetisk sida, övervägdes möjligheten att via professor Svartz' sovjetiska kontakter söka vinna gehör hos den högsta sovjetledningen för de svenska framställningarna. I maj 1962 inbjöds professor Svartz till en läkarkongress i Moskva och sammanträffade, därvid på nytt med sin ursprunglige sagesman. Denne avvisade dock varje meningsutbyte om Wallenberg och hänvisade till det sovjetiska utrikesministeriet.

15. I samband med den sovjetiske ambassadören Guseevs förflyttning från Stockholm uppkallades denne den 17 augusti 1962 till statsminister Erlander och ombads att efter återkomsten till Moskva till sovjetregeringen och personligen till ministerpresidenten Chrustjov vidarebefordra ett meddelande, innehållande en enträgen vädjan om en positiv behandling av de svenska framställningarna angående Wallenberg (*bilaga 1*). Icke heller denna nya framställning föranledde något svar från sovjetisk sida.

16. Sedan utrikesminister Nilsson av den sovjetiske utrikesministern Gromyko inbjudits att avlägga ett besök i Moskva i maj 1963, underrättade utrikesdepartementet den 17 april den sovjetiska ambassa-

den i Stockholm, att den svenske utrikesministern icke hade några konkreta ärenden, som han önskade ta upp under besöket, med ett undantag, nämligen frågan om Wallenbergs öde.

Vid sitt första samtal med utrikesminister Gromyko den 8 maj 1963 erinrade utrikesminister Nilsson om statsminister Erlanders framställningar och förklarade, att han önskade ta upp ärendet med ministerpresidenten Chrustjov. Utrikesminister Gromyko avrådde bestämt från en sådan åtgärd, vilken enligt hans mening måste bli helt resultatlös, eftersom ingenting nytt fanns att meddela i saken. Sedan utrikesminister Nilsson den 16 maj erhållit besked om att tid för ett sammanträffande med ministerpresidenten utsatts till påföljande dag, bekräftade han omedelbart till utrikesminister Gromyko sin tidigare deklarerade avsikt att ta upp Wallenberg-frågan med ministerpresidenten. Så skedde även vid det sammanträffande, som kom till stånd den 17 maj 1963. Utrikesminister Nilsson hänvisade därvid bl. a. till professor Svartz' utsaga och riktade en enträgen vädjan till ministerpresidenten om hjälp med att få klarhet om Wallenbergs öde. Ministerpresidenten förklarade, att både Wallenberg funnits, skulle han återsänts till Sverige. Han deklarerade, att han intet hade att tillägga utöver vad som tidigare meddelats från sovjetisk sida.

17. Under utrikesminister Gromykos svarsbesök i Sverige i mitten av mars 1964 ägde ett samtal rum mellan denne och statsminister Erlander, som nästan helt ägnades Wallenberg-frågan. Statsministern erinrade om ärendets stora betydelse för de svensk-sovjetiska förbindelserna och hemställde, att man å sovjetisk sida måtte göra ett ytterligare försök att spåra Wallenbergs öde med ledning av föreliggande uppgifter. Han föreslog även att ett sammanträffande skulle ordnas mellan professor Svartz och hennes sagesman för att vinna närmare klarhet om detta vittnesmål. Utrikesminister Gromyko svarade, att Wallenberg ej fanns i Sovjetunionen, att man ej hittat något ytterligare spår efter honom och att intet var att tillägga. Professor Svartz' utsagor måste bero på ett missförstånd. Vederbörande sovjetiske vetenskapsman hade kategoriskt förnekat att han uttalat sig på det sätt som påstätts. Kanske skulle han vara beredd att själv till professor Svartz avge en deklaration härom.

Någon tid efter detta samtal mottog professor Svartz ett brev från sin sagesman, daterat den 29 april 1964. I brevet förklarade denne, att han vid samtalet i januari 1964 sagt sig ingenting veta om Wallenberg, aldrig ha hört hans namn och icke ha den ringaste uppfattning

om han var i livet eller ej. Innehållet i brevet samt professor Svartz' bemötande i svarsbrev av den 28 maj 1964 redovisas i professor Svartz' redogörelse.

18. I en interpellation den 3 mars 1964 ställde herr Ohlin till utrikesminister Nilsson frågan, om denne ville för kammaren dels lämna en redogörelse för Wallenberg-affärens utveckling efter publiceringen av utrikesdepartementets vitbok 1957 — i den mån ej av särskilda skäl vissa uppgifter måste hemlighållas — dels upplysa om vilka åtgärder regeringen planerade att vidta för att övertyga sovjetregeringen om nödvändigheten av en mera effektiv efterforskning av Wallenberg och hans vistelseort under olika perioder efter kriget.

Utrikesministerns svar kunnades i rikstagen den 3 april 1964 (*bilaga J*). I svaret framhölls bland annat att regeringen sökt utnyttja varje lämplig möjlighet att för sovjetmyndigheterna understryka vikten av att klarhet måtte vinnas angående Wallenbergs öde. Det material som under de senaste åren framlagts för sovjetmyndigheterna och detaljerna i de framställningar som gjorts var dock icke av den karaktär att i sammanhanget kunna offentliggöras. Samtliga framställningar hade emellertid av sovjetregeringen mötts av svaret, att intet fanns att tillägga utöver vad som tidigare meddelats från sovjetisk sida. Utrikesminister Nilsson bekräftade avslutningsvis att svenska regeringen icke betraktade Wallenbergs sak som utagerad utan skulle komma att fortsätta ansträngningarna att skapa klarhet om hans öde.

19. Med anledning av ministerpresidenten Chrustjovs förestående besök i Sverige hade ambassadör Järring den 26 maj 1964 i Moskva ett samtal med chefen för det sovjetiska utrikesministeriets skandinaviska avdelning Kovaljov. Vid samtalet framfördes ånyo det svenska önskemålet att sovjetregeringen måtte vidtaga en förnyad undersökning i Wallenberg-ärendet. Under hänvisning till detta samtal kallades ambassadör Järring den 11 juni 1964 till vice utrikesminister Orlov och mottog därvid ett muntligt meddelande av följande innehåll.

Sovjetiska vederbörande hade genomförd den mest noggranna undersökning i Wallenberg-fallet med anledning av samtalet med Kovaljov. Resultatet av denna undersökning var detsamma som framlagts i memorandum den 6 februari 1957, i vilket omständigheterna kring Wallenbergs död 1947 meddelades. Det fanns inga som helst ytterligare omständigheter som kunde medföra något nytt i denna fråga. Uttalanden av några personer om att Wallenberg skulle ha varit i livet

efter 1947 berodde antingen på misstag eller också återspeglade de vissa kretsars strävanden att komplicera förbindelserna mellan Sovjetunionen och Sverige. Wallenberg hade icke efter 1947 befunnit sig i någon hälsovårdsanstalt, något fängelse eller på någon annan plats. På sovjetisk sida förelåg intet som helst tvivel om att Wallenberg avled den 17 juli 1947 i Ljubljanskaja-fängelset. Då sålunda alla möjligheter för undersökning av Wallenbergs öde redan var fullständigt utlönda, hade man på sovjetisk sida ingen grund att vidare sysselsätta sig med denna fråga. Att återkommande till en diskussion av detta beklagansvärda faktum i det förgångna kunde endast vålla de svensk-sovjetiska förbindelserna skada.

20. Under ministerpresident Chrustjovs officiella besök i Sverige den 22—27 juni 1964 fördes Wallenberg-frågan på tal från svensk sida vid flera tillfällen. Huvuddiskussionen ägde rum under ett enskilt sammanträffande mellan statsminister Erlander och ministerpresident Chrustjov, i närvaro av utrikesminister Nilsson och statsrådet Palme, omedelbart efter regeringsöverläggningarna den 23 juni 1964.

Statsminister Erlander underströk den stora vikt man från svensk sida fäste vid Wallenberg-frågan och framhöll nödvändigheten att äntligen bringa klarhet i en utestående fråga för att därmed skapa bättre förbindelser mellan de båda länderna.

Statsministern redovisade därefter professor Svartz' vittnesmål och underströk det stora förtroende han personligen hyste för henne. Den svenska regeringen var medveten om att den sovjetiske vetenskapsmannen gjort gällande att ett missförstånd uppkommit. Då det alltså förelåg två motstridiga uppfattningar om vad som förekommit, var det angeläget att ordna ett sammanträffande mellan de båda vetenskapsmännen för att söka vinna klarhet.

Ministerpresident Chrustjov reagerade med en förklaring, att han icke hade kunnat föreställa sig att Wallenberg-frågan ånyo skulle tagas upp av den svenska regeringen. Han förklarade, att Wallenberg icke fanns i Sovjetunionen. Detta hade han redan med skärpa sagt ifrån till ambassadören Sohlman. Den svenska regeringen måste förstå, att Sovjetunionen självfallet skulle utlämna Wallenberg, om denne fanns i livet, oberoende av hans fysiska eller psykiska tillstånd. Sovjetunionen hade utlämnat och återsänt alla möjliga människor. Vad skulle den sovjetiska regeringen ha för intresse att behålla Wallenberg? Professor Svartz' uttalande byggde på ett rent missförstånd. Hennes sovjetiske sagesman hade aldrig hört talas om Wallenberg.

aldrig hört talas om affären Wallenberg; han kände ej till den brevväxling som förekommit mellan regeringarna. Det måste vara ett missförstånd på grund av dåliga språkkunskaper. För den sovjetiska regeringens del var ärendet utagerat. Om man på privat väg ville ordna ett sammanträffande mellan de båda vetenskapsmännen, skulle den sovjetiska regeringen ej lägga hinder i vägen härför. När statsministern omedelbart log fast på detta uttalande, förklarade ministerpresidenten, att den sovjetiska regeringen varken rekommenderade eller avrådde från en sådan konfrontation.

Ministerpresidenten tillade, att många djupt tragiska ting hade hänt under Stalin-perioden. Man kunde inte förvänta sig, att han skulle här avlägga räkenskap för Stalin-tiden. Han ville inte utsätta sig för detta förhör med en massa frågor, som för länge sedan var besvarade. Man hade från sovjetisk sida gjort omfattande undersökningar och givit klara besked beträffande Wallenberg, men man syntes ändå icke lita på dem från svensk sida.

Statsminister Erlander underströk, att han velat begagna tillfället att öppet och förtroligt resonera om en fråga av betydande vikt för förbindelserna mellan Sverige och Sovjetunionen. Den svenska opinionen skulle säkert ha mycket svårt att förstå, att man från sovjetisk sida motsatte sig ytterligare undersökningar för att skapa klarhet.

Vid enskilda samtal med ministerpresidenten senare under besöket återkom statsminister Erlander upprepade gånger till frågan och utvecklade ytterligare de svenska synpunkterna. Ingenting nytt framkom därvid i sak. Ministerpresidenten förklarade sig vara uppriktigt ledsen över att den sovjetiska regeringen icke hade tillgång till något material, varigenom denna beklagliga tvistefråga mellan Sovjetunionen och Sverige skulle kunna bringas ur världen.

I ett särskilt svenskt uttalande i Wallenberg-frågan, som offentliggjordes vid statsministerns presskonferens den 26 juni 1964, utsades att man från sovjetisk sida vidhållit sitt tidigare besked att Wallenberg icke finns i Sovjetunionen. Den svenska regeringen kände djup besvikelse över att man på sovjetisk sida icke ansett sig kunna göra mera i denna fråga. Trots att de många framställningar, som regeringen gjort efter det besked som från sovjetisk sida lämnades år 1957, blivit resultatlösa, skulle den svenska regeringen icke ge upp sina strävanden *(bilaga K)*.

21. Under de närmaste månaderna efter ministerpresidenten Chrustjovs besök prövades olika möjligheter att på privat väg, bland annat

genom förmedling av olika vetenskapsmän, få till stånd ett sammanträffande mellan professor Svartz och hennes sovjetiske sagesman. Dessa ansträngningar ledde emellertid icke till resultat.

22. Ministerpresident Kosygin tillträdde sitt ämbete i oktober 1964. I början av 1965 riktades en framställning i Wallenberg-frågan till denne. Hänvändelsen skedde i en skrivelse från statsminister Erlander, daterad den 11 februari 1965. Efter en sammanfattning av ärendets tidigare behandling och med hänvisning till bl. a. de vittnesmål, enligt vilka Wallenberg skulle ha varit vid liv i Sovjetunionen vid betydligt senare tidpunkt än det uppgivna dödsåret 1947, dels i fängelse i Vladimir och dels på sovjetiskt sjukhus, utmynnade skrivelsen i en vädjan till ministerpresidenten, att denne måtte personligen föranstalta om en sådan prövning av samtliga led i det förevarande ärendet och av de uppgifter, som från svensk sida ställts till förfogande, att klarhet kunde vinnas (*bilaga L*).

Skrivelsen överlämnades av ambassadören Jarring vid företräde den 22 mars 1965 hos ministerpresident Kosygin. Denne förklarade därvid, att han noggrant läst den sovjetiska akten om Wallenberg. Han kunde inte komma till annat resultat än det som undersökningarna visat, nämligen att Wallenberg icke var i livet utan död i fängelse i Moskva på sätt och tid som akten angav. Ett svar efter dessa linjer skulle lämnas på statsministerns framställning.

I fråga om professor Svartz' vittnesmål förklarade ministerpresidenten, att den sovjetiske vetenskapsmannen aldrig gjort de uttalanden som tillskrevs honom av professor Svartz. Han hade ingen invändning mot att ambassadör Jarring själv konstaterade detta vid ett personligt sammanträffande med vetenskapsmannen.

23. Ett sådant sammanträffande med den sovjetiske vetenskapsmannen kom till stånd den 11 maj 1965. Under detta samtal, som ägde rum i närvaro av en representant för det sovjetiska utrikesministeriet, bekräftade sagesmannen för ambassadören Jarring, att professor Svartz i januari 1964 haft ett längre samtal med honom om deras gemensamma vetenskapliga problem och intressen. Anslutningsvis hade hon sagt sig vilja enskilt få taga upp med honom ett humanitärt fall, vilket gällde en svensk som hölls fången i Sovjetunionen, och bett om hjälp att uppnå ett frigivande av denne. Professor Svartz hade nämnt mannens namn, men sagesmannen hade vid den tiden aldrig hört detta namn och ej haft någon uppfattning vem det gällde. Han hade hänvi-

sat professor Svartz att göra en hänvändelse på hög nivå i utrikesministeriet. Ambassadör Jarring erinrade om att professor Svärtz sagt sig av sagesmannen ha erfarit, att Wallenberg skulle vara vid liv men i dåligt tillstånd och på sjukhus. Sagesmannen förnekade denna uppgifts riktighet och framhöll, att det var honom obegripligt hur professor Svartz så helt kunnat missuppfatta honom. Kanske berodde det på att hans kunskaper i tyska — på vilket språk samtalet förts — icke var så goda. Härigenom skulle professor Svartz kunna ha uppfattat uttalanden såsom »om han är vid liv» eller »om han är sjuk» icke som villkorssatser utan som påståenden.

Ambassadör Jarring genmälde, att två utsagor stod mot varandra. Han sade sig tro, att det skulle vara till stor nytta om ett sammanträffande kunde ordnas mellan sagesmannen, professor Svärtz och honom själv, där tillfälle gavs att gemensamt lägga ut om saken. Sagesmannen förklarade, att han inte kunde förstå vad ett sådant sammanträffande skulle tjäna till men förklarade sig till slut på direkt fråga dock vara beredd att medverka.

24. Vid besök hos statsminister Erlander den 13 maj 1965 anmälde Sovjetunionens ambassadör Belokhvostikov, att han med anledning av statsministerns brev till ministerpresident Kosygin den 14 februari 1965 hade i uppdrag att meddela, att sovjetregeringen i sin note den 6 februari 1957 klarlagt att Wallenberg dog år 1947. De undersökningar som nu gjorts hade bekräftat att så var fallet. Professor Svärtz vittnesmål måste grunda sig på ett missförstånd.

Statsminister Erlander sade sig ämna upptaga frågan vid sitt förestående besök i Moskva. Han framhöll att den sovjetiska regeringen måste inse, att den svenska regeringen fäste en utomordentlig vikt vid ärendet och att den svenska offentliga opinionen krävde en utförlig redovisning av detta.

25. Under statsminister Erlanders officiella besök i Sovjetunionen den 10—17 juni 1965 togs Wallenberg-frågan upp vid regeringsöverläggningarna den 11 juni och den 17 juni. Inledningsvis förklarade sig statsministern vilja konstatera, att de bilaterala svensk-sovjetiska förbindelserna var gynnsamma så när som på att Wallenberg-frågan ännu icke kunnat uppklaras. Statsministern sammanfattade därefter i tre punkter de ytterligare upplysningar och besked från sovjetisk sida som han önskade:

a) I det sovjetiska svaret år 1957 angavs förekomsten av en anteck-

ning om en person »Wallenberg», avliden i juli 1947, som det ansågs finnas grund betrakta sasom hänförande sig till Raoul Wallenberg. Av senare uttalanden av den sovjetiska regeringen syntes framga, att denna förmodan nu blivit visshet. Från svensk sida var det angeläget att få tillgång till de undersökningar, som företagits under senare år och som tydligen lett fram till denna förändring.

Ju Sovjetiska synpunkter på och eventuell motbevisning mot de vittnesmål, som avlägts av krigsfångar som återvänt från Sovjetunionen och enligt vilka Wallenberg skulle ha befunnit sig i fängelse i Vladimir efter år 1947. Dessa vittnesmål hade granskats av framstående svenska jurister, som kommit fram till slutsatsen att, även om full bevisning ej föreläg, det är sannolikt att Wallenberg varit vid liv åtminstone i början av 1950-talet och då befunnit sig i fängelse i Vladimir.

e) Professor Svartz' vittnesmål beträffande hennes samtal i Moskva med en sovjetisk vetenskapsman i början av januari 1961 hade denne förklarat bero på missförstånd. Denna fråga måste klarläggas.

Diskussionen vid de båda överläggningarna kom i huvudsak att gälla dessa svenska krav. Ministerpresident Kosygin förklarade, att han efter mottagandet av statsministerns brev begärt en ny undersökning. Han hade fått dokument med dödsdag och uppgift att Wallenberg kremerats och icke finns i livet. Den svenska regeringen hade underrättats härom. Det fanns intet ytterligare material och ingen personlig dossier över Wallenberg. Varför visste man icke. Några sovjetiska vittnen existerade heller ej. Om Wallenberg var i livet skulle han hittas mycket fort. Man visste vilka som fanns i fängelser och sjukhus. En regeringschef kunde snabbt finna en levande men ej en död. Hur kunde man på svensk sida på allvar tro, att de sovjetiska myndigheterna bevarade Wallenberg i Sovjetunionen? Varför skulle de behålla honom? Ministerpresidenten sade sig förstå, att saken var svår och komplicerad för svenska regeringen och för Wallenbergs familj. Från sovjetisk sida hade man emellertid gjort allt och hade ej mer att tillägga.

Vittnesmålen av de hemvändande krigsfångarna hade ingen bärkraft. Professor Svartz' sagesman hade förklarat, att han aldrig hört talas om Wallenberg och att missförstandet måste bero på språksvårigheter. Statsministerns begäran om ett sammanträffande mellan professor Svartz och dennas sagesman sade sig ministerpresidenten beredd att vidtala, även om han ansåg åtgärden meningslös.

Under de fortsatta meningsutbytenas gång återkom man från vägge hall till redan refererade ståndpunkter. Ministerpresidenten uppehöll

sig utförligt vid de förhållanden som rådde under kriget och den närmaste tiden därefter, Statsminister Erlander upprepade med skärpa kravet att ett utförligt material skulle ställas till förfogande för att klarlägga frågan i dess helhet. Syftet var att få en fullständig redovisning på alla de punkter, där det vid en opartisk granskning framstod stor oklarhet. Statsministern uttalade sin tillfredsställelse med att ministerpresidenten tillstyrkt ett sammanträffande för professor Svartz men beklagade att svaren på hans övriga önskemål varit negativa.

26. I enlighet med vad som sålunda överenskommits under statsminister Erlanders officiella besök ägde ett samtal rum i Moskva den 6 juli 1965 mellan professor Svartz och hennes sagesman. Närvarande utan att deltaga i samtalet var ambassadör Jarring samt två tjänstemän från det sovjetiska utrikesministeriet, av vilka den ene tjänstgjorde som tolk. Meningsutbytet, som utförligt refereras i professor Svartz redogörelse, slutade med att utsaga stod mot utsaga.

BILAGA A

Note överlämnad av ambassadören Sohlman i Moskva till vice utrikesminister Zacharov den 9 februari 1959

I sin note till sovjetregeringen den 19 februari 1957 förbehöll sig svenska regeringen att till sovjetregeringens förfogande ställa det ytterligare material rörande legationssekreteraren Raoul Wallenberg, född den 4 augusti 1912, som av regeringen bedömdes vara av betydelse för fortsatta undersökningar i Sovjetunionen.

De svenska myndigheterna har fortsatt att noggrant pröva alla spår som har avseende på Wallenbergs vistelse i Sovjetunionen. Därvid har till deras kännedom kommit ett flertal utsagor av från sovjetisk fångenskap återvända personer av innebörd, att Wallenberg efter år 1947 överförts till fängelset i Vladimir och där vistats i sjuk- och isoleringsavdelningen (Corpus II). Dessa av varandra oberoende utsagor har alla erhållits vid direkt kontakt mellan vederbörande och representanter för svenska myndigheter.

Svenska regeringen får anhålla, att sovjetregeringen företar en skyndsam undersökning i syfte att fastställa, om Wallenberg vistats i Vladimir-fängelset.

BILAGA B

Note från Sovjetunionens utrikesministerium till svenska ambassaden i Moskva den 6 mars 1959

Översättning

Sovjetunionens utrikesministerium betygar svenska ambassaden sin aktning och har med anledning av ambassadens note den 9 februari d. å. åter meddela följande.

I ambassadens note meddelas, att, enligt informationer från personer, som utrest från Sovjetunionen, svenske medborgaren R. Wal-

lenberg efter år 1947 skulle ha befunnit sig i fängelse i Vladimir, och framföres den svenska regeringens önskan, att en undersökning maätte företagas i syfte att verifiera dessa uppgifter.

I samband härmed har ministeriet även meddela, att i dess memorandum den 6 februari 1957 alla de informationer i fråga om R. Wallenberg framlades, som erhållits som resultat av noggrann och allsidig kontroll och som ledde till slutsatsen, att R. Wallenberg avled i juli år 1947. En förnyad undersökning, som företagits i enlighet med den svenska regeringens önskan, har icke bringat i dagen några nya uppgifter i denna fråga och har visat, att de i ambassadens note omnämnda informationerna om R. Wallenbergs vistelse i fängelse i Vladimir icke ha bekräftats.

BILAGA C

Pressmeddelande från utrikesdepartementet den 28 maj 1959

I sin note till den sovjetiska regeringen den 19 februari 1957 uttalade svenska regeringen, att den förbehöll sig att ställa till förfogande det ytterligare material rörande Raoul Wallenberg, som bedömdes vara av betydelse för fortsatta undersökningar i Sovjetunionen.

De svenska myndigheterna har fortsatt att noggrant pröva alla spår som avser Wallenbergs vistelse i Sovjetunionen. Härvid har det till deras kännedom kommit flera utsagor från personer, som återkommit från sovjetisk fångenskap, av innehörd att Wallenberg efter år 1947 funnits i ett fängelse i Vladimir, ungefär 20 mil öster om Moskva.

Med anledning av dessa uppgifter hemställde svenska regeringen i en note, som överlämnades till sovjetiska utrikesdepartementet den 9 februari 1959, att en undersökning skulle göras för att fastställa om Wallenberg vistats i Vladimir-fängelset.

Sasom svar härpå meddelade sovjetregeringen den 6 mars 1959, att den vidtagit sådana undersökningar, som begärts i den svenska noten, men att dessa icke bringat i dagen några nya uppgifter i denna fråga och att den svenska regeringens informationer om Wallenbergs vistelse i Vladimir icke bekräftats.

BILAGA D

Muntligt meddelande lämnat av ambassadören Rodionov i Sovjetunionens utrikesministerium till ambassadören Sohlman i Moskva den 27 juni 1959

Översättning

Utrikesministern har uppdragit åt mig att lämna Eder följande meddelande rörande herr Raoul Wallenbergs. I slutet av maj 1959 har den svenska pressen publicerat artiklar, som innehåller uppgifter om att svenske medborgaren Raoul Wallenberg ännu skulle befinna sig i Sovjetunionen. I dessa artiklar har man hänvisat till några sa kallade vittnen, som skulle ha sett herr Raoul Wallenberg i Sovjetunionen efter 1947. I anledning av dessa svenska informationer anser jag det nödvändigt säga Eder följande. Utrikesministeriet har i sin aide-mémoire den 6 februari 1957 meddelat som resultat av en enligt svenska regeringens önskan år 1957 gjord grundlig och fullständig utredning, att det klarlagts, att herr Raoul Wallenberg dog år 1947. De uppgifter, vartill vissa svenska tidningar hänvisar, är i sin helhet påhittade.

Utrikesministeriet hemställer, att vad jag nu sagt måtte framföras till herr Raoul Wallenbergs moder, fru von Dardel, som vänt sig till ministerpresidenten Chrustjov med förfrågan om sin sons öde.

Samtidigt uttrycker man å sovjetisk sida den förhoppningen, att man å svensk sida i frågan om Raoul Wallenberg måtte intaga en hållning, som icke möjliggör för vissa element att i framtiden använda denna fråga i syfte att förgifta de sovjetisk-svenska förbindelserna.

BILAGA E

Memorandum överlämnat till Sovjetunionens utrikesministerium den 18 juli 1959

Svenska utrikesdepartementet har mottagit sovjetiska utrikesministeriets till ambassadör Sohlman den 27 juni lämnade meddelande angående Raoul Wallenberg. Däri hänvisas till vissa i svensk press i

maj månad publicerade uppgifter om Raoul Wallenbergs vistelse i Sovjetunionen, vilka förklaras vara helt gripna ur luften. Med anledning härav önskar utrikesdepartementet framhålla, att departementet den 28 maj till svar på frågor från pressen lämnade ett kort meddelande om den förfrågan, som gjordes av svenska ambassaden den 9 februari, och det sovjetiska utrikesministeriets svar den 6 mars 1959. Departementet saknar anledning kommentera vad den svenska pressen därutöver publicerat i denna fråga. För att undvika missförstånd om arten av det material, som låg till grund för den svenska förfrågan, anser departementet det emellertid nödvändigt att lämna följande mera preciserade uppgifter om vissa av de vittnesutsagor, som ingick i detta material.

1. Schweiziske medborgaren E. Brugger, född den 22.1.1903, vilken under åren 1948—1958 vistades i sovjetiska fängelser, har uppgivit, att han i Vladimir-fängelsets corpus II vid månadsskiftet juli/augusti 1954 haft knackningsförbindelser med Raoul Wallenberg. Ett flertal andra från Sovjetunionen återvända fångar har bekräftat, att Brugger redan under fångenskapen talat om denna sin kontakt med Wallenberg.

2. En österrikisk medborgare, vilken under tiden 1945—1955 vistats i sovjetiska fängelser, har förklarat, att han i början av år 1955 delat cell med Wallenberg i corpus II i Vladimir-fängelset. När vederbörande sovjetiske fängelseofficer uppmärksammade österrikaren i Wallenbergs cell, hade österrikaren omedelbart bortförts ur densamma och därefter vid flera tillfällen ammodats förbinda sig icke yppa något om detta sammanträffande med svensken.

3. Två tyska medborgare, H. T. Mulle och G. Rehekampff, födda den 11.6.1917 och 19.6.1903, vilka under tiden 1950—1956 och 1945—1955 vistats i sovjetiska fängelser, har var för sig uppgivit, att de vid olika tillfällen av en och samme sovjetiske medfånge i Vladimir-fängelset erfarit, att Wallenberg vistades i corpus II i Vladimir i början av 1950-talet. Denne sovjetiske medfånge har av ett stort antal återvända f. d. Vladimir-fångar betecknats som en trovärdig och tillförlitlig person.

Självfallet måste utrikesdepartementet fästa stor vikt vid utsagor av en så preciserad karaktär, vilka oberoende av varandra talar om att Wallenberg under vissa år på 1950-talet vistats i en viss avdelning av ett visst fängelse. Utrikesdepartementet anser icke, att det finns grund antaga, att dessa utsagor tillkommit i medvetet syfte att sprida lögnaktiga uppgifter. Det förefaller icke heller sannolikt, att samtliga ut-

sagor skulle vara att tillskriva namnförväxlingar eller minnesfel. Detta är anledningen till att utrikesdepartementet ansett det nödvändigt att genom en förfrågan till det sovjetiska utrikesministeriet söka bringa klarhet i frågan om Wallenbergs öde.

Vad beträffar det i sovjetiska utrikesministeriets meddelande uttalade önskemålet om att svenska regeringen i framtiden måtte intaga en hållning i Wallenberg-ärendet, som icke kan utnyttjas i syfte att störa de svensk-sovjetiska förbindelserna, vill utrikesdepartementet endast framhålla, att svenska regeringens enda bevekelsegrund i denna fråga har varit och är att skapa klarhet om Raoul Wallenbergs öde. Om så sker kommer detta att avlägsna ett allvarligt irritationsmoment i de svensk-sovjetiska relationerna. I detta sammanhang önskar utrikesdepartementet erinra om att det sovjetiska utrikesministeriet i sitt memorandum den 6 februari 1957 icke uttalade sig mera bestämt om vad som hänt Wallenberg i Sovjetunionen än att säga att på grund av vad som anförts i sagda memorandum den slutsatsen bör dragas, att Wallenberg avled i juli 1947.

Slutligen vill utrikesdepartementet bekräfta, att Raoul Wallenbergs moder, fru von Dardel, underrättats om innehållet i ministeriets meddelande den 27 juni 1959.

BILAGA F

Pressmeddelande från utrikesdepartementet den 23 januari 1960.

Såsom många gånger framhållits, prövar de svenska myndigheterna noggrant alla existerande och nytillkommande spår i Wallenberg-ärendet. Att så förfarande är fallet, framgår senast av pressmeddelandet den 28 maj 1959. I detta lämnades en redogörelse för en svensk förfrågan till den sovjetiska regeringen huruvida Wallenberg vistats i Vladimir-fängelset samt svaret på denna fråga. Utöver vad som redovisats i detta pressmeddelande finns för närvarande intet att tillägga.

BILAGA G

Yttrande av justitieråden Gyllenswärd och Santesson den 25 april 1960

Svenske medborgaren legationssekreteraren vid Kungl. Maj:ts beskickning i Budapest Raoul Wallenberg togs i januari 1945 i sovjetiskt förvar och fördes därefter såsom fånge till Sovjetunionen.

I ett den 6 februari 1957 avlämnat memorandum har sovjetregeringen, under åberopande av viss utredning, anfört att på grund av nämnda utredning den slutsatsen borde dragas, att Wallenberg avlidit i juli 1947.

Uppgifter hava emellertid framkommit, enligt vilka Wallenberg skulle hava varit vid liv även efter nämnda tid och därvid befunnit sig i fängelse i Vladimir.

Undertecknade hava i Kungl. utrikesdepartementet tagit del av ett stort antal uppteckningar av utsagor av personer, som tidigare befunnit sig i sovjetisk fångenskap, äfvensom av andra upptecknade utsagor och andra handlingar.

Utsagorna hava avgivits av finska, franska, schweiziska, tyska och österrikiska medborgare samt av statslösa personer. De flesta utsagorna hava avgivits inför tjänstemän vid den svenska utrikesförvaltningen eller den svenska statspolisen.

Uppteckningarna äro gjorda med stor omsorg och föranleda icke till antagande, att utsagorna tillkommit efter ledande frågor eller under andra omständigheter, som kunnat påverka innehållet. Utsagorna innehålla ett stort antal uppgifter, vilkas riktighet kunnat kontrolleras, och de stödja varandra.

Enligt vår mening måste efter svensk rätt den föreliggande utredningen — ehuru den icke innefattar full bevisning i förevarande hänseende — anses göra sannolikt, att Wallenberg varit vid liv åtminstone i början av 1950-talet och då befunnit sig i fängelse i Vladimir.

Stockholm den 25 april 1960.

Ragnar Gyllenswärd
f. d. justitieråd och Högsta domstolens ordförande

Per Santesson
f. d. justitieråd och ordförande på avdelning i Högsta domstolen

BILAGA II

Skrivelse från statsminister Erlander till ministerpresidenten Chrustjov den 9 februari 1961

Ärade Herr Ministerpresident,

Som Ni säkert erinrar Eder, samtalade vi under mitt besök i Moskva våren 1956 om den i Budapest vid krigets slut försvunne svenske diplomaten Raoul Wallenberg. Jag framhöll, att frågan om Wallenbergs öde i hög grad sysselsatte den svenska opinionen och att svenska regeringen önskade göra allt som stod i dess makt för att bringa klarhet över hans öde. Från sovjetisk sida lovade man företaga undersökningar och förklarade, att Wallenberg om han befanne sig i Sovjetunionen givetvis skulle få hemresa. Vi fick år 1957 meddelande om undersökningarnas dittillsvarande resultat. Från svensk sida förklarades vid ett senare tillfälle, att svenska regeringen förbehöll sig att ställa till förfogande det ytterligare material rörande Wallenberg, som av svenska regeringen bedömdes vara av betydelse för fortsatta undersökningar i Sovjetunionen.

Jag vill nu meddela Eder, att jag av en svensk läkare, professor Nanna Svartz, som i slutet av januari 1961 besökte Moskva för att där på inbjudan föreläsa om sina forskningsresultat, mottagit den informationen, att Wallenberg då var i livet och att han befann sig på ett sinnessjukhus i Moskva. Hans hälsotillstånd var icke gott. Fru Svartz erhöll informationen från en internationellt känd, framstående representant för den sovjetiska läkarvetenskapen.

Utrikesminister Undén och jag har resonerat om det lämpliga förfaringssättet för att överföra Wallenberg till Sverige. Vi har kommit fram till att det bästa vore om någon svensk läkare omedelbart finge resa ut till Moskva och tillsammans med sina sovjetiska kolleger bestämma om transportsätt, läkarvård m. m.

Med största högaktning

Tage Erlander

BILAGA 1

Muntligt meddelande lämnat av statsminister Erlander till Sovjetunionens ambassadör Gusev den 17 augusti 1962

Vid besök hos ministerpresidenten Chrustjov den 25 februari 1961 överlämnade ambassadören Sohlman ett den 9 i samma månad daterat brev från mig till ministerpresidenten. Däri upplystes, att jag mottagit den information, att Wallenberg var i livet i slutet av januari 1961 och att han befann sig på ett sinnessjukhus i Moskva. Hans hälsotillstånd var icke gott. Brevet slutade med ett förslag att en svensk läkare omedelbart skulle få resa ut till Moskva och tillsammans med sina sovjetiska kolleger bestämma om förfaringssättet för att överföra Wallenberg till Sverige.

När hr Chrustjov mottog brevet, sade han, att ett besked redan lämnats från sovjetisk sida och att inget nytt förelåg i frågan.

Vid besök hos A. I., chefen för skandinaviska avdelningen i det sovjetiska utrikesministeriet, ambassadören Kirsanov, den 10 juli 1961 uttryckte ambassadören Sohlman enligt instruktion en allvarlig förvänfan, att svar snart skulle lämnas. Vi kunde förstå, sade han, att undersökningar erfordrats, men då flera månader gått ansåge vi oss kunna utgå från att de nu slutförts. Hr Kirsanov gjorde gällande, att svar på brevet redan lämnats, varpå hr Sohlman genmälde, att statsministern efter en skriftlig hänvändelse av detta slag ansåg sig ha rätt vänta sig ett skriftligt svar.

Som Ni förstår, Herr Ambassadör, inger mig detta läge allvarliga bekymmer, och jag vill be Eder att efter återkomsten till Moskva framföra detta till sovjetregeringen och personligen till dess chef. När jag talar om bekymmer, menar jag i första hand, att saken är av betydelse för de svensk-sovjetiska förbindelserna, för vilkas vidareutveckling i en harmonisk och vänskaplig anda jag som Ni vet har ett stort intresse. Det för sig här om en svensk diplomat, som för mer än 17 år sedan tillfångatogs av sovjetiska trupper. Ni är helt säkert ense med mig om att ingen regering i ett sådant läge kan underlåta att begära, att de framställningar, som den gör på grundval av informationer, som den erhållit och funnit tillförlitliga, föranleder ingående prövning och tillmötesgående behandling. Jag vill också understryka att, såsom framhölls av ambassadören Sohlman vid hans besök i det sov-

jetiska utrikesministeriet den 10 juli 1961, vi vinnlagt oss om att utesslutande behandla frågan på en strikt sakligt grundval.

Men jag har även den rent mänskliga aspekten i tankarna. Det är en allmänt accepterad grundsats, att medlemmar av samma familj som blivit skilda åt och ömsesidigt önskar kontakt, skall få tillgång till alla tillgängliga upplysningar om varandra och att de skall få tillfälle att förena sig med varandra, oberoende av uppehållsort, hälsotillstånd etc. Grundsatsen är icke bara allmänt omfattad i teorin. Den har också alltmer kommit att omsättas i praktiken. Jag vill enträget vädja till Eder regering och till ministerpresidenten Chrustjov personligen att även ta hänsyn härtill vid behandlingen av denna fråga. Jag framför denna vädjan med en stark förhoppning om en positiv reaktion.

BILAGA 1

Utrikesministerns svar den 3 april 1964 på interpellation i andra kammaren av herr Ohlin

(Utdrag)

Herr talman!

Herr Ohlin har i en interpellation den 3 mars 1964 frågat mig, om jag ville för kammaren dels lämna en redogörelse för Raoul Wallenberg-affärens utveckling efter publicering av utrikesdepartementets vitbok 1957 — i den mån ej av särskilda skäl vissa uppgifter måste hemlighållas — dels upplysa om vilka åtgärder regeringen planerar att vidta för att övertyga sovjetregeringen om nödvändigheten av en mera effektiv efterforskning av Raoul Wallenberg och hans vistelseort under olika perioder efter kriget.

Vad först beträffar efterforskningarna av Raoul Wallenberg vill jag till en början erinra om att offentliggörandet av utrikesdepartementets vitbok år 1957 skedde, sedan det besked i ärendet ingått, som från sovjetisk sida utlovats vid statsminister Erlanders och inrikesminister Hedlunds besök i Moskva månadsskiftet mars—april 1956. Beskedet, som mottogs den 6 februari 1957, innebar i huvudsak,

att Sovjetunionens regering med anledning av ett påträffat dokument i Ljubljanskaja-fängelset i Moskva ansåg dels att det fanns grund betrakta detta dokument som hänförande sig till Wallenberg, dels att av dokumentets innehåll den slutsatsen borde dras, att Wallenberg avled i Ljubljanskaja-fängelset i juli 1947.

Med anledning av sovjetregeringens besked den 6 februari 1957 överlämnades den 19 februari samma år ett svenskt svar, som likaledes offentliggjordes i vitboken. I detta förklarades bland annat, att svensk opinion med rätta vore upprörd över vad som förekommit i ärendet. Den svenska regeringen hade svårt att tro, att all annan dokumentation rörande Wallenbergs vistelse i sovjetiska fängelser än den rapport som omnämnts i sovjetregeringens besked skulle vara helt utplånad. Regeringen förväntade sig därför, att om ytterligare material skulle framkomma i Sovjetunionen, som kunde klarlägga vad som hänt Wallenberg, detta skulle delgivas det svenska utrikesdepartementet. Den svenska regeringen förbehöll sig å sin sida att ställa till förfogande det ytterligare material rörande Wallenberg, som av svenska regeringen bedömdes vara av betydelse för fortsatta undersökningar i Sovjetunionen.

För den svenska regeringen stod det sålunda klart, att även i fortsättningen alla existerande eller nya spår måste prövas. Under de fortsatta efterforskningarna, som bedrevs med samma noggrannhet och efter samma principer som de tidigare undersökningarna om Wallenbergs vistelse i Ljubljanskaja- och Butyrskaja-fängelserna, framkom flera utsagor från personer, som återvänt från sovjetisk fångenskap, av innehörd att Wallenberg efter år 1947 funnits i ett fängelse i Vladimir, ungefär 20 mil öster om Moskva. Med anledning av dessa uppgifter hemställde regeringen i en note, som överlämnades till sovjetiska utrikesdepartementet den 9 februari 1959, att en undersökning skulle göras för att fastställa om Wallenberg vistats i Vladimir-fängelset.

Såsom svar härpå meddelade sovjetregeringen den 6 mars 1959, att den vidtagit sådana undersökningar, som begärts i den svenska noten, men att dessa icke bringat i dagen några nya uppgifter i denna fråga och att den svenska regeringens informationer om Wallenbergs vistelse i Vladimir icke bekräftats.

Även efter denna tidpunkt har regeringen sökt utnyttja varje lämplig möjlighet att för sovjetmyndigheterna understryka vikten av att klarhet måtte vinnas angående Wallenbergs öde. Det ytterligare material som därvid framlagts för sovjetmyndigheterna och detaljerna i

de framställningar som gjorts är dock icke av den karaktär att de här kan offentliggöras.

Jag kan emellertid bekräfta, att statsministern i början av år 1961 riktat en personlig skrivelse till ministerpresidenten Chrustjov i saken. Vidare vill jag erinra om att jag vid mitt besök i Moskva i maj förra året upptog ärendet såväl med utrikesminister Gromyko som med ministerpresidenten Chrustjov. Slutligen har statsministern, såsom meddelats i pressen, tagit upp Wallenberg-affären med utrikesminister Gromyko vid dennes besök i Stockholm för två veckor sedan.

Samtliga framställningar har från sovjetisk sida mötts av svaret, att inkt funnes att tillägga utöver vad som tidigare — d. v. s. i 1957 och 1959 års besked — meddelats från sovjetisk sida. Vid upprepade tillfällen har därjämte förklarats, att både Wallenberg funnits skulle han ha återsänds till Sverige.

Jag vill emellertid till herr Ohlin ännu bekräfta, att regeringen inte betraktar Raoul Wallenbergs sak som inlagerad utan kommer att fortsätta ansträngningarna att skapa full klarhet om hans öde.

BILAGA K

Uttalande av statsminister Erlander den 26 juni 1964

Den svenska regeringen har vid samtalen under ministerpresident Chrustjovs besök tagit upp fallet Wallenberg. Vi har för ministerpresidenten starkt understrukit vilken betydelse vi fäster vid denna fråga. Från sovjetisk sida har man förklarat, att man på grundval av de upprepade svenska hänvändelserna gjort en förnyad undersökning. Man vidhåller sitt tidigare besked, att Raoul Wallenberg icke finns i Sovjetunionen.

Vi känner djup beskivelse över att man på sovjetisk sida icke ansett sig kunna göra mera i denna fråga. Trots att de många framställningar, som regeringen gjort efter det besked som från sovjetisk sida lämnades år 1957, blivit resultatlösa, kommer vi icke att ge upp vara strävanden i denna sak.

BILAGA I.

Skrivelse från statsminister Erlander till ministerpresidenten Kosygin den 11 februari 1965

Ärade Herr Ministerpresident,

Jag ber att med Eder, Herr Ministerpresident, få taga upp till behandling ett ärende, som alltsedan krigets slut varit föremål för långvariga meningsutbytet mellan de svenska och sovjetiska regeringarna, nämligen frågan om den i Sovjetunionen försvunne svenske diplomaten Raoul Wallenberg. Som Ni säkert förstår, skulle jag icke på nytt återkomma till ärendet, om detta icke varit och är av så stor betydelse för Sverige och svensk opinion och om jag icke hade varit övertygad om att ett klarläggande av frågan skulle avlägsna ett besvärande moment i de svensk-sovjetiska relationerna och därigenom på ett utomordentligt gynnsamt sätt befrämja den framtida harmoniska utvecklingen av dessa relationer.

Såsom torde vara Eder bekant, omhändertogs Raoul Wallenberg i januari 1945 av de framryckande ryska trupperna i Budapest. Detta bekräftades av ett meddelande, som framfördes av dåvarande vice utrikesministern Dekanosov till svenske ministern i Moskva den 16 januari 1945, att de sovjetiska myndigheterna vidtagit åtgärder för att skydda Raoul Wallenberg och hans egendom. Under de följande månaderna, och sedermera under alla de år som gått, har ett stort antal framställningar riktats från svensk sida till de sovjetiska myndigheterna om att Raoul Wallenberg måtte frigés och klarhet vinnas om hans öden. Jag vill i detta sammanhang erinra om de överläggningar som ägde rum i Moskva under mitt besök i april 1956, då man från sovjetisk sida utfäste sig att vidtaga en undersökning i ärendet med utgangspunkt från nytt material, som under samtalen ställdes till sovjetiskt förfogande. Såsom resultat av denna undersökning meddelade den sovjetiska regeringen i en note den 6 februari 1957, att på grundval av ett påträffat dokument slutsatsen borde dragas, att Raoul Wallenberg avled i Ljubljanskaja-fängelset i juli 1947.

Efter mottagandet av detta meddelande har svenska regeringen i olika omgångar till den sovjetiska regeringen överlämnat ytterligare uppgifter, enligt vilka Raoul Wallenberg skulle ha varit vid liv i Sovjetunionen väl betydligt senare tidpunkt än 1947, dels i fängelse i

Vladimir och dels, enligt uttalanden av . . . till professor Nanna Svartz vid sammanträffande i Moskva i januari 1961, på sovjetiskt sjukhus vid sistnämnda tidpunkt.

Senast begagnade jag de tillfällen, som erbjöd sig vid utrikesminister Gromykos besök i Stockholm i mars 1964 och vid förutvarande ministerpresidenten Chrustjovs besök i Sverige i juni 1964, för att understryka vilken betydelse man från svensk sida fäster vid frågan. Vid dessa liksom vid andra tillfällen under senare år har man från sovjetisk sida hänvisat till den ovan nämnda noten av den 6 februari 1957 och tillagt att Raoul Wallenberg nu icke finns i Sovjetunionen.

Under många år har jag personligen följt detta ärende i en förhoppning att föra frågan till en tillfredsställande lösning. Genom det vänliga budskap, som den 16 oktober 1964 överlämnades till mig genom Sovjetunionens ambassadör i Stockholm, vet jag, att Ni är ense i det angelägna i att de svensk-sovjetiska förbindelserna vidareutvecklas och att vår målsättning därvidlag är gemensam. I denna anda tillåter jag mig att rikta till Eder en vädjan att Ni måtte personligen föranstalta om en sådan prövning av samtliga led i det förevarande ärendet och av de uppgifter, som från svensk sida ställts till förfogande rörande Raoul Wallenberg, att klarhet kan vinnas.

Jag kan försäkra Eder att ett tillmötesgående av denna min hemställan kommer att röna den största uppskattning från svenska regeringens och svenska folkets sida.

Med största högaktning

Tage Erlander

Redogörelse av professor Nanna Svartz

Under besök i Moskva i januari 1961 för att hålla föredrag vid en vetenskaplig kongress sammanträffade jag med flera framstående sovjetiska vetenskapsmän. Med en av dessa hade jag den 27 januari ett samtal på tjänsterummet. Detta fördes på tyska. Efter en stunds diskussion om kongresser, forskning m. m. bad jag honom om ursäkt, att jag drog upp en fråga, som låg mig och andra svenskar mycket om hjärtat. Jag gav honom en redogörelse för fallet Raoul Wallenberg och frågade honom om han kände till detta fall, varvid han nickade jakande. Jag frågade honom då, om han kunde ge mig något råd hur jag kunde förfara för att vinna klarhet, var Wallenberg befann sig. Jag omtalade att vi i Sverige hade uppgifter om att han levde ännu för ett par år sedan och att hans anhöriga fått meddelanden som lydde på att Wallenberg fortfarande var vid liv. Min sagesman sade då plötsligt, att han nog kände till fallet och att den jag frågade om var i mycket dåligt tillstånd. På hans fråga vad jag önskade svarade jag, att huvudsaken var att Wallenberg kunde föras hem i vilket tillstånd han än vore. Min sagesman sade där mycket lägt att den efterfrågade var på mentalsjukhus. Sedan tillade han: »Jag skall kalla hit en av mina kolleger och rådgöra med honom.» Han lämnade rummet och återkom efter en kort stund tillsammans med kollegan, varefter han själv återavlägsnade sig.

Kollegan satte sig mitt emot mig. Jag frågade om han orienterats om vad saken gällde och han bekräftade detta. Han frågade mig noga om var Wallenberg tjänstgjort och bad mig skriva hans namn på ett papper. Jag skrev då Attaché Raoul Wallenberg. Jag berättade, att hans mor var min patient. Hon skulle behöva få ro och få full visshet. Även om sonen vore än så sjuk, skulle det vara en välgärning mot henne och f. ö. hela Sverige om han kunde få vårdas i hemlandet. Jag frågade honom, om han kunde hjälpa oss, och han svarade, att han skulle göra allt vad han förmådde. Jag sade honom, att hela svenska folket skulle bli Sovjetunionen tacksamt, om Wallenberg finge föras hem, även om han vore både fysiskt och psykiskt svårt sjuk. Denna

sak, sade jag, ligger vår regering mycket varmt om hjärtat. Jag nämnde att jag kände bitr. utrikesminister Semjonov sedan hans vistelse i Sverige och fick genast rådet att vända mig direkt till denne.

Jag frågade kollegan vidare, om han ansåg det möjligt, att jag som läkare kunde föra hem Wallenberg. Han ansåg, att — »om han fortfarande är vid liv» — ett sådant tillvägagångssätt ej vore omöjligt, men att jag skulle tala med Semjonov därom.

Efter återkomsten till hotellet fick jag genom svenska ambassaden numret till minister Semjonovs sekreterare. Jag telefonerade på numret, men fick svaret, att Semjonov rest utomlands.

På kvällen hölls bankett. Efter måltiden fick jag plötsligt se kollegan, som kom emot mig och frågade om jag träffat Semjonov. Jag svarade då, att han rest utomlands, och frågade, om jag kunde skriva till Semjonov. Han svarade ja. Efter resonemang lovade han att jag fick säga i brevet att jag talat med dem båda — d. v. s. med honom och min egentlige sagesman — och att de gett mig rådet att vända mig till Semjonov. Kollegan berättade, att de tillsammans, sedan jag hade lämnat dem, på f. m. diskuterat den fråga, som vårt samtal gällt. De var båda av den uppfattningen, att en eventuell överflyttning till Sverige av den efterfrågade — »om han fortfarande är vid liv» — givetvis måste organiseras på diplomatisk väg, vilket jag sade mig helt förstå.

Efter återkomsten till Stockholm uppsökte jag omedelbart statsminister Erlander och berättade för honom och utrikesminister Undén vad som inträffat.

I syfte att återknyta kontakten skrev jag ett personligt brev till min sagesman och uttryckte förhoppningen att under ett snart återbesök i Moskva ånyo få träffa honom. Enligt det råd jag fått i Moskva skrev jag även ett brev till Semjonov vari jag frågade hur långt undersökningarna om Wallenberg hade fortskridit och om möjligheterna att föra hem honom.

Från min sagesman mottog jag ett svar, i vilket han förklarade sig beredd att åter träffa mig i Moskva. Min resa kom till stånd i slutet av mars 1961. Vid ett första samtal med min sagesman — i närvaro av en annan sovjetisk vetenskapsman — ställde jag frågan, om jag kunde få besöka Wallenberg. Han svarade, att detta måste avgöras på högre ort, varvid han tillfogade: »om han icke är död». Till detta yttrande genmäle jag: »Då måste han ju ha dött helt nyligen.» Under ett längre enskilt sammanträffande med min sagesman framhöll denne för mig att jag ej bort berätta för svenska regeringen om

vårt ursprungliga samtal. Han förnekade ej samtalet men hävdade, att hans dåliga tyska fett till missförstånd och förklarade nu att han ej känt till fallet Wallenberg. Han berättade att han kallats till ministerpresident Chrustjov, som erhållit meddelande om vårt samtal och blivit uppbragt häröver.

Då jag ej heller under detta Moskvabesök lyckades få företräde hos Semjonov — frois att jag även sökte telefonera till honom på hans privata nummer, som jag fått av min sagesman — skrev jag efter återkomsten till Stockholm ett nytt brev till denne med begäran om företräde så snart som möjligt, varvid jag förklarade mig beredd att omedelbart resa till Moskva.

Något svar på dessa nära brev mottog jag ej i någon form.

I maj 1962 erbjöd sig ett nytt tillfälle för mig att deltaga i en vetenskaplig kongress i Moskva. Under detta besök träffade jag visserligen min sagesman, men vid mitt försök att föra samtalet in på Wallenberg-frågan förklarade han endast, att denna fråga måste upptagas på diplomatisk väg och att några privatsamtal mellan oss båda i detta ämne inte bordé förekomma.

Försök att nå min sagesman genom andra kanaler lyckades ej.

I början av maj 1964 mottog jag ett brev från honom, daterat den 29 april 1964. I detta brev hette det:

»Jag tillskriver Er i samband med på nytt frankomna uttalanden i Stockholm rörande herr Wallenbergs öde. I dessa efterades jag — på sätt att jag skulle ha givit Eder några slags uppgifter om honom under Ert besök . . . 1961 i Moskva.

Som Ni säkert erinrar Er, sade jag Er då, att jag ingenting vet om herr Wallenberg, aldrig hört hans namn och inte har den ringaste uppfattning om han är i livet eller ej.

Jag radde Er att i denna angelägenhet vända Er till vårt utrikesministerium, genom Eder ambassadör eller personligen. På Eder begäran att jag skulle efterfråga denne personens öde hos vår regeringschef N. S. Chrustjov, vårs läkare jag enligt Eder hypotes vore, svarade jag Eder att N. S. Chrustjov, såsom alla väl visste, var fullständigt frisk och att jag inte var hans läkare.

På grund av något mig oförstäckligt missförstånd har detta mitt korta samtal med Eder (det försiggick på tyska språket, vilket jag mahända icke helt behärskar) blivit felaktigt tolkat i svenska officiella kretsar.

Senare fick jag reda på att herr Wallenberg avlidit redan år 1947 och att vår regering vid senare tidpunkt meddelat svenska regeringen och den avlidnes familj härom.»

I ett utförligt svar av den 28 maj 1964 återgav jag de viktigare punkterna av vad som enligt min uppfattning förekommit vid vårt

samtal i januari 1961 och som i väsentliga avseenden avvek från den av min sagesman i brevet lämnade versionen. Med anledning av påståendet att något missförstånd på grund av språksvårigheter skulle ha förelegat, påminde jag om att vi båda vid ett flertal samtal under 1950-talet, då vi första gången träffades, alltid förstått både frågor och svar synnerligen väl, så också vid vårt samtal i januari 1961 liksom vid de därpå följande samtalen. I mitt brev uttalade jag även den enträgna och varma förhoppningen, att man från sovjetisk sida så snart det sig göra lät skulle vidtaga åtgärder för att låta Wallenberg återvända hem.

Under hela denna tid har jag stått i ständig kontakt med stats- och utrikesministrarna vid deras ansträngningar att med stöd av bl. a. mitt vittnesmål lösa Wallenberg-frågan.

Ända sedan 1962 har jag på olika sätt försökt få till stånd ett nytt personligt sammanträffande med min sagesman. Jag har också sökt erhålla uppgifter om Wallenberg genom andra vetenskapsmän, men något av betydelse har härvid ej framkommit. Efter ministerpresident Chrustjovs besök i Sverige i juni 1964 intensifierades ansträngningarna att få ett personligt sammanträffande med sagesmannen. De ledde emellertid icke till något resultat.

I mars 1965 orienterades jag om att ambassadör Jarring i samband med överlämnandet till ministerpresident Kosygin av en ny framställning från statsminister Erlander i Wallenberg-ärendet fått möjlighet att själv besöka min sagesman för att dryfta mitt vittnesmål. När min sagesman vid detta besök – som kom till stånd i maj – upprepade sina kategoriska förnekanden, föreslog ambassadör Jarring att ett nytt sammanträffande skulle ordnas för min räkning.

Efter återkomsten från sitt officiella besök i Moskva i mitten av juni meddelade mig statsministern, att ministerpresident Kosygin samtyckt till att jag träffade min sagesman i Moskva.

Detta sammanträffande ägde rum den 6 juli 1965 i närvaro av ambassadören Jarring och två representanter för det sovjetiska utrikesministeriet, varav den ene tjänstgjorde som tolk. Jag inledde samtalet – som fördes på svenska respektive ryska och varade nära tre timmar – med att utförligt redogöra för anledningen till mitt intresse för Wallenberg. Det daterade sig redan från mitt besök i Moskva i mars 1945. Den främsta orsaken var dock uppgifter jag erhållit av hans mor och hennes nuvarande make, som jag samarbetat med under många år på Karolinska sjukhuset. Hans mor, fru von Dardel, hade

varit min patient sedan länge. Då hon visste att jag varit nära bekant med Sovjetunionens tidigare ambassadör i Stockholm, Madame Kollontay, och hade många andra sovjetiska vänner, bad hon mig upprepade gånger söka göra något för sonen. När jag år 1960 mottog en inbjudan till en kongress i Moskva i början av 1961, beslöt jag att för alla eventualiteter sätta mig in i fallet. Under mitt studium av utrikesdepartementets år 1957 publicerade »vitbok» fann jag vissa förhållanden särskilt anmärkningsvärda. År 1957 kom det ett officiellt sovjetiskt meddelande, som omtalade att Wallenberg av allt att döma hade dött i Ljubljanskaja fängelset den 17 juli 1947. Det var då ägnat att förvåna att det tio dagar senare, den 27 juli 1947, avhölls förhör angående Wallenberg i såväl Ljubljanskaja- som Lefortovskaja-fängelserna med ett flertal andra fångar (som inte suttit i samma cell som Wallenberg, med undantag av en av dem). Det var märkligt att läsa att fångarna uppgivit identiskt samma sak. De hade bl. a. talat om att Wallenberg var svensk diplomat och i den egenskapen haft hand om judeärenden och judeförföljelser i Budapest. De hade också uppgivit att de erfarit genom knackningar från Wallenberg eller andra, att Wallenberg och hans chaufför Langfelder förts till Ljubljanskaja-fängelset 1945. Så hade också berättats att Wallenberg förts samma år från Ljubljanskaja till Lefortovskaja-fängelset. De fångar som berättat detta hade varit beredda att gå ed på sina uppgifter. Allt detta föreföll egendomligt, när man betänkte att det den 18 augusti 1947 sändes en note till vår regering från dåvarande utrikesminister Vysjinskij, vari denne meddelade att Wallenberg var okänd i Sovjetunionen. Inom loppet av en månad skulle det alltså för det första ha hänt att Wallenberg skulle ha dött. Tio dagar senare skulle det ha hållits förhör om Wallenberg med fångar från olika länder i två olika fängelser. Det hade inte varit fängelsepersonal som fett förhören. Han måste alltså ha varit väl känd. De förhörda fångarna hade satts i ensamcell under flera månader. Sedan kom det nyssnämnda meddelandet i mitten av augusti 1947 att han var okänd i Sovjetunionen.[1]

Det var inte minst denna bristande överensstämmelse, förklarade jag för min sagesman, som på sin tid gjorde att jag kom till slutsatsen att jag borde höra mig för om Wallenberg. Härtill kom senare uppgifter i pressen från tre olika personer, som suttit i Vladimirfängelset, att Wallenberg med säkerhet vistats i detta fängelse på

[1] Senare uppgavs som bekant i den sovjetiska noten av den 6 februari 1957, att Wallenberg avled i juli 1947.

1950-talet. Familjen von Dardel hade även fått ytterligare uppgifter om att han skulle vara i livet vid senare tidpunkt.

När jag reste ut i januari 1961 hade min avsikt varit att försöka ta kontakt med bitr. utrikesminister Semjonov, som jag kände sedan hans vistelse i Stockholm. När jag övervägde vilka andra som jag kunde tala med, hade tankarna fallit på min sagesman. Jag hade tyckat mycket att blanda in honom i dessa frågor, men i en svår och angelägen fråga måste man ibland gripa efter tillfället.

Jag påpekade för min sagesman, att jag under samtalet i januari 1961 inte hade berättat om anledningen till mitt intresse så utförligt som jag nu gjort men angivit de väsentliga punkterna. Jag erinrade honom vidare om att jag efter min inledande redogörelse hade frågat honom om han kände till fallet Wallenberg och att han då svarat jakande. Jag citerade det uttalande som han fällt om att Wallenberg var i dåligt tillstånd och mentalsjuk. Jag påminde även om att han tillkallat en kollega, med vilken jag likaledes talat om fallet och givit ett papper med anteckning av Wallenbergs namn.

Vid senare samtal och i brev hade min sagesman förklarat att jag missförstått honom på grund av hans dåliga tyska. Jag fortsatte min framställning. Jag hade från min sida svarat, att jag alltid haft mycket lätt att förstå honom. Jag tillade, att det skulle vara orätt av mig att inte säga att jag var säker på vad jag hade hört.

Jag framkastade i slutet av min framställning tanken, att Wallenberg kanske på senare år varit på platser som sovjetledningen icke kände till, men att det borde vara möjligt genom en mycket noggrann undersökning att få fram upplysningar för att erhålla full klarhet. Detta skulle i Sverige – och i hela världen – uppfattas som en verkligt stor handling av sovjetledningen.

Min sagesman tog därefter till orda. Han sade sig dela de moraliska aspekter som drivit mig i min handling, men han kunde tyvärr ej ge någon personlig hjälp i denna angelägenhet. Hans person hade icke spelat någon roll i detta sammanhang. Om det samtal, som fett till ett missförstånd mellan oss, ville han säga följande. I början av samtalet hade jag berättat om fallet. Han hade då sagt, att han först genom min berättelse fått kännedom om fallet – före samtalet hade han sålunda icke haft någon aning om detta och absolut inte känt till namnet. Han hade inte heller kunnat veta något om det, då han intet haft att göra med fängelser eller fängelsesjukhus eller med krigsfångar eller med militärer över huvud. Efter kriget hade han blivit en

helt civil medborgare. Dessutom hade han aldrig av sovjetiska myndigheter inbjudits att behandla några utländska eller andra krigsfångar. Därför hade han ej kunnat ha sett eller ha hört talas om Wallenberg. Därför kunde han till vad jag nu anfört endast förklara, att jag måste ha missförstått honom. Han hade under vårt samtal 1961, till svar på mina påståenden, sagt: »om Wallenberg är i livet kanske han kan vara sjuk» — och om man förmodade att Wallenberg var vid liv, så kunde man fortsätta att förmoda att han kunde vara sjuk, på det ena eller andra sättet. I sådana vändningar låg kanske orsaken till att jag uppfattat hans ord icke såsom förmodanden utan som påståenden. Han hade talat med mig helt mänskligt och icke trott att jag haft något officiellt eller halvofficiellt uppdrag. Hade han trott detta, skulle han självfallet ha tillkallat en tolk som hade fått skriva ned vad som sades. Jag hade missförstått hans dåliga tyska. Han ville försäkra mig att han inte hade någon anledning att säga något som han inte visste, d. v. s. det som tillskrevs honom av mig. Alla i Sovjetunionen kände väl till att han icke haft något att göra med krigsfångar. Jag hade under samtalet 1961 helt honom tala om Wallenberg med Chrustjov, varvid han förnekat att han var dennes läkare. Jag hade då frågat vem jag skulle vända mig till. Han hade rekommenderat utrikesministeriet. I slutet av samtalet och mot bakgrunden av alla de uppgifter som jag framfört, hade han sagt till mig att den omfrågade troligen var död.

Under det fortsatta meningsutbytet förnekade jag att jag haft ett officiellt eller halvofficiellt uppdrag utan talat med honom som privatperson. Jag upprepade vidare att han vid vårt *första* samtal i denna fråga i *januari* 1961 sagt sig känna till fallet och känna till att Wallenberg var svårt sjuk. Jag undersökte att det var vid vårt *andra* samtal i *mars* 1961 som han hade påstått sig icke tidigare ha känt till fallet. Min sagesman bemötte mig ånyo med förklaringen, att han aldrig haft med Wallenberg att göra och aldrig hört något om honom före samtalet med mig. Han upprepade att ett missförstånd måste ha uppkommit på grund av hans dåliga tyska, vartill jag genmälde, att jag varit på spänn och hört noga på och alltid förstått hans tyska väl. På båda sidor återkom vi därefter gång efter annan i olika former till dessa ståndpunkter. I slutet av diskussionen påpekade jag ånyo att den redogörelse, som min sagesman lämnat, överensstämde med det samtal vi hade i mars 1961, två månader efter det första samtalet. Min sagesman sade att detta var riktigt, men av hans yttrande fram-

gick att han inte tycktes anse detta vara av någon betydelse. I detta sammanhang hänvisade jag även till vad som förevarit på det officiella planet mellan de båda samtalen.

Samtalet utmynnade i en avslutande förklaring av min sagesman, att han ansåg frågan vara slutdiskuterad mellan oss och att vi inte kommit till det resultat som någon av oss önskade. Härtill förklarade jag, att jag ej heller trodde att vi kunde komma längre utan att ulsaga stod mot ulsaga.

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FROM : Amembassy STOCKHOLM

DATE: September 24, 1965.

SUBJECT: Statement by Prime Minister on WALLENBERG Affair

REF

SUMMARY

The recently released Swedish White Paper on the case of Raoul WALLENBERG is a surprisingly strong effort to put pressure on the Soviets to be more cooperative in the matter. The White Paper also needs to be seen in the domestic political context as an attempt by the Government to reply to opposition criticism that it has not been active enough in pursuing the question with the USSR. While the Wallenberg affair will continue to be a definite irritant in Swedish-Soviet relations, it will not affect the operation of Swedish neutrality policy.

There is enclosed an Embassy translation of a statement made by Prime Minister Tage ERLANDER on September 16 on the occasion of the release of the Swedish Government's White Paper on the case of Raoul Wallenberg, the Swedish diplomat who disappeared in Hungary in 1944 during the Soviet advance into that country. The White Paper released to the press comprises three sections: the Prime Minister's statement enclosed with this airgram, a chronological recitation of the history of the Wallenberg affair, and a series of documents bearing upon the subject, such as letters from Erlander to KHRUSHCHEV and KOSYGIN. The chronological account, together with the documentation (both of which are rather long), will be submitted separately as soon as the Embassy has been able to complete the translations.

1965 SEP 28 PM 4 37

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Contents and Classification Approved by: Charge TCMcCameron, Jr.

The Wallenberg case has been the most persistent issue of contention between Sweden and the USSR since the war. In addition, it has been a domestic political issue in Sweden. The bourgeois opposition has criticized the Social Democratic Government for not doing enough to clear up the mystery, and has urged the Government to make public the evidence available to it showing that Wallenberg was alive after August 1947, the date on which he is alleged by the Soviets to have died in Ljubljanka prison. The Government resisted these pressures on the grounds that to release the information would antagonize the Soviets and thereby reduce the chances of obtaining Wallenberg's release if he were actually still alive.

After the visit of KHRUSHCHEV to Sweden in June 1964, and during the campaign before the elections in September of that year, there was continued agitation by the bourgeois opposition for the Government to issue a White Paper which would put public pressure on the Soviets to be more cooperative and forthcoming in their investigations in the Wallenberg case. The Embassy was informed confidentially at the time that Khrushchev in his talks with Erlander last June was extremely unreasonable and obdurate, and was very annoyed at Erlander's persistence in the matter. However, the Government still refused to agree to opposition demands for the release of its confidential documents, feeling that the time was not yet ripe, and that further efforts should be made with the Soviets behind the scenes. Subsequently, (which has only just been revealed through the publication of the White Paper), Prime Minister Erlander wrote to Premier Kosygin on the subject on February 11, 1965 (receiving a negative reply from the Soviet Ambassador in Stockholm). During Erlander's visit to the Soviet Union in June of this year, he again took up the Wallenberg case with Kosygin but without any result. It was at the conclusion of this trip apparently that Erlander decided to accede to the proposal of a White Paper, and rumors to this effect appeared in the press in July.

When the Government actually did issue its White Paper, three months later, the leaders of the opposition were not given an opportunity to study it ahead of time, but were presented with copies of it in a meeting of the Foreign Relations Council just a couple of hours before its release to the press. By releasing the White Paper in this fashion without prior consultation with the opposition, Erlander presumably intended to forestall any future opposition claim that the Government had acted upon the advice of the opposition,

as well as to stress to the Soviet Union that the White Paper represents a considered step by the Government, acting upon its own initiative. The opposition leaders on the Council protested this mode of operation and refused to give their assent to the White Paper (on the theory that there might be additional documentation which should have been included in it), and requested that the Government make available to them the entire file on Wallenberg. Prime Minister Erlander has replied that the opposition is welcome to examine the Government's voluminous dossier on the case. There is another meeting of the Foreign Relations Council scheduled for October 1, at which time the opposition will probably express its satisfaction with the White Paper. In fact, the opposition press has been practically unanimous in commending Erlander for having pursued the case with such tenacity through the years, despite Soviet denials. However, the opposition will presumably insist that the Wallenberg affair not be shelved and that Sweden continue to make strenuous efforts to clarify the matter.

The White Paper contained one sensational new piece of evidence in the form of a statement by a respected and internationally known Swedish doctor, Professor Nanna SVARTZ, who said that while on a visit to Moscow in January 1961 she had learned from a Soviet professor that Wallenberg was then still alive but confined to a mental institution. This information was immediately communicated by Professor Svartz to Prime Minister Erlander and it has formed the basis for a series of Swedish representations to the Soviets ever since, although the information was subsequently retracted by Professor Svartz's informant under what appeared to be pressure from Soviet officials.

As for Erlander's statement itself, it is a surprisingly strong condemnation of Soviet behaviour, as can be seen from the following excerpts:

> "The fate of Raoul Wallenberg has deeply engaged Swedish opinion...We have sought to convince the Soviet leadership of the extraordinary seriousness with which Swedish quarters look upon this question. An essential part of our negotiations with the Soviet leaders during this time has come to concern the Wallenberg case. Unfortunately, the result has been negative. The Soviet leaders firmly assert that Raoul Wallenberg is not in the Soviet Union -- either in prison, in hospital, or somewhere else....We have not achieved the result we have sought. Today, we make public our account....In a democratic country, the individual citizen should be able to rest assured that the community will spare no

efforts for his protection. As long as there is a possibility, this effort must continue and be pursued. In its effort to find a solution to the Wallenberg case, the Government has felt the support of a unanimous Swedish opinion."

Conclusion:

The Government's White Paper, including Erlander's statement, represents an effort to put public pressure on the Soviets, while at the same time seeking to avoid giving undue offense. However, it is in effect also an admission of despair on the part of the Government that there can be a successful resolution of the Wallenberg case. In a sense, it is more of a gesture towards Swedish public opinion. However, Erlander specifically stated that "as long as there is a possibility, this effort must continue and be pursued", so the case is not considered to be publicly closed, and will continue to be an irritant between Sweden and the USSR. Nevertheless, it should be remembered that whatever the frictions in Swedish-Soviet relations engendered by the Wallenberg affair, the Social Democratic Government is highly unlikely to let them affect its concept of Sweden's neutral and non-aligned role in the East-West conflict.

For the Charge d'Affaires ad interim

George R. Andrews
Second Secretary of Embassy

PRIME MINISTER ERLANDER'S STATEMENT OF SEPTEMBER 16, 1965.

(In connection with release of the Government's White Paper)

The fate of Raoul WALLENBERG has deeply engaged Swedish opinion. He was arrested and carried away by a foreign Power while in diplomatic service for Sweden. His heroic achievements to save Hungarian Jews from brutal persecutions by German and Hungarian Nazis have aroused deep admiration and affection. We have had proof that he was in prison in the Soviet Union. This is the background for the intensive Swedish efforts to find out his whereabouts and have him sent home.

In 1957, the Foreign Ministry made public an exhaustive collection of documents concerning Raoul Wallenberg, together with commentaries concerning his captivity in the Soviet Union. Allow me to make a short recapitulation.

In March 1944, after the German troops had marched into Hungary, a Swedish relief action was started for the Hungarian Jews. Raoul Wallenberg was assigned to the Legation in Budapest in July 1944 to lead the relief action under the direct supervision of the Chief of Mission, Minister DANIELSSON. He carried a Swedish diplomatic passport and enjoyed diplomatic immunity. He worked untiringly, with his own life at stake, to save Jews from Nazi persecution. He saved human lives by the thousands.

By the middle of January 1945, that part of Budapest where the Jews protected through the Swedish relief action were living fell in the hands of the Soviet troops. On January 16, the Soviet Foreign Ministry advised that Wallenberg was under the protection of the Russian troops.

The earlier White Paper [1957] contains detailed material on all the Swedish démarches which were made at that time and during the years to follow, to clarify Wallenberg's whereabouts and to have him transferred to Sweden. They were all fruitless. I wish to recall in particular that the Soviet Government in August 1947 informed us that as a result of a careful investigation it had been established that Wallenberg was not in the Soviet Union and that he was unknown to the Soviet authorities.

Between 1947 and 1951 no essentially new facts in the

Wallenberg affair reached the Swedish Foreign Ministry. But in so far as foreign prisoners began to be sent home from the Soviet Union there appeared definite reports about Wallenberg being held in prison in Moscow. This prompted a new long series of Swedish démarches, similarly without result. In April 1956, Minister of the Interior Gunnar HEDLUND and I visited the Soviet Union. We had then the opportunity to present directly to the Soviet Union's Government an exhaustive account of the Swedish views. As a matter of fact, the talks primarily centered on the Wallenberg case. At the end of our talks, the representatives of the Soviet Government -- including BULGANIN, KHRUSHCHEV and MOLOTOV -- promised that a new extensive investigation concerning Wallenberg's fate would be made because of the evidence which had been collected and presented by Sweden.

On February 6, 1957, came the Russian reply. Its implication was as follows: in the course of the extensive Soviet investigations a document had been found according to which Raoul Wallenberg had died in the Ljubljanskaja Prison in Moscow on July 17, 1947. This had been told by the head of the health service in the prison, SMOLTSOV, to the chief of the Soviet security service, ABAKUMOV. The latter, it was stated in the Russian reply, had previously supplied the Soviet Foreign Ministry with false information. Abakumov was executed in connection with the purge within the Security Police following STALIN's death.

The Swedish Government's reaction to this reply was that it seemed difficult to believe that all documentation concerning Wallenberg's stay in Soviet prisons other than the document mentioned would be extinct. The Swedish Government reserved the right to submit any further material concerning Wallenberg that could be of importance for a continued investigation in the Soviet Union.

During the years which have followed since then, we have pursued our search and our efforts. We have left no trace unexplored, however vague it may have seemed. We have seized upon every opportunity to bring up the question, through diplomatic channels or by personal contacts. Intensive checking of all material and thorough internal considerations have taken place all the time.

The collection of documents now being published aims at providing a comprehensive picture of what has happened since the earlier White Paper was published. Thus, it contains

the texts of the notes exchanges with the Soviet Union since 1957. It accounts for the various conversations which we have had with members of the Soviet Government during this period, particularly my talks with Khrushchev in the summer of 1961 and with KOSYGIN in June of this year. Furthermore, the White Paper contains material about the testimonies on which we have founded our representations in recent years. These testimonies refer to two different periods of time.

First, it concerns the reports that Wallenberg during the 1950's had been in prison in Vladimir. We have sought to make contact with the prisoners of war returning from the Soviet Union who could be expected to have been in Vladimir during this period. All of the information obtained from them which could be placed in direct or indirect connection with Raoul Wallenberg has been the subject of testing. A collective judgment of the weight of this information was made in 1959 by Justices of the Supreme Court GYLLENSWÄRD and SANTESSON. Their pronouncement, which is included in the material now presented, is to the effect that in their opinion, and under Swedish law, the investigation at hand, although not containing full evidence in this respect, must be held as making likely that Wallenberg was alive at least during the early 1950's and that he was then in prison in Vladimir.

Second, the White Paper contains [new] testimony which appeared in January 1961. Professor Nana SVARTZ on a visit to Moscow had a conversation about Raoul Wallenberg with a prominent Soviet scientist. According to her testimony, the latter on her direct question then made a statement to the effect that Wallenberg was still alive. Professor Svartz has written a separate account, which forms part of the White Paper, about this statement and about her subsequent contacts with the Soviet scientist.

These testimonies have formed the basis for our recurring representations to the Soviet Government. We have concentrated our efforts to the opportunities when there have been possibilities for contact on the highest level. For an initiative from the highest quarters in the Soviet Union has seemed to be the absolute prerequisite for achieving clarity about the fate of Wallenberg and for having him returned to Sweden. During these contacts we have accounted for our material and for our views. We have sought to convince the Soviet leadership of the extraordinary seriousness with which Swedish quarters look upon this question.

An essential part of our negotiations with the Soviet leaders during this time has come to concern the Wallenberg case.

Unfortunately, the result has been negative. The Soviet leaders firmly assert that Raoul Wallenberg is not in the Soviet Union -- either in prison, in hospital, or somewhere else. They persist that no material whatsoever exists concerning Wallenberg over and beyond the brief notation about his death in 1947 which we were told about in the Soviet reply of 1957. Repeated new investigations are said to have been made because of our representations, but no new material whatsoever has been uncovered. It is being stated that Wallenberg was never in Vladimir and that the statements by the Soviet scientist to Professor Svartz have been misinterpreted. It is being held forth that there is no reason whatsoever why the Soviet Union should detain Wallenberg, in whatever condition he may be, and reference is being made in th[illegible] connec[illegible]ion to all of the prisoners of war and others who h[illegible] been [illegible]llowed to return from the Soviet Union in recen[illegible] ear[illegible] The Russians express their regret about Raoul Walle[illegible] [illegible]ate, and call to mind in this connection all of [illegible] which followed in the wake of the war.

We have not achieved the result we have sought. Today, we make public our account.

All of the efforts made by Sweden in this case have naturally been motivated by Raoul Wallenberg's contribution to relieve suffering people and by consideration for his family. But this engagement and these efforts also have a wider aspect. In a democratic country, the individual citizen should be able to rest assured that the community will spare no efforts for his protection. As long as there is a possibility, this effort must continue and be pursued. In its effort to find a solution to the Wallenberg case, the Government has felt the support of a unanimous Swedish opinion.

Translation: Nils Moller.

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ACTION
EUR-6

RMR	REP	AF
ARA	EUR	FE
NEA	CU	INR
C	P	IO
	FBO	AID
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AOR	COM	FAR
INT	LAB	TAR
TRE	XMB	AIR
ARMY	CIA	NAVY
OSD	USIA	NSA

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

A-222
NO.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State

1965 OCT 9 PM 1 48

INFO : OSLO, COPENHAGEN, HELSINKI, REYKJAVIK, GOTEBORG, MOSCOW.

RM/AN
ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH

FROM : Amembassy STOCKHOLM

DATE: October 4, 1965.

SUBJECT: Government White Paper on Wallenberg Affair

REF : Embassy's A-210 dated September 24, 1965.

The airgram under reference enclosed the statement made on September 16 by Prime Minister ERLANDER on the occasion of the release of the Swedish Government's White Paper on the WALLENBERG affair (the statement forms an integral part of the White Paper). This airgram submits Embassy translations of the other portions of the White Paper as follows:

(1) a chronological account of the Wallenberg case since 1957 (enclosure 1);

(2) appendices to the chronological account, consisting of the texts of hitherto confidential correspondence between Erlander and Soviet leaders, public statements by the Swedish Government, etc. (enclosure 2);

(3) a memorandum by Professor Nanna SWARTZ concerning the information she received in the Soviet Union in January 1961 that Wallenberg was then still alive (enclosure 3).

The following appendices in enclosure 2 are of particular interest:

a) Ambassador RODIONOV of the Soviet Foreign Ministry informed Swedish Ambassador SOHLMAN on January 27, 1959 that because of Swedish newspaper stories alleging that Wallenberg was still in the Soviet Union, "I find it necessary to inform you...that

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Drafted by: POL:GRAndrews:

Contents and Classification Approved: Chargé TCBameron, Jr.

Clearances: POL:JKHolloway, Jr.

POL:EAGaeblius

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Wallenberg died in 1947 - the pieces of information to which Swedish papers refer are all made up". Rodionov added that "on the part of the Soviet Union the hope is expressed that Sweden...may assume an attitude that makes it impossible for certain elements in the future to use this question for the purpose of poisoning Soviet-Swedish relations." (page 4, enclosure 2).

b) A Swedish memorandum dated July 18, 1959 replied to Rodionov's statements cited above in the following terms: "Reference was made /by Rodionov/ to certain pieces of information published in the Swedish press...which are declared to be simply made up....In order to avoid misunderstandings as to the material on which the Swedish inquiry was based, the Ministry finds it necessary to give the following more detailed information..." The Swedish memorandum then went on to cite by name Swiss, Austrian, and German citizens who had been in Russia as prisoners who had all reported separately and individually to Swedish authorities that they had either seen or heard that Wallenberg was interned in the hospital of Vladimir Prison in the early 1950's (several years after the Soviets say he died in 1947). The Swedish note went on to say that the only Swedish motive was to solve the fate of Raoul Wallenberg and that "if this happens this will remove a serious irritative factor in Swedish-Soviet relations". (page 5, enclosure 2).

c) A letter from Erlander to KHRUSHCHEV on February 9, 1961 in which Erlander said that Professor Hanna SWARTZ had been informed by a prominent Soviet doctor that Wallenberg was then alive in a mental hospital, which concluded as follows (without asking for verification of the information): "Foreign Minister UNDEN and I have discussed the most suitable way of transferring Wallenberg to Sweden. We have found that the best way would be if a Swedish physician were permitted to come to Moscow and discuss with his Soviet colleagues arrangements for transportation, medical care, etc. Yours very respectfully." Despite sharp requests by Erlander to the Soviet Ambassador in Stockholm, as well as by the Swedish Ambassador in Moscow, Khrushchev never replied to this letter. (page 9, enclosure 2)

Comment:

The implications of the release of the Government's White Paper have already been analyzed in the airgram under reference. The above brief selections from its appendices serve to reveal the extent of irritation in Swedish-Soviet

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relations caused by the Wallenberg affair and highlight the persistence and determination shown by the Swedes, as well as the obdurate, and even scornful, attitude of the Soviets toward the repeated Swedish requests for information. The chronology and appendices make clear that there were several points at which Erlander could have dropped the matter or the Soviets could have sought to allay Swedish suspicions by providing specific information or by appearing more solicitous of Swedish feelings, but neither did so.

For the Charge d'Affaires ad interim

George R. Andrews
Second Secretary of Embassy

Chronological Account of Wallenberg Case since 1957

1. In 1957, the Foreign Ministry published a collection of documents along with commentaries concerning Raoul Wallenberg's captivity in the Soviet Union. The material was made public after the reply in the matter had been received which had been promised by the Soviet Government during Prime Minister Erlander's and Interior Minister Hedlund's visit to Moscow in March/April 1956. The reply, which was received in the form of a memorandum on February 6, 1957, implied in the main that the Soviet Government, because of the discovery of a document from the Ljubljanskaya Prison in Moscow, was of the opinion, first, that there was reason for looking upon this document as referring to Wallenberg, and, second, that the conclusion ought to be drawn from the content of the document that Wallenberg died in the Ljubljanskaya Prison in July 1947.

2. On account of the Soviet Government's memorandum of February 6, 1957, a Swedish note of reply was transmitted on February 19, 1957, in which it was stated, inter alia, that Swedish public opinion was rightly disturbed by what had occurred in the matter. The Swedish Government found it difficult to believe that all documentation concerning Wallenberg's confinement to Soviet prisons other than the report referred to in the Soviet Government's memorandum would be wholly extinct. The Government therefore expected that if additional material should come to light in the Soviet Union which [illegible] to Wallenberg, this would be communicated to the Swedish Foreign Ministry. The Swedish Government for its part reserved the right to make available any additional material concerning Wallenberg which the Swedish Government judged to be of importance for continued investigations in the Soviet Union.

3. The Swedish note of February 19, 1957 was replied to by the Soviet Government through a note of April 17, 1957, which was handed to the Swedish Chargé d'Affaires ad interim by Deputy Foreign Minister Zacharov. It was stated in the note of reply that the Soviet memorandum of February 6, 1957, had given all [illegible] which had been obtained as the result of a careful and comprehensive investigation concerning Wallenberg carried out by the competent Soviet authorities. It was also pointed out that the Soviet Government unfortunately was not in possession of any further information to discover. The content of the Soviet note was made public through a press release on April 23, 1957.

4. It was clear to the Swedish Government that also henceforth all existing or new clues would have to be tested. The continued search, which was conducted with the same [illegible] and along the same principles as the earlier [illegible] of Wallenberg's stay in the Ljubljanskaya and Lefortovskaya Prisons, indicated that Wallenberg some time after 1947 had been transferred to the prison in Vladimir, situated northeast of Moscow. In the beginning of 1958, the work on the collection of the new material of evidence had progressed far enough to provide the

foundation for a new representation by the Swedish government. This was given the form of a note which was submitted by Ambassador Schlman to Deputy Foreign Minister [illegible] on February 9, 1959 (Appendix A). By way of introduction, it is recalled in the note that the Swedish Government in the note of February 14, 1957 had reserved the right to make additional material available to the Soviet Government. The Swedish authorities had continued to test all clues bearing upon Wallenberg's sojourn in the Soviet Union. There had then come to the knowledge of the Swedish authorities a number of testimonies by persons having returned from Soviet captivity of the implication that Wallenberg after 1947 had been transferred to the prison in Vladimir. These testimonies, independent of each other, had all been obtained from direct contact between the persons in question and Swedish official representatives. The note concluded with the request that the Soviet Government make a prompt investigation for the purpose of determining whether Wallenberg had been staying in the Vladimir prison.

5. The Soviet reply to this request was received on March 6, 1959 (Appendix B). It was stated in the reply that the Soviet Government's memorandum of February 6, 1957 had contained all the information which had been obtained as the result of a careful and comprehensive control, and led to the conclusion that Wallenberg died in July 1947. The reply concluded with the declaration that a renewed investigation, made in accordance with the Swedish Government's wish, had not brought to light any new facts in the matter. The information mentioned in the Swedish note about Wallenberg's stay in Vladimir had not been confirmed.

In response to press inquiries, the Foreign Ministry on May 28, 1959, published a communiqué concerning this exchange of notes (Appendix C).

6. During the spring and summer of 1959 preparations were in progress for the eventually cancelled return visit to Sweden by Minister President KHRUSHCHEV which had been scheduled for August 1959. The Swedish Government informed the Soviet Embassy on May 8 that the Wallenberg affair would be brought up during the negotiations in connection with the visit.

7. On June 27, 1959, the Soviet Foreign Ministry made an oral statement to Ambassador Schlman in reply to a letter which Wallenberg's mother, Mrs. Maj von Dardel, had written to Minister President Khrushchev. It was requested in the statement that Mrs. von Dardel be referred to the Soviet Government's memorandum of February 6, 1957 (Appendix D).

8. Irrespective of the negative Soviet replies, the Swedish representation of February 9, 1959, was followed up through the delivery on July 17, 1959 of a summary of the main testimonies which formed part of the Swedish material concerning Wallenberg's stay in Vladimir (Appendix E).

9. As is also seen from the communications exchanged during June and July 1959, the Swedish press particularly during the month of May 1959 carried a large number of articles on the Wallenberg case. In this connection

the Foreign Ministry as already stated, issued a press communiqué on May 28, 1959, concerning the exchange of notes which had taken place earlier in the year. During the latter half of 1959 and in early 1960 there were also numerous articles in the press which caused inquiries to be made to the Ministry. On January 23, 1960, a new press release was issued (Appendix F), in which it was stated anew that the Swedish authorities were carefully testing all existing and newly incoming clues in the Wallenberg affair and that nothing new was to be added at that time over and beyond what had been accounted for in the press communiqué of May 28, 1959.

10. In the collection of documents of 1957 concerning the Wallenberg affair an account was given of the study of the then available material of evidence about Wallenberg's confinement to prison in the Soviet Union which had been made by former Justices of the Supreme Court Eklund and Lind. The work by the two Justices led to a written report which was submitted to the Soviet Embassy in Stockholm on March 10, 1956, as part of the material which at that time had been made available by Sweden to the Soviet authorities. A corresponding study of the material which had transpired in support of the fact that Wallenberg had been in the Soviet Union after July 1947 and had then been confined to prison in Vladimir was made on the Ministry's orders by former Justices of the Supreme Court Gyllensvärd and Santesson. They stated in a report dated April 25, 1960, that in their opinion the investigation at hand, although not including full evidence in this respect, must under Swedish law be considered as making likely that Wallenberg had been alive at least in the early 1950's and had then been in prison in Vladimir (Appendix G).

11. Throughout this period, efforts were being made to elaborate the evidence as the basis for a renewed démarche to the Soviet Government. An important new testimony appeared in January 1961 in connection with a visit to Moscow by Professor Hanna Svartz. In a conversation with a prominent Soviet scientist she had, in response to a direct question, received the reply that the latter knew about Wallenberg, who was "in a very poor condition" and mentally ill. After Professor Svartz' informant had summoned a colleague, she had been given the advice by the latter to get in touch with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister SEMJONOW -- whom Professor Svartz had said she had known for a long time -- to seek permission for Wallenberg to be brought home -- "if he is still alive".

Professor Svartz in a memorandum has given an account of this conversation and of her subsequent contacts in Moscow.

12. Professor Svartz, who had tried in vain to see Deputy Foreign Minister Semjonov personally in Moscow, quickly informed the Swedish Government about what had happened. Following thorough considerations within the Cabinet, Prime Minister HANSSON addressed a letter directly to Minister President Khrushchev containing a request that a Swedish physician be allowed immediately to travel to Moscow to decide in consultation with his Soviet colleagues the manner of transportation, medical care, etc.,

in connection with a memorial to Wallenberg to Sweden (Appendix II). The letter, which was dated February 9, 1961, was delivered on February 25, 1961, by Ambassador Sohlman at a personal call on Minister President Khrushchev. The latter, who had been informed in advance that the conversation would concern the Wallenberg affair, immediately and categorically declared that he had nothing new to add to the information given previously.

13. Professor Svartz for her part made various efforts to renew contact with her colleagues in Moscow. During a visit to Moscow in March 1961, at which she again met with her informant, she reverted to the question about Wallenberg. The informant then maintained that Professor Svartz had misunderstood him. He declared that prior to their conversation in January he had known nothing about Wallenberg.

After some time had past without any written reply to Prime Minister Erlander's letter having been received, Ambassador Sohlman was instructed to express to the Soviet Foreign Ministry an earnest expectation that such a reply would soon be delivered. This oral reminder was made on July 10, 1961. The Foreign Minister then asserted that a reply to the letter had already been made, to which Ambassador Sohlman rejoined that Prime Minister Erlander after a written representation of this nature felt he had the right to expect a written reply.

14. During the months following this reminder, which neither led to any reply from the Soviet Government, the possibility was considered of seeking to find response from the highest Soviet quarters to the Swedish representations via Professor Svartz' Soviet contacts. In May 1962, Professor Svartz was invited to attend a medical congress in Moscow and then met anew with her original informant. The latter, however, rejected any conversation about Wallenberg and referred her to the Soviet Foreign Ministry.

15. In connection with Soviet Ambassador GUSEV's transfer from Stockholm he was summoned to call on Prime Minister Erlander on August 17, 1962, and was asked upon his return to Moscow to forward to the Soviet Government and to Minister President Khrushchev personally a message containing an urgent appeal for a positive treatment of the Swedish representations concerning Wallenberg (Appendix I). Not even this new representation caused any reply from the Soviet Union.

16. After Foreign Minister Nilsson had been invited by Soviet Foreign Minister GROMYKO to pay a visit to Moscow in May 1963, the Foreign Ministry on April 17 informed the Soviet Embassy in Stockholm that the Swedish Foreign Minister had no concrete questions that he wished to bring up during his visit, with one exception, namely, the question about Wallenberg's fate.

At his first talk with Foreign Minister Gromyko on May 8, 1963, Foreign Minister NILSSON reminded him of Prime Minister Erlander's representations and declared that he wished to take up the question with

Minister President Khrushchev [illegible] Minister Gromyko firmly advised against such a step which in my opinion must be entirely fruitless since there was nothing new to say in the matter. After Foreign Minister Nilsson on May 16 had been informed that time for a meeting with the Minister President had been set for the following day, he immediately confirmed to Foreign Minister Gromyko his previously declared intention to take up the Wallenberg question with the Minister President. This was also done at the meeting which took place on May 17, 1963. Foreign Minister Nilsson then referred to, among other things, Professor Svartz' testimony, and addressed an urgent appeal to the Minister President for assistance in clarifying Wallenberg's fate. The Minister President declared that if Wallenberg had existed he would have been returned to Sweden. He regretted that he had nothing to add over and beyond what had previously been told by the Soviet Government.

17. During Foreign Minister Gromyko's return visit to Sweden at the middle of March 1964 there was a conversation between him and Prime Minister Erlander which was devoted almost exclusively to the Wallenberg affair. The Prime Minister pointed to the great importance of the affair to Swedish-Soviet relations and requested that the Soviet Government make a further attempt to trace Wallenberg's fate, under the guidance of available information. He also proposed that a meeting be arranged between Professor Svartz and her informant, to gain further clarity about that testimony. Foreign Minister Gromyko replied that Wallenberg was not in the Soviet Union, that no further trace had been found after him, and that nothing was to be added. Professor Svartz' testimony must depend on some misunderstanding. The Soviet scientist in question had categorically denied that he had spoken the way it had been alleged. Perhaps he would be prepared himself to make a declaration to Professor Svartz to this effect.

Some time after this conversation, Professor Svartz received a letter from her informant, dated April 29, 1964. In his letter he stated that at the conversation in January 1961 he had said that he knew nothing about Wallenberg, had never heard his name, and had not the slightest idea whether or not he was alive. The content of this letter as well as Professor Svartz' reply by letter of May 28, 1964, are accounted for in Professor Svartz' memorandum.

18. In an interpellation on March 2, 1964, Mr. OHLIN asked Foreign Minister Nilsson whether [illegible] provide the Riksdag with an account of the development of the Wallenberg affair since the publication of the Foreign Ministry's White Paper of 1957 -- in so far as certain information must not be kept secret for special reasons -- and also give information on what measures the Government planned to take to convince the Soviet Government of the necessity of a more effective search for Wallenberg and his whereabouts during different periods after the war.

The Foreign Minister's reply was given in the Riksdag on April 3, 1964 (Appendix 7). It was stated in the reply, among other things, that the Government had sought to exhaust every suitable possibility to underscore

to the Soviet authorities the importance of having clarity achieved concerning Wallenberg's fate. However, the material which in recent years had been presented to the Soviet authorities and the details of the representations which had been made were not of a character to make it possible to make them public in this connection. Yet, all representations had been met by the Soviet Government with the reply that there was nothing to add beyond what had previously been stated by the Soviet Government. In conclusion, Foreign Minister Nilsson continued that the Swedish Government did not look upon Wallenberg's cause as being finished but would continue its efforts to create clarity about his fate.

19. On account of Minister President Khrushchev's impending visit to Sweden, Ambassador JARRING had a conversation in Moscow on May 26, 1964, with the chief of the Scandinavian Division in the Soviet Foreign Ministry, KOVALJOV. During this conversation, the Swedish request was advanced anew that the Soviet Government make an investigation in the Wallenberg affair. With reference to this conversation, Ambassador Jarring was summoned on June 11, 1964, to call on Deputy Foreign Minister ORLOV and then received an oral statement on June 15, 1964.

The Soviet authorities has carried out the most minute investigation in the Wallenberg case because of the conversation with Kovaljov. The result of this investigation was the same as had been presented in the memorandum of February 6, 1957, in which the circumstances of Wallenberg's death had been stated. There were no further circumstances whatsoever that could bring about any news in this matter. The assertions by some persons that Wallenberg was supposed to have been alive after 1947 were either due to mistakes, or else they reflected the efforts of certain circles to complicate relations between the Soviet Union and Sweden. Wallenberg had not, after 1947, been in any hospital, nor prison, or in any other place. For the part of the Soviet Union, there was no doubt whatsoever that Wallenberg died on July 17, 1947, in the Lubljanskaya Prison. Since all possibilities for investigating Wallenberg's fate had consequently been completely exhausted, the Soviet Government saw no further reason for engaging itself any longer in this question. Any return to a discussion on this regrettable fact belonging to the past could only cause harm to Swedish-Soviet relations.

20. During Minister President Khrushchev's official visit to Sweden on June 22-27, 1964, the Wallenberg affair was brought up by the Swedish Government on several occasions. The main discussion took place during a private conversation between Prime Minister Erlander and Minister President Khrushchev, in the presence of Foreign Minister Nilsson and Minister PALME, immediately after the governmental negotiations on June 23, 1964.

Prime Minister Erlander underscored the great importance which was attached on the Swedish side to the Wallenberg question, and pointed to the necessity of at last bringing about clarity on this outstanding question in order to create thereby better relations between the two countries.

The Prime Minister thereupon gave an account of Professor Svartz' testimony, and stressed the great confidence which he personally had in her. The Swedish Government was aware of the fact that the Soviet scientist had asserted that there had been a misunderstanding. Since there were thus two contradictory opinions on what had occurred, it would be necessary to arrange a meeting between the two scientists in order to gain clarity.

Minister President Khrushchev reacted with a declaration that he could not have imagined that the Wallenberg question would be brought up anew by the Swedish Government. He declared that Wallenberg was not to be found in the Soviet Union. This he had already sharply made clear to Ambassador Gohlman. The Swedish Government must realize that the Soviet Union naturally would extradite Wallenberg if he were alive, irrespective of his physical or mental status. The Soviet Union had extradited and repatriated all sorts of people. What interest would the Soviet Union have in keeping Wallenberg? Professor Svartz' statement was founded on sheer misunderstanding. Her Soviet informant, to whom Mme Wallenberg mentioned, had never heard anything about the Wallenberg affair; he was not aware of the exchange of letters which had taken place between the two Governments. It must all be a misunderstanding because of poor knowledge of a foreign language. As far as the Soviet Government was concerned the matter was finished. If there was a desire on the part of a meeting between the two scientists through private channels, the Soviet Government would not make any objections. When the Prime Minister [illegible] on this statement, the Minister President declared that the Soviet Government neither recommended nor advised against such a confrontation.

The Minister President added that many deeply tragic things had happened during the STALIN period. One could not expect of him to account for the Stalin period. He did not wish to expose himself to this interrogation, with a number of questions which had been replied to long ago. The Soviet Government had made extensive investigations and had given clear replies concerning Wallenberg, and yet the Swedish Government did not seem to rely on them.

Prime Minister Erlander emphasized that he had wished to take this opportunity to discuss, openly and in confidence, a question of considerable importance to the relations between Sweden and the Soviet Union. Swedish public opinion would certainly find it very difficult to understand why the Soviet Government objected to further investigations in order to seek clarity.

At private conversations with the Minister President later during his visit Prime Minister Erlander repeatedly reverted to the question and further developed [illegible] the point of fact transpired then. The Minister President [illegible] to be sincerely sorry that the Soviet Government did not have access to any material whereby this regrettable subject of contention between the Soviet Union and Sweden could be brought to an end.

In a special [illegible] statement on the Wallenberg question which was made public at the Prime Minister's press conference on June 2[illegible], 1[illegible], it was said that the Soviet Government had held to its earlier declaration that Wallenberg was not to be found in the Soviet Union. The Swedish Government felt deep disappointment that the Soviet Government had not felt itself capable of doing anything more in this matter. Despite the fact that the many representations made by the Government after the reply made by the Soviet Government in 19[illegible]7 had been fruitless, the Swedish Government would not give up its efforts (Appendix K).

21. During the months immediately following upon Minister President Kosygin's visit, various possibilities were considered for bringing about through private channels, for example through the agency of different scientists, a meeting between Professor Svartz and her Soviet informant. However, these efforts did not produce any result.

22. Minister President KOSYGIN took office in October 19[illegible]. In early 19[illegible] a representation was made to him on the Wallenberg question. This was done in the form of a letter from Prime Minister Erlander dated February 11, 19[illegible], following a summary of the earlier treatment of the case, and with reference to, among other things, the testimonies according to which Wallenberg had been alive in the Soviet Union at a considerably later date than the stated year of death 19[illegible]7, in prison in Vladimir as well as in a Soviet hospital, the letter concluded with an appeal to the Minister President that he personally bring about such a testing of all phases of the [illegible] question and of the information made available by the Swedish Government as to make it possible to gain clarity (Appendix L).

The letter was delivered by Ambassador Jarring at a call on Minister President Kosygin on March [illegible], 19[illegible]. The latter then declared that he had carefully read the Soviet file on Wallenberg. He could not arrive at any conclusion other than that stated in the investigations, namely, that Wallenberg was not alive but died in prison in Moscow under the circumstances and at the place stated in the file. A reply to this effect would be made to the Prime Minister's representation.

With regard to Professor Svartz's contacts, the Minister President declared that the Soviet [illegible] never made the statements attributed to him by Professor Svartz. He had no objection to Ambassador Jarring himself having had confirmed at a personal meeting with the scientist.

23. A meeting with the Soviet scientist was brought about on May 11, 19[illegible]. During this conversation, which took place in the presence of a representative of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, the informant confirmed to Ambassador Jarring that Professor Svartz had had long talk with him in January 19[illegible] concerning Wallenberg's health and interests. In conclusion, she [illegible] the [illegible] on a strictly private [illegible] immediately and with [illegible] Swedish citizen who was being made [illegible]

[illegible] activity in the Swedish [illegible] for [illegible] to have the letter released, [illegible] the [illegible] the name of the [illegible], but the informant said that [illegible] never heard this name and had no [illegible] in [illegible] concerned. He had recommended Professor Gvartz to [illegible] herself to high officials in the Foreign Ministry. Ambassador [illegible] recalled that Professor Gvartz had said she had learnt from her [illegible] that Wallenberg was alive but in poor condition and was in hospital. The informant [illegible] the correctness of this information and [illegible] that it was [illegible] to him how Professor Gvartz could have [illegible] completely. Perhaps it was due to the fact that his knowledge of the [illegible] language -- in which their conversation had been held -- was [illegible] of this, Professor Gvartz could have interpreted [illegible] "if he is alive" or "if he is sick" not as conditional [illegible] statements of fact.

Ambassador [illegible] could [illegible] the testimonies stood against each other, [illegible] said that [illegible] could be arranged between the Ambassador, Professor Gvartz and himself, where an opportunity was given [illegible] to discuss the matter. The informant declared that he failed to understand what purpose such a meeting would serve, but in the end, in reply to a direct question, he declared that he would be [illegible] to participate.

[illegible] visit to Prime Minister Erlander on [illegible] 13, 19[illegible], Soviet Ambassador [illegible] handed over an aide-mémoire of the Prime Minister's letter to Minister [illegible] of February 11, 1947. He had been instructed to state that the Soviet Government in its note of February [illegible], 1947, had made [illegible] investigations which had now [illegible] had confirmed that this was the case. Professor Gvartz' testimony [illegible] misunderstanding.

Prime Minister [illegible] proposed to take up the question during his [illegible] visit. He pointed out that the Soviet Government [illegible] the Swedish Government attached extraordinary importance to the matter and that Swedish public opinion demanded an answer of [illegible].

[illegible]. During Prime Minister Erlander's official visit to the Soviet Union on June 16-17, 19[illegible], the Wallenberg question was taken up at the governmental negotiations held on June 11 and June 17. By way of introduction, the Prime Minister [illegible] to establish that bilateral Swedish-Soviet relations were favorably affected by the fact that the Wallenberg question had not yet been solved. The Prime Minister then [illegible] in three points the further information and replies from the Soviet Government which he desired.

[illegible]) The Soviet Government [illegible] the existence of a [illegible] Wallenberg, [illegible] in July 1947, which [illegible] was considered [illegible] to be [illegible] to Wallenberg. It seems [illegible] later statements by the Soviet Government [illegible] now become a reality. In [illegible]

[illegible]

a) Soviet view on the possible counter-evidence against the testimonies which have been made by prisoners of war who have returned from the Soviet Union and according to which Wallenberg had been in prison in Vladimir after 1947. These testimonies had been studied by prominent Swedish jurists, who had come to the conclusion that, even if full evidence were not at hand, it is likely that Wallenberg had been alive at least at the beginning of the 1950's and had been held in prison in Vladimir.

b) Professor Svartz' testimony concerning her conversation in Moscow with a Soviet scientist in early January 1961 had been stated by the latter as being due to misunderstanding. This question must be clarified.

The discussion at the two negotiations came to deal mainly with these Swedish demands. Minister President Kosygin stated that after receipt of the Prime Minister's letter he had ordered a new investigation. He had received documents giving the date of death and information that Wallenberg was cremated and was not alive. The Swedish Government had been informed of this. There existed no further material and no personal file on Wallenberg, and it was not known, nor were there any Soviet witnesses. If Wallenberg was alive he would be found very soon. It was known who were in prisons and in hospitals. A Chief of Government could soon find a living man but not a dead one. How could the Swedish Government seriously believe that the Soviet authorities were keeping Wallenberg in the Soviet Union? Why should they keep him? The Minister President said he realized that the matter was a difficult and complicated one for the Swedish Government and for Wallenberg's family. However, the Soviet Government had done everything and had no more to add.

The testimonies by the repatriated prisoners of war had no bearing. Professor Svartz' informant had declared that he had never heard of Wallenberg and that the misunderstanding must be due to language difficulties. The Prime Minister's request for a meeting between Professor Svartz and her informant, the Minister President said he was prepared to comply with, even though he considered the measure meaningless.

In the course of the continued exchange of views, both sides reverted to the stands already taken. The Minister President dwelt at length on the conditions which prevailed during the war and the time immediately thereafter. The Prime Minister repeated with sharpness the demand that exhaustive material be made available to shed light on the question in its entirety. The purpose was to have a complete account on all the points where there was great obscurity at an impartial study. The Prime Minister expressed his satisfaction that the Minister President had endorsed a meeting for Professor Svartz, but regretted that the replies to his other requests had been negative.

26. In accordance with what had been then agreed during Prime Minister Erlander's official visit, a consultation took place in Moscow on July 6,

1965, between Professor Svartz and her informant. Present without taking part in the conversation were Ambassador Jarring and two officials from the Soviet Foreign Ministry, of whom the one served as interpreter. The exchange of views, which is accounted for in detail in Professor Svartz' memorandum, ended in that statement stood against statement.

APPENDICES TO CHRONOLOGICAL ACCOUNT

APPENDIX A

Note delivered by Ambassador SCHLEAN in Moscow to Deputy Foreign Minister ZACHAROV on February 9, 1959.

In its Note to the Soviet Government of February 19, 1957 the Swedish Government reserved the right to put at the disposal of the Soviet Government any additional material concerning Secretary of Legation Raoul WALLENBERG, born August 4, 1912, that was considered by the Government to be of importance for further investigations in the Soviet Union.

The Swedish authorities have continued to examine carefully all clues having a bearing on the whereabouts of Wallenberg in the Soviet Union. In so doing, it has come to their notice that statements have been made by several persons returning from Soviet imprisonment that after 1947 Wallenberg was transferred to the prison in Vladimir where he was detained in the isolation ward of the sick (Corpus II). These quite independent statements have all been received in direct contact between the person in question and representatives of Swedish authorities.

The Swedish Government urges the Soviet Government to make a speedy investigation in order to determine whether Wallenberg has been detained in the Vladimir Prison.

APPENDIX B

Note from the Foreign Ministry of the Soviet Union to the Swedish Embassy in Moscow, March 8, 1959.

The Foreign Ministry of the Soviet Union assures the Swedish Embassy of its consideration and in response to the Embassy's Note of February 9 this year has the honor to provide the following information.

In the Embassy's Note it is stated that, according to information by persons who have left the Soviet Union, the Swedish citizen R. WALLENBERG after 1947 was detained in prison at Vladimir, and the Swedish Government's request is presented that an investigation be made for the purpose of verifying this information.

In this connection, the Ministry has the honor to state that its memorandum of February 6, 1957 contained all information concerning R. Wallenberg, which had been received as a result of a thorough and comprehensive check and which resulted in the conclusion that R. Wallenberg died in July 1947. A renewed investigation made in accordance with the Swedish Government's request has not brought to light any fresh information relative to the case and has shown that the information referred to in the Embassy's Note about R. Wallenberg's detention in the Vladimir prison has not been confirmed.

APPENDIX C

Press Release from the Foreign Ministry, May 28, 1959.

In its note to the Soviet Government of February 19, 1957 the Swedish Government stated that it reserved the right to put at the disposal of the Soviet authorities any additional material concerning Raoul WALLENBERG that was regarded as being of importance for further investigations in the Soviet Union.

The Swedish authorities have continued to check carefully every fact that might have a bearing on the whereabouts of Wallenberg in the Soviet Union. In doing so, it has come to their attention that assertions have been made by several persons returning from imprisonment in the Soviet Union that after 1947 Wallenberg was detained in a prison at Vladimir, about 200 kilometers east of Moscow.

In view of these statements the Swedish Government, in a Note handed over to the Soviet Foreign Ministry on February 9, 1959, urged that an investigation be made to determine whether or not Wallenberg had been detained in the Vladimir prison.

The Soviet Government replied in a Note of March 6, 1959, that it had undertaken the investigations requested in the Swedish Note but that no fresh information relevant to the case had been brought to light, nor had the Swedish Government's information about Wallenberg's detention at Vladimir been confirmed.

APPENDIX D

Verbal information given by Ambassador PODIONOV of the Foreign Ministry of the Soviet Union to Ambassador SCHLMAN in Moscow, June 27, 1959.

The Foreign Minister has instructed me to give you the following information concerning Mr. Raoul WALLENBERG. At the end of May 1959 the Swedish press published articles stating that the Swedish citizen Raoul WALLENBERG was still in the Soviet Union. In these articles one referred to some so called witnesses, who reportedly should have seen Mr. Raoul Wallenberg in the Soviet Union after 1947. Because of these pieces of Swedish information I find it necessary to inform you of the following. In its aide-memoire of February 6, 1957 the Foreign Ministry stated, as a result of a thorough and complete investigation made upon the request of the Swedish Government in 1957, that it had been established that Mr. Raoul Wallenberg died in 1947. The pieces of information to which Swedish papers refer are all made up.

The Foreign Ministry requests that what I have now said be reported to Mr. Raoul Wallenberg's mother, Mrs. VON DARDEL, who has turned to Chairman of the Council of Ministers KHRUSHCHEV with an inquiry about the fate of her son.

At the same time on the part of the Soviet Union the hope is expressed that Sweden on her part with respect to the Raoul Wallenberg matter may assume an attitude that makes it impossible for certain elements in the future to use this question for the purpose of poisoning Soviet-Swedish relations.

APPENDIX E

Memorandum delivered to the Foreign Ministry of the Soviet Union on July 18, 1959.

The Swedish Foreign Ministry has received the Soviet Foreign Ministry's information concerning Raoul WALLENBERG which was given to Ambassador SOHLMAN on June 27. Reference was then made to certain pieces of information published in the Swedish press in May on Raoul Wallenberg's whereabouts in the Soviet Union, which are declared to be simply made-up. For this reason the Foreign Ministry wants to stress that the Ministry on May 28 in reply to questions from the press made a short statement about the inquiry made by the Swedish Embassy on February 9 and the reply by the Soviet Foreign Ministry on March 6, 1959. The Ministry has no reason to comment on any additional information published by the Swedish press on this matter. In order to avoid misunderstandings as to the material on which the Swedish inquiry was based, however, the Ministry finds it necessary to give the following more detailed information concerning certain evidence included in this material.

1. The Swiss citizen E. BRUGGER, born January 22, 1903, who was detained in Soviet prisons during the years 1948-1958, has stated that he was in contact with Raoul Wallenberg through tapping in the Corpus II of the Vladimir prison at the turn of the month July/August 1954. Several other prisoners who have returned from the Soviet Union have confirmed that Brugger during the time of his imprisonment talked about this contact with Wallenberg.

2. An Austrian citizen, who spent the period 1945-55 in Soviet prisons, has declared that he had shared a cell with Wallenberg in Corpus II of the Vladimir prison. When the proper Soviet prison officer noticed the Austrian in Wallenberg's cell, the Austrian had immediately been removed from the cell and thereafter at several occasions been asked not to disclose anything about this meeting with the Swede.

3. Two German citizens, H. F. MOLLY and O. KEHRKAMPFF, born June 11, 1917 and June 19, 1903, who were detained in Soviet prisons during 1930-1936 and 1945-1955, have each separately stated that they learned on different occasions through one and the same co-prisoner in the Vladimir prison that Wallenberg was in Corpus II in Vladimir at the beginning of the 1950's. This Soviet co-prisoner has been characterized as a trustworthy and reliable person by a great number of former prisoners who have returned from Vladimir.

Naturally the Foreign Ministry must attach great importance to statements of such a detailed character which independently of each other tell that Wallenberg during certain years in the 1950's was detained in a certain section of a certain prison. The Foreign Ministry does not believe that there is reason to assume that these statements were made with the obvious intention of spreading untruthful information. Nor does it appear likely that all statements could be ascribed to confusion of names or slip of memory. This is the reason why the Foreign Ministry considered it necessary to try to throw light upon the question of the fate of Wallenberg through inquiry to the Soviet Foreign Ministry.

With respect to the expressed wish in the message of the Soviet Foreign Ministry that the Swedish Government in the future assume an attitude towards the Wallenberg case that cannot be utilized for the purpose of disturbing Swedish-Soviet relations, the Foreign Ministry should like only to stress that the Swedish Government's only motive in this case has been and is to procure light as to the fate of Raoul Wallenberg. If this happens, this will remove a serious irritative factor in Swedish-Soviet relations. In this connection the Foreign Ministry wishes to call attention to the fact that the Soviet Foreign Ministry in its memorandum of February 6, 1957, did not express itself more precisely as to what had happened to Wallenberg in the Soviet Prison preferring to state that on account of what had been reported in the memorandum referred to the conclusion ought to be drawn that Wallenberg died in July 1947.

Finally, the Foreign Ministry wishes to confirm that Raoul Wallenberg's mother, Mrs. von Dardel, has been informed of the content in the Ministry's memorandum of June 27, 1959.

APPENDIX F

Press Release from the Foreign Ministry, January 23, 1960.

As pointed out several times the Swedish authorities check carefully all existing and new facts in the WALLENBERG case. That this still is the case is shown most recently in the press release of May 28, 1959. In that release, an account was given of a Swedish inquiry to the Soviet Government whether Wallenberg had been detained in the Vladimir prison and the reply to this question. In addition to what was reported in this press release there is at present nothing to be added.

APPENDIX 2

Statement by Supreme Court Justices GYLLENSWÄRD and SANTESSON, April 25, 1960.

Raoul WALLENBERG, Secretary of Legation at the Royal Swedish mission in Budapest, was taken in Soviet custody in January 1945 and later taken as prisoner to the Soviet Union.

In a memorandum delivered on February 6, 1957 the Soviet Government, on grounds of certain investigations, stated that because of the investigation referred to the conclusion ought to be drawn that Wallenberg died in July 1947.

Reports have, however, been received indicating Wallenberg was alive even after the mentioned time and was detained in prison in Vladimir.

The undersigned have studied a great number of records in the Foreign Ministry of statements by persons who earlier lived in Soviet captivity, as well as other recorded statements and other documents.

The statements have been given by Finnish, French, Swiss, German and Austrian citizens and by stateless persons. Most statements have been given before officers of the Swedish Foreign Service or the Swedish national police.

The records are made with great care and do not give rise to the assumption that the statements were made after leading questions or other circumstances which might have influenced the content. The statements contain a great amount of information the correctness of which it was possible to check and they support each other.

According to our opinion the present investigation must according to Swedish law -- although it does not include full evidence in this respect -- be considered to make it likely that Wallenberg was alive at least in the beginning of the 1950's and then was detained in prison in Vladimir.

Stockholm, April 25, 1960.

Nagnar Gyllenswärd
former Supreme Court Justice and
President of the Supreme Court

Per Santesson
former Supreme Court Justice and
President of Section of the
Supreme Court

APPENDIX B

Letter from Prime Minister ERLANDER to Chairman of the Council of Ministers KHRUSHCHEV, February 2, 1961.

Dear Mr. Chairman of the Council of Ministers,

As you certainly recall, during my visit to Moscow in the spring 1956 we talked about the Swedish diplomat Raoul WALLENBERG who disappeared in Budapest at the end of the war. I stressed that the question concerning the fate of Wallenberg occupied Swedish public opinion to a high degree and that the Swedish Government wished to do everything in its power to throw light upon his fate. The Soviet Union on its part promised to make investigations and declared that Wallenberg would of course be permitted to return home if he was in the Soviet Union. In 1957 we were informed of the result so far of the investigations. Sweden on her part declared at a later occasion that the Swedish Government reserved the right to submit any additional material concerning Wallenberg which the Swedish Government considered to be of importance for continued investigations in the Soviet Union.

I now wish to inform you that I have been informed by a Swedish physician, Professor Hanna SVARTZ, who visited Moscow at the end of January 1961, invited to lecture there on her research results, that Wallenberg was alive at that time and that he was a patient in a mental hospital in Moscow. His health was not good. Mrs Svartz got the information from an internationally known, prominent representative of Soviet medical science.

Foreign Minister UNDEN and I have discussed the most suitable way of transferring Wallenberg to Sweden. We have found that the best would be if a Swedish physician was permitted to come to Moscow and discuss with his Soviet colleagues the way of transportation, medical care, etc.

Yours very respectfully,

Tage Erlander

APPENDIX I

Verbal information given by Prime Minister ERLANDER to Soviet Ambassador GUSEV, August 17, 1962.

During a call on the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Mr. KHRUSHCHEV, on February 25, 1961, Ambassador SOHLMAN handed over to him a letter from me, dated February 9. In this letter it was stated that I had received the information that WALLENBERG was alive at the end of January 1961 and that he was a patient in a mental hospital in Moscow. His health was not good. The letter ended with a proposal that a Swedish physician be immediately permitted to go to Moscow to discuss with his Soviet colleagues the method of transferring Wallenberg to Sweden.

When Mr. Khrushchev received the letter he said that information had already been given on the part of the Soviet Union and that there was nothing new with respect to the matter.

During a call on the acting chief of the Scandinavian section in the Soviet Foreign Ministry, Ambassador KIRSANOV, on July 10, 1961, Ambassador Sohlman, under instructions, expressed his serious expectation that a reply would be soon delivered. We understand, he said, that investigations have been necessary but since several months have passed, we were of the opinion that it could be assumed that they had been completed by now. Mr. Kirsanov stated that a reply to the letter had already been given and to this Mr. Sohlman said that the Prime Minister considered that after a written request of this kind he had the right to expect a written reply.

As you may understand, Mr. Ambassador, this situation causes me serious concern and upon your return to Moscow I ask you to convey this to the Soviet Government and personally to its chief. When I speak about concern, I mean in the first place that the matter is of importance for Swedish-Soviet relations, in whose further development in a harmonious and friendly spirit I know you have a great interest. What is involved is the question of a Swedish diplomat who was captured by Soviet troops more than 17 years ago. You certainly agree with me that no Government in such a situation can refrain from demanding that the

APPENDIX I (Cont'd.)

requests it makes on the basis of information which it has received and found reliable, be given both thorough investigation and courteous treatment. I should also like to stress, as was pointed out by Ambassador Sohlman at his visit to the Soviet Foreign Ministry on July 10, 1961, that we have endeavored to treat the matter solely on a strictly factual basis.

But I have also the more human aspect in mind. It is a generally accepted principle that members of the same family who have been separated and mutually wish for contact shall be given all available information about each other and that they shall be given the opportunity to join each other, independent of place of residence, state of health etc. The principle is not only generally accepted in theory. It has also come to be more and more put into practice. I appeal urgently to your Government and to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Mr. Khrushchev, personally to also take this into consideration in dealing with this matter. I make this appeal with the strong hope of a positive reply.

APPENDIX J

Reply by the Foreign Minister in the Lower House of the Riksdag to an interpellation by Mr. OHLIN, April 3, 1964.

(Excerpt)

Mr. Speaker,

In an interpellation dated March 3, 1964 Mr. OHLIN has asked me if I would tell this House what has happened in the Raoul WALLENBERG affair since the publication of the Foreign Ministry's White Book in 1957 -- with the exception of any particulars that must be kept secret for special reasons -- and also inform it about the steps the Government intends to take in order to convince the Soviet Government of the necessity of a more effective investigation into the disappearance of Raoul Wallenberg and his whereabouts during different periods after the war.

--.--.--.--.

First, in regard to the inquiries into the disappearance of Raoul Wallenberg, I should like to begin by recalling that the Foreign Ministry's White Book of 1957 was published after the receipt of information on the matter which had been promised by the Soviet Government during the visit to Moscow of the Prime Minister, Mr. Erlander, and the then Minister of the Interior, Mr. HEDLUND, in March - April 1956. In broad outline this reply, which was received on February 6, 1957, was to the effect that in view of the evidence of a document discovered in the Ljubljanskaja Prison in Moscow, the Soviet Government considered that there was reason to believe that this document referred to Wallenberg, and that from the contents of the document the conclusion could be drawn that Wallenberg died in the Ljubljanskaja Prioson in July 1947.

In the light of the Soviet Government's reply of February 6, 1957 a Swedish note was delivered on February 19, 1957, which was similarly published in the White Book. In this Note it was declared, among other things, that Swedish public opinion was justifiably concerned about what had happened in regard to this affair. The Swedish Government found it hard to believe that all documents referring to Wallenberg's detention in Soviet prisons other

APPENDIX 3 (Continued)

than the report mentioned by the Soviet Government had been entirely destroyed. The Government therefore expected that the Swedish Foreign Ministry would be informed should additional material emerge in the Soviet Union which could throw light on what might have happened to Wallenberg. The Swedish Government, for its part, reserved the right to make available any additional material concerning Wallenberg which could, in its opinion, be of importance in subsequent inquiries in the Soviet Union.

Thus the Swedish Government clearly realized that it must continue its examination of all existing or fresh clues. During the subsequent Swedish investigations, which were carried out with the same exactitude and along the same lines as the previous inquiries into Wallenberg's detention in the Lubjanskaja and Lefortovskaja prisons, several statements were made by persons who had returned from Soviet imprisonment to the effect that Wallenberg after 1947 was detained in a prison at Vladimir, about 200 kilometers east of Moscow. In view of these statements the Government urged in a Note, which was sent to the Soviet Foreign Ministry on February 9, 1959, that an inquiry should be made to establish whether Wallenberg had been detained in the Vladimir prison.

In reply the Soviet Government announced on March 6, 1959 that it had made the inquiries requested in the Swedish Note, but that no fresh information on the matter had been brought to light and that the Swedish Government's assertions regarding Wallenberg's detention at Vladimir had not been substantiated.

Since then the Government has sought to make use of every appropriate opportunity to impress the importance to the Soviet authorities of obtaining definite knowledge of Wallenberg's fate. The additional material put before the Soviet authorities on these occasions and the details of the representations made are, however, not of a kind suitable to make public here.

I can however confirm that at the beginning of 1961 the Prime Minister sent a personal letter on this matter to the Soviet Premier, Mr. Khrushchev. Furthermore, I should like to mention that during my visit to Moscow in May last year I took up the matter both with the Foreign

APPENDIX 1 (Cont'd.)

Minister, Mr. GROMYKO, and with Mr. Khrushchev. Finally, as has been reported by the press, the Prime Minister took up the Wallenberg affair with Mr. Gromyko during his visit to Stockholm two weeks ago.

All representations have been met with the Soviet answer that nothing has been found to add to what has been previously -- i.e. in 1957 and 1959 -- communicated. It has also been repeatedly declared that if Wallenberg had been found, he would have been sent back to Sweden.

Nevertheless I should like to affirm to Mr. Ohlin that the Government does not regard Raoul Wallenberg's case as finally settled and that it will continue its efforts to obtain complete and definite knowledge of his fate.

--.--.---.--.

APPENDIX A

Statement by Prime Minister Erlander, June 26, 1964. (At Conclusion of Khrushchev's Visit to Sweden).

The Swedish Government, in the talks during the visit of the Soviet Premier, Mr. Khrushchev, has taken up the Wallenberg affair. We have informed the Premier of the importance we attach to this matter. It has been declared on the part of the Soviet Union that a fresh inquiry has been made on account of the repeated Swedish applications. The Soviet part maintains that no change has been made in its previous announcement that Raoul Wallenberg is not in the Soviet Union.

We are deeply disappointed that the Soviet Union has not felt able to do more about this matter. Despite the fact that the many representations made by the Government since the Soviet reply in 1957 have yielded no result, we do not intend to give up our efforts in this matter.

APPENDIX 1 (Cont'd)

has at different times provided further information to the Soviet Government, indicating that Raoul Wallenberg was alive in the Soviet Union at a considerably later time than 1947, at one time in prison in Vladimir and at another in a Soviet hospital in January 1961, according to a statement by ..... to Professor Nanna SVARTZ at a meeting in Moscow in January 1961.

Most recently, I took the opportunities which were afforded in connection with Foreign Minister GROMYKO's visit to Stockholm in March 1964 and former Chairman of the Council of Ministers KHRUSHCHEV's visit to Sweden in June 1964 to stress what importance is attached to the matter on the part of Sweden. On these two occasions, just like at other times the Soviet Union for its part has referred to the above-mentioned Note of February 6, 1957 and added that Raoul Wallenberg is not in the Soviet Union.

I have personally followed this case for many years in the hope of bringing the matter to a satisfactory solution. Through the kind message, which was handed over to me on October 16, 1964 by the Soviet Ambassador to Stockholm, I know that you agree with us on the importance of Swedish-Soviet relations being further developed and that in this respect we have a joint goal. In this spirit I take the liberty of addressing an appeal to you that you personally make arrangements for such an investigation into all aspects of the matter in question and into the pieces of information, which have been placed at your disposal by Sweden concerning Raoul Wallenberg, in order that definite knowledge can be attained.

I can assure you that a compliance with my request will be highly prized by the Swedish Government and the Swedish people.

Yours very respectfully,

Tage Erlander

Translations: M-LH-Rylander

MEMORANDUM BY PROFESSOR GUNNA SVARTZ

During a visit to Moscow in January 1961 to lecture before a scientific congress I met with several prominent Soviet scientists. I had a talk with one of these on January 27 in his office. Our talk was held in the German language. After some discussion on congresses, research, etc., I asked him to pardon me if I brought up a question which was very close to my heart and to the heart of other Swedes. I gave him an account of the Raoul WALLENBERG case, and asked him whether he knew about this case, whereupon he nodded in the affirmative. I asked him then whether he could give me some advice on how I might go about to find out where Wallenberg may be. I told him that we in Sweden had information to the effect that Wallenberg was alive only two years ago and that his next of kin had received reports which indicated that he was still alive. My informant then suddenly said that he surely knew about the case and that the person I was asking about was in a very poor condition. Asked what I wanted I replied that the main thing was that Wallenberg could be brought home, no matter in what condition. My informant then said in a very low voice that the person inquired about was in a mental hospital. Then he added: "I shall call one of my colleagues to come here and consult with him". He left the room and returned after a while in company with his colleague, whereupon he himself again withdrew.

His colleague sat down facing me. I asked whether he had been briefed on what the matter was about, and he confirmed that this was so. He asked me carefully about where Wallenberg had been serving and asked me to write his name on a piece of paper. I then wrote: Attache Raoul Wallenberg. I told him that Wallenberg's mother was one of my patients. She would be served to have peace of mind and to be given full certainty. No matter how sick her son might be, it would be a blessing to her as it would be for all of Sweden if he could be given treatment in his home country. I asked him whether he could help us, and he replied that he would do everything within his power. I told him that the entire Swedish nation would be grateful to the Soviet Union if Wallenberg was permitted to be brought home, even if he were both physically and mentally seriously ill. This matter, I said, lies very close to the heart of our Government. I mentioned that I knew Deputy Foreign Minister SEMJONOV since his stay in Sweden, and was immediately given the advice to address myself directly to him.

I further asked the colleague whether he considered it possible for me as a docter to take Wallenberg home. He believed -- "if he is still alive" -- that such a procedure would not be

impossible but that I ought to talk to Semjonov about this.

Upon returning to my hotel I was given through the Swedish Embassy the telephone number to Minister Semjonov's secretary. I dialled the number but was given the reply that Semjonov had gone abroad.

There was a banquet in the evening. After the dinner I suddenly spotted the colleague, who walked up to me and asked whether I had seen Semjonov. I replied that he had gone abroad, and asked whether I could write Semjonov. He replied in the affirmative. After some argument he promised me that I may say in the letter that I had been speaking with both of them -- i.e., with him and with my original informant -- and that they had given me the advice that I address myself to Semjonov. The colleague told me that after I had left them earlier in the day they had together discussed the question which had been the subject matter of our conversation. They were both of the opinion that a possible transportation to Sweden of the person in question -- if he is still alive -- naturally had to be organized through diplomatic channels, whereupon which I said I could fully understand.

Upon my return to Stockholm I immediately called on Prime Minister ERLANDER and told him and Foreign Minister UNDEN about what had happened.

For the purpose of renewing the contact I wrote a personal letter to my informant and expressed the hope of seeing him again during an early return visit to Moscow. In accordance with the advice I had been given in Moscow I also wrote a letter to Semjonov in which I asked how far the investigations concerning Wallenberg had proceeded and about the possibilities for taking him home.

I received a reply from my informant in which he declared himself prepared to meet me again in Moscow. My journey took place at the end of March 1947. At our first talk with my informant -- in the presence of another Soviet scientist -- I put the question whether I might visit Wallenberg. He replied that this would have to be decided in higher quarters, and he added: "unless he is dead". To this I rejoined: "But then he must have died quite recently." During a private meeting with my informant later on he pointed out to me that I ought not to have told the Swedish Government about our original conversation. He did not deny the conversation but maintained that his poor German had led to a misunderstanding, and he declared now that he

had known nothing about the Wallenberg case. He told me that he had been summoned to Minister President KHRUSHCHEV, who had been informed about our conversation and had been angered because of it.

Since I did not succeed either during this Moscow visit to get an appointment with Semjonov -- despite the fact that I even sought to call him on his private telephone number, which I had been given by my informant -- I wrote a new letter to him upon my return to Stockholm asking for an appointment as soon as possible, wherewith I declared myself prepared to travel to Moscow immediately.

I never had a reply in any form to these letters of mine.

In May 1962 I was offered a new opportunity to attend a scientific congress in Moscow. It is true that I met my informant during this visit, but when I tried to lead our conversation into the Wallenberg question he merely declared that this question would have to be taken up through the diplomatic channels and that no private talks between the two of us on this subject ought to be held.

Attempts to reach my informant through other channels did not succeed.

In early May 1964, I received a letter from him, dated April 29, 1964. This letter read:

"I write you in connection with new statements appearing in Stockholm concerning Mr. Wallenberg's fate. I was cited in these statements -- in a way as to indicate that I should have given you some sort of information about him during your visit ... to Moscow in 1961.

"As you will surely recall, I told you then that I know nothing about Mr. Wallenberg, have never heard his name, and have not the slightest idea whether or not he is alive.

"I advised you to address yourself to our Foreign Ministry in this matter, through your ambassador or in person. Upon your request that I inquire about the fate of this person with our Chief of Government N. S. Khrushchev, whose doctor I was according to your hypothesis, I replied to you that N.S. Khrushchev, as everyone knew full well, was in absolutely good health and that I was not his doctor.

"Owing to some misunderstanding inconceivable to me, this short talk with you (it was carried on in the German language which I may not fully master) has come to be erroneously interpreted in official Swedish quarters.

"I learnt later on that Mr. Wallenberg had died already in 1947 and that our Government at a later date had informed the Swedish Government and the deceased's family accordingly."

In an exhaustive reply of May 28, 1964, I recapitulated the main points of what in my opinion had happened during our conversation in January 1961 and which in essential respects deviated from the version given by my informant in his letter. Because of the allegation that there had been some misunderstanding owing to language difficulties, I reminded him that the two of us at a number of conversations during the 1950's, when we first met, had always understood both questions and answers very well, as had also been the case at our conversation in January 1961 as well as at the conversations which followed. In my letter I also expressed my urgent and warm hope that the Soviet authorities as soon as ever possible would take steps to permit Wallenberg to return home.

Throughout this period I have been in constant contact with the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister in their efforts to solve the Wallenberg question with the support of, among other things, my own testimony.

Ever since 1962 I have in various ways tried to bring about a new personal meeting with my informant. I have also sought to obtain information on Wallenberg through other scientists, but nothing of importance has been unearthed. Following Minister President Khrushchev's visit to Sweden in June 1964, I intensified my efforts to have a personal meeting with my informant. However, these efforts produced no result.

In March 1965 I was informed that Ambassador JARRING in connection with submitting to Minister President KOSYGIN a new representation from Prime Minister Erlander in the Wallenberg case, had been given the opportunity himself to visit my informant to discuss my testimony. As my informant at this visit -- which took place in May -- repeated his categorical denials, Ambassador Jarring proposed that a new meeting be arranged for my account.

This meeting took place on July 6, 1965, in the presence of Ambassador Jarring and two representatives of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, of whom one served as interpreter. I began

the conversation -- which was conducted in Swedish and Russian, respectively, and lasted for several hours -- by giving a thorough account of the reasons for my interest in Wallenberg. It dated back as early as from my visit to Moscow in March 1945. The immediate reason, however, was information which I had received from his mother and her present husband, with whom I had cooperated for many years at the Karolinska Hospital (in Stockholm). Wallenberg's mother, Mrs. von Dardel, had been my patient for a long time. Since she knew that I was closely acquainted with the former Soviet Ambassador in Stockholm, Madame KOLLONTAI, and had many other Soviet friends, she asked me on repeated occasions to be responsible for her son. When in 1960 I received an invitation to attend a congress in Moscow in early 1961, I decided to produce on the case to be prepared for any contingencies. Considering a copy of the "White Paper" published by the Foreign Office in 1957 I found certain circumstances to be particularly remarkable. In 1957 there had been an official Soviet announcement saying that judging from all accounts Wallenberg had died in the Ljubljanskaya prison on July 17, 1947. It was then surprising that two days later, on July [illegible], 1947, there [illegible] interrogations concerning Wallenberg [illegible] in the [illegible] and the Lefortovskaya prisons with a number of other prisoners who had not been in the same cell as Wallenberg, nor the prisoners of one of them. It was remarkable to read that the prisoners had all told identically the same story. Thus, they had said that Wallenberg was a Swedish diplomat and in that capacity had dealt with Jewish affairs and persecution of Jews in Budapest. They had also stated that they had learnt from tapping signals from Wallenberg or others that Wallenberg and his chauffeur LANGFELDT had been brought to the Ljubljanskaya prison in 1945. So it had also been told that Wallenberg the same year had been transferred from Ljubljanskaya to the Lefortovskaya prison. The prisoners who had told this had been prepared to swear to their statements. All this seemed strange when considering the fact that on August 16, 1947, a note had been dispatched to our Government from then Foreign Minister VYSHINSKY in which the latter declared that Wallenberg was unknown in the Soviet Union. Within the course of one month it would thus have happened, first, that Wallenberg had died. Ten days later there would have been interrogations on Wallenberg held with prisoners from different countries in two separate prisons. It had been trusty personnel who conducted the interrogations. Thus, it must have been well known. The prisoners interrogated had been placed in lone cells for several months. Then came the aforementioned announcement of August 1947 that he was unknown in the Soviet Union. *)

*) Later on, it will be recalled, it was said in the Soviet note of February 6, 1957, that Wallenberg died in July 1947.

[illegible] responsibility, I told my informant which caused me to come to the conclusion at the time that I could be [illegible]. To this came later information in the press from different persons who had been in the Vladimir prison that Wallenberg for a certainty had been confined in this prison in the 1950's. The von Dardel family had also received additional information that he was alive at a later date.

When I travelled to Moscow in January 1961 it had been my intention to try to contact Foreign Minister Gromjonov, whom I knew since his stay in Stockholm. When I considered who else I could talk to, my thoughts had come upon my informant. I had [illegible] much hesitated to mix him into these questions, but in a difficult and urgent matter one must sometimes seize the opportunity.

I pointed out to my informant that during our conversation in January 1961 I had not told him the reason for my interest as exhaustively as I had [illegible] that I had stated the essential points. I further reminded him that after my introductory account I had asked him whether he knew about the Wallenberg case and that he had then replied in the affirmative. I quoted the statement he had made about Wallenberg being in a poor condition and mentally ill. I also reminded him that he had summoned a colleague, with whom I had likewise spoken about the case and had given him a piece of paper with a notation giving Wallenberg's name.

At subsequent talks and [illegible] my informant had declared that I had misunderstood [illegible] of his poor German, my presentation went on. I for my part had replied that I had always found it very easy to understand him. I added that it would be wrong of me not to say that I was certain about what I had heard.

Toward the end of my presentation I ventured the idea that perhaps Wallenberg in reality was not been in places unknown to the Soviet leadership, but that it ought to be possible through a very thorough investigation to extract information in order to achieve full clarity. This would be interpreted in Sweden -- and throughout the world -- as a truly great action by the Soviet government.

My informant thereupon spoke up. He said he shared the moral aspects which had inspired me in my doings, but unfortunately he could not render any personal assistance in this affair. He

personally [illegible] about the conversation [illegible] between the two of us [illegible] of our [illegible] said that [illegible] thus, prior [illegible] had no idea about this and had absolutely [illegible] could he have known anything [illegible] prisons or prison [illegible] on the whole. [illegible] ordinary civil citizen. [illegible] by any Soviet authority [illegible] prisoners [illegible]. Therefore [illegible] challenge. Therefore he [illegible] said that I must have misunderstood him. [illegible] in 1951 he had said, in reply [illegible] alive perhaps he may be [illegible] alive one could [illegible] the way or the other. [illegible] I had interpreted [illegible] of fact. [illegible] humane spirit and had not [illegible] or semi-official errand. Had he [illegible] summoned an interpreter who would [illegible] what was said. I had misunderstood him [illegible] that he had no [illegible] anything about, [illegible] him by [illegible]. Everyone in [illegible] had nothing to do with [illegible] I had asked him [illegible] he had denied [illegible] he was the [illegible]. He had recommended the Foreign [illegible]. [illegible] of our conversation and against the background of all the information which I had presented, he had said to me that the person [illegible] probably was dead.

During the [illegible] of our conversation I mentioned that I had been on any official [illegible] when we had talked to him as a private [illegible] first conversation [illegible] he had said he was familiar [illegible] Raoul Wallenberg was personally all. I understood [illegible] that he had [illegible] 1951 that he had [illegible] knowledge about the case. My informant [illegible] with the declaration that he had never had anything to do with Raoul Wallenberg and had never heard anything about him prior to his conversation with me. He repeated that a misunderstanding must have arisen because of his poor German, to which [illegible] been on the alert and had listened [illegible] misunderstood Mr. Herman. On both [illegible] seems to

these grounds. At the end of the discussion I pointed out anew that the account given by my informant tallied with the conversation we had had in [illegible] two months after our first conversation. My informant said that this was correct, but judging from his statement he did not seem to feel that this was of any importance. In this connection I also referred to what had happened on the official level between the two conversations.

The discussion ended with a concluding declaration by my informant that he considered the question brought to an end between the two of us and that we had not come to the result that anyone of us had wanted. To this I declared that neither did I believe that we could come any further and that testimony stood against testimony.

Translation: Nils Möller

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
- MARKED FOR INDEXING
- NO INDEXING REQUIRED
- ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
- MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WE

INFO.:

FROM: [redacted]

SUBJECT: Government White Paper on The Wallenberg Affair

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES

Action: FYI

The attachments listed below on the subject of the Wallenberg affair are forwarded for Headquarters' information:

1. Embassy dispatch A-210, September 24, 1965
2. Embassy dispatch A-222, October 4, 1965
3. Swedish White Paper on the Wallenberg Affair.

[redacted]

3 Atts. HW
as stated

Distribution:
3 - Headquarters w/atts.
2 - [redacted]

OSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	[redacted]	9 October 1965
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER: [redacted]

SECRET

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	1. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

WALLENBERG, RAOUL
201-005925
SEX M DOB ?

100-006-139/04
CD -00691
19 NOV 65
A01 P1

CIT ?
CCC ?
PP 20, 30, 31.
SUBJ NAME APPEARS IN EIN SCHWETZER ERLERBT DIE SOVIET UNION BY EMIL BRUGGER.

R 6511302125

FILE IN 201-

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 867 SEE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

Wallenberg bortglömd av polisen

Från DN:s specielle korrespondent
TOR HÖGNÄS

HELSINGORS, fredag.

— Den finländska statspolisen glömde att fråga mig om fallet Raoul Wallenberg då den förhörde mig efter hemkomsten från min ryska fångenskap, säger Boris Björkelund på fredagen till Dagens Nyheters korrespondent. Och själv kom inte jag att tänka på svensken. Jag var självfallet mycket medtagen efter mina dryga tio fängelsår och hade inte kunnat följa med alla händelser i väster.

Samma representant för statspolisen som förhörde Björkelund år 1955 tog kontakt med honom på fredagen. Polismannen konstaterade endast att man hade glömt att beröra fallet Wallenberg vid förhöret. Dessutom har Sveriges TV ringt upp och kommer att göra en intervju på lördagen.

— Här är full rulle, säger den pigge 73-åringen, som Stalin inte lyckades knacka.

Björkelund lokaliserar fånglägret, där Wallenberg enligt uppgift skulle ha legat sjuk och avlidit den 19 eller 20 augusti 1955. Det var ett genomgångsläger vid järnvägsstationen Palma, som ligger i Krasnojarski-rajongen, ca 100 km väster om Taschet, ungefär mitt emellan staden Krasnojarski och Taschet. Palma är en mycket liten station, närmast bara en anhalt på Vladivostokbanan.

"Vet ganska litet"

I sjukhusets arkiv i Palma borde dödsattesten alltså obduktionsprotokollet, finnas, om de bägge tyskarna talat sant, och de hade väl ingen orsak att ljuga.

Senare har Boris Björkelund givetvis läst om Wallenberg, men han har inte tyckt att hans uppgifter skulle betyda så mycket.

— Jag vet ju ganska litet, — bara det som de tyska fångarna berättade. De var först då jag började skriva min bok om fängelsetiden som jag märkte att det kanske vore värdefullt att skriva ned allt det jag visste. Men mera än det som Dagens Nyheter återgav på fredagen vet jag inte.

Boris Björkelund har skrivit sin bok på ryska. Den har översatts till finska. Föräldrarna var finlandssvenskar men bodde i Ryssland, där Boris gick i skola. Men sitt finska medborgarskap har han alltid haft trots att han före revolutionen tjänstgjorde i ryska flottan. Han talar svenska med stark rysk accent trots alla åren i

DN 15-Oct 66

Fd Stalinfånge:

Wallenberg dog i Sibirien 1955

Från DN:s specielle korrespondent Tor Högnäs

HELSINGFORS, torsdag.

Raoul Wallenberg dog den 19 eller 20 augusti 1955 på sjukhuset i ett fångläger vid den lilla järnvägsstationen Pioma i Sibirien. Lägrets övervakningscentrum låg i staden Krasnojarsk väster om Itkutsk. I fånglägrets arkiv i Krasnojarsk finns helt säkert Wallenbergs dödsattest eller "akten" som ryssarna kallade obduktionsprotokollet. Det är bara för de ryska myndigheterna att söka i dessa arkiv så kan de äntligen ge ett klart svar i fallet Wallenberg.

Den som säger detta heter Boris Björkelund, född i Ryssland år 1893 av finlandssvenska föräldrar. Han fängslades i sin bostad i Helsingfors år 1945 på order av den ryska kontrollkommissionen och sändes till Sovjet trots att han var finsk medborgare. Under tio år och sex månader fick Björkelund grundligt lära känna Stalintidens fängelser och fångläger.

— Under min sista ryska sommar, år 1955, blev jag sänd till ett läger i Krasnojarski vid Vladivostokbanan. Innan jag blev bortsänd från detta fångläger i augusti anlände till lägret en gammal tysk fånge som hade legat på sjukhuset. Jag har glömt hans namn, men han sade till mig: "Det ligger en svensk som heter Wallenberg på sjukhuset. Han är mycket dålig, men då han fick höra att här finns en som heter Björkelund bad han mig ta kontakt med dig. Wallenberg önskade att du skulle underrätta svenska ambassaden om hans vistelseort".

Jag minns att jag sade åt tysken att han vet när jag blir fri myndigheter, men jag skall lägga det bak örat.

Då berättade min tyske vän att Wallenberg blev anhållen i Budapest redan år 1945 då han tjänstgjorde där inom Sveriges Röda kors. Man beskyllde honom, berättade tysken, för spionage för amerikanernas räkning. Han fick tio års dom för detta.

Annat visste inte min kamrat.

Men två dagar senare blev jag på nytt påmind om Wallenberg. Från samma sjukhus anlände en tysk som hette Diehl och som nu efter sin frigivning har bott i Östtyskland. Jag försökte pumpa honom på uppgifter om svensken.

Diehl svarade: "Visst var där en sådan person, men han dog i går och fördes till likrummet."

Svaret var inte märkligt under rådande förhållanden, men jag frågade: "Är du alldeles säker på detta?" "Javisst, jag låg två sängar ifrån honom."

"Vet du vart han var på väg?"

"Nej, jag talade inte med Wallenberg, men jag vet att han var från Sverige och att han blev tagen i Budapest", svarade Diehl.

*

Ovanstående version av Raoul Wallenbergs öde är anmärkningsvärd inte minst med hänsyn till att vittnet befunnit sig i Finland ända sedan 1955. Den skiljer sig helt från den hittills föreliggande. Enligt rysk uppgift skulle Wallenberg ha avlidit i ett fängelse i Moskva i juli 1947. Detta påstående har från svenskt håll motsagts med hänvisning till rapporter, som givit vid handen att han varit i livet långt senare. Viktigast är en redogörelse av professor Nanna Svartz. Vid ett sammanträffande med en rysk läkarkollega 1961 säger sig professor Svartz ha erfarit att Wallenberg var i livet men "i mycket dåligt tillstånd".

Å andra sidan hävdade de svenska historikerna Elsa och Hans Villius i ett uppmärksammat arbete i början av detta år att de ryska uppgifterna om Wallenbergs död 1947 inte kunde motbevisas och att "bevisbördan åligger den som vill göra gällande att Wallenberg var i livet efter 1947".

Av allt att döma har Björkelund — trots att han återvände till Finland redan 1955 — av någon anledning förblivit okänd för svenska UD.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO: Chief, European Division

INFO:

FROM: [redacted]

SUBJECT: [redacted] Operations
Raoul WALLENBERG

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES:
A.R. FYI

Forwarded herewith for Subject's 201 are the latest reports from the Swedish press concerning his purported fate.

[redacted]

Attachments:
New Clippings (2)

Distribution:
3 - Chief, EUR w/atts
2 [redacted] w/o/atts

CROSS REFERENCE TO:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: [redacted]

DATE: 17 Oct. 66

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-5925

[redacted]

Raoul Wallenberg died on 17 or 20 August 1955 in a hospital of a prison camp at a small railroad station Pioma in Siberia. The administrative center of the camp was located in the city of Krasnoyarsk west of Itkutsk. [illegible] Wallenberg's death certificate, [illegible] "akten" which the Russians called the post mortum record. The Russian authorities only need to look in these records [illegible] to finally give a clear answer on the Wallenberg case.

The person who says this is Doris Bjorkelund, born in Russia in 1893 of Finnish-Swedish parents. He was imprisoned in his home in Helsinki in 1945 at the order of the Russian control commission and was sent to the USSR despite the fact that he was a Finnish citizen. For ten years and six months, Bjorkelund [illegible] thoroughly to know the prisons and concentration camps of Stalin's time.

"During my last summer in Russia in 1955, I was sent to a camp in Krasnoyarski on the Vladivostok line. Before I was sent away from this concentration camp in August, an old German prisoner who had been in a hospital arrived at this camp. I have forgotten his name but he said to me: "A Swede with the name Wallenberg is in the hospital. He is very ill but when he heard that there is a person here with the name Bjorkelund he asked me to contact you. Wallenberg wished that you would inform the Swedish Embassy regarding his location."

I remember that I said to the German that "The devil knows when I shall be a free agent but I shall remember it." Then my German friend said that Wallenberg was captured in Budapest [illegible] in 1945 when he

served there with the Swedish Red Cross. He was accused of spying for the Americans, the German said. He was sentenced for ten years for this.

My friend did not know anything else.

But two days later, I was reminded again about Wallenberg. From the same hospital a German who was named Diehl arrived. After obtaining his freedom has lived in East Germany. I attempted to pump him for information about the Swede.

Diehl answered, "Certainly there was such a person, but he died yesterday and was taken to the funeral room."

The answer was not noteworthy during the prevailing conditions but I asked, "Are you quite sure of this?" "Indeed, I lay two beds away from him."

"Do you know where he was going?"

"No, I had not spoken with Wallenberg but I know that he was from Sweden and that he was taken in Budapest," answered Diehl.

The above version of Raoul Wallenberg's fate is remarkable at least in that the witness has been in Finland since 1955. It differs completely from the versions up to this time. According to Soviet information, Wallenberg should have died in a prison in Moscow in July 1947. This assertion has been contradicted by the Swedes with regard to the reports which indicate that he was alive much later. The most important one is an account of Prof. Hanna Svartz. At a meeting with a Russian doctor colleague in 1961, Prof. Svartz said that he learned that Wallenberg was alive but "in very poor condition."

On the other hand, the Swedish historians Elsa and Hans Villius maintained in an attention-getting work in the beginning of this year

that the Russian information about Wallenberg's death in 1947 could not be refuted and that "the burden of proof lies with those who wish to maintain that Wallenberg was alive after 1947."

Judging from everything, Björkelund has no reason to remain unknown to the Swedish Foreign Department, despite the fact that he returned to Finland already in 1955.

[redacted]

The Finnish State Police forgot to ask me about the Raoul Wallenberg case when they questioned me after my arrival home from my Russian imprisonment," said Doris Bjorkelund on Friday to Dagens Nyheter's correspondent. "And I myself had not thought about the Swede. I was obviously very worn out after my ten hard years in prison and had not been able to follow all the events in the west."

The same representative of the State Police who questioned Bjorkelund in 1945 contacted him on Friday. The policeman only stated that he had forgotten to touch on the Wallenberg case during the questioning. In addition, Sweden TV telephoned and planned to interview them on Saturday.

"[illegible]," said the lively 73-year old whom Stalin had not succeeded in breaking.

Bjorkelund located the prison camp where Wallenberg was said to have become ill and died on 19 or 20 August 1955. It was a transit camp at the Paima railroad station which lies in the Krasnoyarski Rayon, about 100 kilometers west of Taschet about half way between the cities of Krasnoyarski and Taschet. Paima is a very little station only a stop on the Vladivostok line.

The death certificate, also the post-mortum record should be found among the records of the hospital in Paima, if the two Germans spoke the truth and they probably had no reason to lie.

Later Doris Bjorkelund naturally had read about Wallenberg but he had not thought that his information would be considered to be important.

"I know very little -- only what the German prisoners related. It was only I began to write my book about the time of the imprisonment, that I thought that it perhaps would be worthwhile to write down everything which I knew. But more than that which Dagens Nyheter reported on Friday, I do not know."

Boris Bjorkelund has written his book in Russian. It was translated into Finnish. His parents were Finnish Swedes but lived in Russia when Boris went to school. But he has always had his Finnish citizenship despite the fact that he served in the Russian Navy prior to the revolution. He speaks Swedish with a strong Russian accent despite all the years in his parents' homeland.

DISPATCH

SECRET

[redacted] Chief, European Division

[redacted] Interest in Raoul Wallenberg Case

201-832512

K-G Swing

Reference: [redacted]

Attached here[illegible] is [illegible] appended a memorandum [illegible] concerning whom [redacted] queri[illegible]

Attachment:
Letter and Memo - USC/[illegible]

Distribution:
2 - [redacted] w/att
2 - [redacted] w/att
[redacted]
2-c/DUR w/att
3 August 1970

[redacted] CERT

201-05925

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER

DATE

CROSS REFERENCE TO

[redacted]

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

DISPATCH

SECRET

[redacted] Chief, European Division

[redacted] Interest in Raoul Wallenberg Case

201-833512

Reference: [redacted] of 13 July 1970

Attached hereto is a note for [redacted] to which is appended a memorandum regarding Karl-Gustav SVINGEL, concerning whom [redacted] queried me on 7 July 1970.

[redacted]

Attachment:
Letter and Memo - USC

Distribution:
2 - [redacted] w/att
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3 August 1970

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201-05925

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER

DATE

[redacted]

EXAMINATION

SECRET

August 3, 1970

Dear Carl Axel,

I'm sure I don't need to tell you how much I enjoyed seeing you on 7 July, and meeting your colleague. I only wish I could have been more helpful to you at that time.

I attach a brief note on Svingel, which probably doesn't add very much to what you already know about him. As far as we are aware, Svingel is not engaged in activities other than those which are publicly known. (Quite honestly, we had long thought that your sister service might have been using him, since he does have interesting connections in the East.)

Please let me know if you feel there is anything further I might be able to do to assist you in this matter. As I mentioned in Hamburg, I am hoping to get up to Scandinavia in the fall, and would greatly enjoy seeing you again at that time. Meanwhile, very best wishes!

3 August 1970

SUBJECT: Karl Gustav Svingel
Born: 31 March 1916, Hjärtum, Sweden
Commissioned Representative of the Swedish National Committee of the Lutheran World Council in West Berlin

1. Svingel has resided in Berlin since 1954, when he gave up a career as an opera singer to become a professional social service worker. He now resides at 5 Winklerstrasse, Berlin Grunewald, in a large villa ("Haus Victoria") where needy elderly persons are cared for and housed for brief periods of time. He also makes these premises available to a group of attorneys and West German officials who are involved in the official program of the West German Government to secure the release of political prisoners from the East in return for cash ransom payments. This involves providing lodgings and food for persons who are brought from the East in cases where no publicity is desired, or when the attorneys wish to avoid formal processing at the West Berlin Refugee Center.

2. Svingel has close personal ties with West German SPD leader Herbert Wehner and the latter's family, presumably emanating from Wehner's close political contacts in Sweden. Svingel has used these connections to assist prisoner exchange attorneys Wolfgang Vogel, the latter's West Berlin counterpart, Juergen Stange, and Reymar von Wedel (a West German Protestant lay official with leftist connections, who is involved in prisoner exchange and ransom matters on behalf of the German Lutheran Church) in by-passing lower echelons of the German bureaucratic structure in order to keep the prisoner exchange and ransom program in operation. Svingel concentrates primarily on family reunification cases, which he handles through Vogel. These are arranged for private persons in a position to make the high ransom payments which are involved.

3. Svingel, who has claimed to have quasi-diplomatic status, travels regularly into East Berlin and through East Germany to Scandinavia. He has admitted to having brought out persons from East to West Berlin in his private car in what he described as a "purely legal" manner. He is extremely reticent about discussing details of his activities and contacts in East Berlin, except to say that he is personally acquainted with East German State Secretary for Church Affairs Hans Seigewasser. It is known that he delivers various kinds of goods purchased in West Berlin to Vogel's offices in East Berlin. These appear to be destined for the church members in East Germany.

4. Svingel maintains close personal contacts with Vogel's divorced wife, Eva, whom the East German authorities permit to live in West Berlin with their two children, and whose apartment Vogel uses as his West Berlin base of operations. At one time Svingel arranged for Vogel's son to go to school in Sweden.

5. Svingel has been awarded the Grosse Verdienstkreuz des Verdienstordens by the German Federal Republic.

201-005925

S E C R E T

20 November 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: SB/HQ

ATTENTION : [redacted]

SUBJECT : Raoul WALLENBERG Case

1. Two documents [redacted] 13 July 1970 and [redacted] 9 November 1970) which were both forwarded to SB, report that [redacted] met the chairman of the Swedish National Police Board and during the conversation the latter requested that Svetlana Alliluyeva be queried about Raoul WALLENBERG. A summary of the WALLENBERG file follows.

2. Raoul WALLENBERG Case

From July 1944 until January 17, 1945 the Swedish citizen Raoul WALLENBERG, born on August 4, 1912, was attached to the Swedish Legation in Budapest as secretary to the legation. He had a special mission to try to protect the Jews in Budapest against the persecutions by the German and Hungarian Nazis. In January 1945 WALLENBERG remained as the only foreign diplomat in the Pest part of the city when the German troops abandoned Pest and retreated to the Buda part of the city on the other side of the Danube and the Gestapo fled by plane with Eichmann to the Austrian border. When the Swedish Minister summoned him to come to Buda, where all missions and consulates remained in relative security, WALLENBERG asked permission to await the arrival of the Red Army in Pest and to be permitted to deal with the Soviet High Command as Charge d'Affaires in the interests of those under his protection. On 15 January the first Soviet patrol came to WALLENBERG's Legation. WALLENBERG asked to be taken to the city commander. The latter, General CHERNISHEV, took him under his protection.

S E C R E T

Raoul asked to be permitted to drive to Debrecen, where the headquarters of Marshal Malinowski (later Defense Minister of the USSR) and the High Commissioner of the Allies, VOROSHILOV, were. WALLENBERG received permission on 17 January 1945 to drive to Debrecen. He is said to have departed that day in the company of his chauffeur, the Hungarian citizen Wilhelm LANGFELDER. On 16 January 1945, one day before this trip, the Soviet Foreign Office informed the Swedish Minister in Moscow in a note that the military authorities had taken WALLENBERG and his property under their protection. Since 17 January 1945 WALLENBERG has been missing and no reliable information has subsequently come to the fore about his fate. The Swedish Government several times applied to the Soviet Government for information concerning WALLENBERG's whereabouts since it was reported that WALLENBERG was accompanied by Russian officers during the journey from Pest to Debrecen. Until 1957, the Soviets continuously denied having any trace of WALLENBERG after 17 January 1945.

Prisoners in the USSR, however, upon return to the West made certain vague statements that WALLENBERG may have been interned in the camp of Krasnogorsk, some 28 kms. from Moscow. Other prison camps (including Ljubljanskaya, Lefortovskaya, and Vladimir) have also been mentioned, but the reliability of the informers cannot be estimated. It has also been postulated that WALLENBERG was incarcerated in a mental institution somewhere in Eastern Europe or in the USSR. Swedish Prime Minister ERLANDER wrote to Minister President KHRUSHCHEV in February 1961 to inform the latter that Professor Nanna SVARTZ had been informed, during her visit to Moscow, by a prominent Soviet doctor that WALLENBERG was then alive in a mental hospital. ERLANDER asked that a Swedish physician be permitted to go to Moscow to discuss with Soviet colleagues arrangements for WALLENBERG's transportation, medical card, etc. Despite sharp requests by ERLANDER to the Soviet Ambassador in Stockholm, as well as by the Swedish Ambassador in Moscow, KHRUSHCHEV never replied to this letter.

In 1957 the Soviets finally admitted that a man probably identical with WALLENBERG had been imprisoned in the USSR, but they claimed he died in a Moscow prison (Ljubljanskaya) in July 1947. Subsequently, the Swedish Government found increasing evidence that WALLENBERG was alive as late as 1954. In numerous exchanges of views with the Swedish Government, the Soviets have always reverted to the position that

WALLENBERG died at Ljubljanskaya prison. In 1965 Minister President KOSYGIN informed the Swedes that a new investigation had overturned documents giving the day of death in July 1947 and information that WALLENBERG had been cremated. Many members of the Swedish press and Government are still not satisfied with the Soviets' explanations regarding WALLENBERG.

3. Thank you for your assistance.

[redacted]

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PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

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STAFF: [redacted]

CONF: [redacted] INFO: FILE [redacted]

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TO: [redacted]

TOLOCK

REF: [redacted] IN 01

WRANGELÖN

1. EXAMINATION ALL-SOUR HOWS NO PUNITIVE CAMP AT WRANGEL AND RE WAS EVER A PUNITIVE CAMP THERE. T N THE EARLY 60'S BY SPECIAL CONSTRUC LD HAVE BEEN ASSIGNED TO HELP. A PUNITIVE CAMP PER SE, ALTHOUGH MEANS OF ESCAPE. IF PRISONERS THEY MAY HAVE BEEN MOVED FROM THE ISL

2. FILE: 201-5929. E2 IMP

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201-0005925

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TO: [redacted]

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REF: [redacted] IN 016040

DATE-TIME GROUP 042000Z CITE DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER 450908

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1. EXAMINATION ALL-SOURCE DATA AVAILABLE HEADQUARTERS SHOWS NO PUNITIVE CAMP AT WRANGEL AND LEAVES US UNABLE SAY WHETHER THERE WAS EVER A PUNITIVE CAMP THERE. THERE WAS AIRFIELD CONSTRUCTION IN THE EARLY 60'S BY SPECIAL CONSTRUCTION FORCES. PRISONER LABOR COULD HAVE BEEN ASSIGNED TO HELP. THIS WOULD NOT HAVE CONSTITUTED A PUNITIVE CAMP PER SE, ALTHOUGH PRISONER LABOR WOULD HAVE HAD NO MEANS OF ESCAPE. IF PRISONERS WERE USED IN THE CONSTRUCTION, THEY MAY HAVE BEEN MOVED FROM THE ISLAND AFTERWARDS.

2. FILE: 201-5929. E2 IMPDET.

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T 87692 PAGE 01 IN 16677

DTG 131512Z FEB 74

[redacted]

S E C R E T 131512Z FEB 74 STAFF

CITE [redacted]

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR [redacted]

[redacted]

1. PAGES 546 TO 548 OF RUSSIAN LANGUAGE EDITION "GULAG" CONTAIN SOLZHENITSYN ACCOUNT HIS ENCOUNTER IN CAMP WITH A SWEDE NAMED "ERIC ARVID ANDERSEN" WHO IDENTIFIED HIMSELF AS SON OF [illegible] "SWEDISH MINISTER" AND NEPHEW OF BRITISH GENERAL ROBERTSON WHO COMMANDED BRITISH OCCUPATION ZONE IN GERMANY. TEXT IMPLIES SOLZHENITSYN SAW "ANDERSEN" AS EARLY AS 1951-2.

2. ACCORDING SOLZHENITSYN, "ANDERSEN" UNDER ORDER USE PSEUDONYM OR BE "DESTROYED". BELIEVE "ANDERSEN" MAY BE WALLENBERG.

3. [redacted] HAS SWEDISH PRESS PICKED UP OR COMMENTED ON "ANDERSEN"? REALIZE SWEDISH GOV'T MADE NUMEROUS DEMARCHES TO USSR RE WALLENBERG'S DISAPPEARANCE. WHEN WAS LAST COMMENT IN SWEDISH PRESS ON WALLENBERG? IS HE STILL THOUGHT TO BE ALIVE IN USSR?

4. FOR DIRECTOR'S PLS PROVIDE CONCISE BACKGROUND WALLENBERG CASE AND SPECIFICALLY:

A. WHAT ARE SOVIET REPLIES TO OFFICIAL SWEDISH [illegible]

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T 879692 PAGE 02-02 IN 166077

TORI 131532Z FEB 74 [redacted]

DEMARCHES

3. HAS USSR ADMITTED WALLENBERG IN SOVIET CUSTODY AND, IF SO, HIS FATE?

4. SINCE GROMYKO LISTED IN "GULAG" AS ONE OF "ANDERSEN" INTERLOCUTERS, [redacted] WOULD LIKE TO SURFACE STORY PARIS IF POSSIBLE DURING GROMYKO VISIT, 15-18 FEB.

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T 885119 PAGE 01 IN 168333

TOR:151145Z FEB 74

"ANDERSEN"

S E C R E T 151118Z FEB

CITE [redacted]

NO: PRIORITY [redacted] INFO

[redacted]

REF: [redacted]

1. SWEDISH LANGUAGE

DOES NOT CORRESPOND WI

SOLZHENITSYN WRITE ABO

2. MATTER OF ANDER BE

WALLENBERG HAS BEEN, ACCORDING TO [redacted]

BROACHED IN SWEDISH PRESS AT LEAST TWICE, ROUGHLY LATTER

PART '72 AND AGAIN IN JAN '74.

3. QUESTION OF WHETHER SWEDES BELIEVE WALLENBERG

STILL ALIVE ONE OF MIXED FEELINGS. SOME MEMBERS OF

FAMILY CLING TO BELIEF HE IS STILL LIVING (MOST RECENT

ACCOUNT DEALT WITH VRANGEL ISLAND PRISON CAMP AND A

MENTAL INSTITUTE), AND PERSISTENTLY KEEP AFTER GOS TO

PRESS SOVIETS FOR TRUTH. TASK OF RUNNING DOWN RUMORS

FALLS TO [redacted] WHICH PRAGMATICALLY ACCEPTS WALLENBERG

PROBABLY DEAD BUT BELIEVES PRESSURE ON SOVIETS SHOULD

S E C R E T [redacted]

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T 885119 PAGE 01 IN 168333

TOR:151145Z FEB 74

S E C R E T 151118Z FEB 74 STAFF

CITE [redacted]

TO: PRIORITY [redacted] INFO DIRECTOR, [redacted]

REF: [redacted] (166077)

1. SWEDISH LANGUAGE EDITION OF "GULAG" APPARENTLY DOES NOT CORRESPOND WITH FRENCH. IN WHICH CHAPTER DOES SOLZHENITSYN WRITE ABOUT "ANDERSEN?"

2. MATTER OF ANDERSEN AND POSSIBILITY HE COULD BE WALLENBERG HAS BEEN, ACCORDING TO [redacted] BROACHED IN SWEDISH PRESS AT LEAST TWICE, ROUGHLY LATTER PART '72 AND AGAIN IN JAN '74.

3. QUESTION OF WHETHER SWEDES BELIEVE WALLENBERG STILL ALIVE ONE OF MIXED FEELINGS. SOME MEMBERS OF FAMILY CLING TO BELIEF HE IS STILL LIVING (MOST RECENT ACCOUNT DEALT WITH VRANGEL ISLAND PRISON CAMP AND A MENTAL INSTITUTE), AND PERSISTENTLY KEEP AFTER GOS TO PRESS SOVIETS FOR TRUTH. TASK OF RUNNING DOWN RUMORS FALLS TO [redacted] WHICH PRAGMATICALLY ACCEPTS WALLENBERG PROBABLY DEAD BUT BELIEVES PRESSURE ON SOVIETS SHOULD

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T 885119 PAGE 02 OF 02 IN 168333

TOR:151145Z FEB 74 [redacted]

CONTINUE.

4. IN ANY CASE, SEE NO HARM IN USING STORY TO EMBARRASS SOVIETS WHENEVER CIRCUMSTANCES RIGHT, AND STATION CONCURS IN PARA 5 REF ACTION.

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TO: IMMEDIATE ~~PRIORITY~~ [redacted]

[redacted]

REF: [redacted] IN 166077

1. IN JULY 44 RAOUL WALLENBERG, BORN 4 AUGUST 1912, ARCHITECT AND SCION OF WEALTHY AND PROMINENT SWEDISH BANKING FAMILY, SENT BUDAPEST. HE ATTACHED TO SWEDISH LEGATION WITH SPECIAL MISSION TO TRY PROTECT HUNGARIAN JEWS FROM NAZI PERSECUTION AND DEPORTATION. APPARENTLY DID VERY EFFECTIVE JOB. IN JANUARY 45, WALLENBERG ONLY FOREIGN DIPLOMAT TO STAY IN PEST WHEN GERMAN TROOPS AND DIPLOMATIC CORPS RETREATED TO BUDA SIDE DANUBE. WHEN SUMMONED TO BUDA BY SWEDISH MINISTER, WALLENBERG ASKED REMAIN PEST AND BE ALLOWED TO DEAL WITH SOVIET HIGH COMMAND AS CHARGE D'AFFAIRES IN INTERESTS OF THOSE UNDER HIS PROTECTION. ON 15 JANUARY 45, FIRST SOVIET PATROL CAME TO WALLENBERG LEGATION AND WALLENBERG ASKED TO BE TAKEN TO SOVIET COMMANDER, GENERAL CHERNISHEV, WHO TOOK WALLENBERG "UNDER HIS PROTECTION." ON 16 JANUARY 45, SOVIET FOREIGN OFFICE INFORMED SWEDISH MINISTER IN MOSCOW THAT MILITARY AUTHORITIES HAD TAKEN WALLENBERG AND HIS PROPERTY UNDER THEIR PROTECTION

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TION. ON 17 JANUARY 45, WALLENBERG RECEIVED SOVIET PERMISSION DRIVE DEBRECEN TO CALL ON MARSHAL MALINOWSKI (LATER SOVIET DEFENSE MINISTER) WHO HAD HQS THERE. LEFT FOR DEBRECEN WITH HUNGARIAN DRIVER WILHELM LANGFELDER AND RED ARMY ESCORT.

2. WALLENBERG HAS BEEN MISSING SINCE 17 JANUARY 45 AND NO RELIABLE INFORMATION HAS COME TO THE FORE ABOUT HIS FATE DESPITE CONTINUED INVESTIGATIONS BY THE WALLENBERG FAMILY AND THE SWEDISH GOVERNMENT, WHICH MADE AT LEAST 30 DEMARCHES WITH THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT BETWEEN 1945 AND 1965. SOVIET GOVERNMENT INITIALLY DENIED ALL KNOWLEDGE WALLENBERG BUT FINALLY IN 1957 INFORMED THE SWEDES THAT WALLENBERG HAD DIED IN LUBIANKA PRISON OF A HEART CONDITION ON 17 JULY 47 AND THAT BODY CREMATED. SOVIET REPLY LAID BLAME AT DOOR SOVIET SECURITY SERVICE. FORMER SOVIET PRISONERS REPATRIATED TO WEST HAVE MADE VAGUE STATEMENTS THAT WALLENBERG HAS BEEN VARIOUSLY INTERNED IN A SOVIET MENTAL HOSPITAL AND IN THE FOLLOWING CAMPS OR PRISONS: KRASNOGORSK, LUBIANKA, LEFORTOVSKAYA, VLADIMIR BUT SWEDISH EFFORTS TO CONFIRM THIS EVIDENCE HAVE SO FAR BEEN IN VAIN.

3. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THERE ENOUGH EVIDENCE TO TIE THE SWEDE

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DESCRIBED IN GULAG TO WALLENBERG, DESPITE SOME POINTS IN COMMON. HOWEVER, BELIEVE STORY RECOUNTED IN GULAG OF SUFFICIENT PROPAGANDA IMPACT ON OWN MERITS TO JUSTIFY SURFACING DURING GROMYKO VISIT, EMPHASIZING GROMYKO'S ALLEGED ROLE IN AFFAIR. RATHER THAN ATTEMPTING TO TIE SOLZHENITSYN'S ANDERSON TO WALLENBERG, STORY SHOULD CHALLENGE GROMYKO TO CONFIRM OR DENY INVOLVEMENT AND TO INVESTIGATE FATE OF SWEDE IN QUESTION.

4. NO FILE. E2 IMPDET.

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T 893415 PAGE 01-01 IN 171379

TOR:200810Z FEB 74 [redacted]

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S E C R E T 200712Z FEB 74 STAFF

CITE [redacted]

TO: [redacted] INFO DIRECTOR.

[redacted]

REF: A. [redacted]

B. [redacted] (168323) 18/71 1-M

1. RE PARA 2 REF A, PRACTICALLY ALL INFO REF B CAME FROM DISCUSSION "ANDERSEN" WITH [redacted] AGREE FROM [redacted] VIEWPOINT THAT MOST APPROPRIATE PLACE TO SURFACE STORY RE WALLENBERG IS STOCKHOLM AND [redacted] MAY WISH DO SO TO CAUSE LOCAL SOVIET EMBASSY SOME MILD DISCOMFORT.

2. FACT OF MATTER IS HOWEVER THAT NORMAL [redacted] REACTION TO PERIODIC RESURRECTION WALLENBERG FATE IS NOT TO MAKE WAVES, SINCE, AS POINTED OUT REF B, BURDEN OF INVESTIGATING LEADS FALLS TO TIBLOCK. SINCE TIBLOCK VIEW IS THAT CHANCE WALLENBERG STILL ALIVE SLIM INDEED, THEY BELIEVE LITTLE USEFUL PURPOSE IS SERVED.

3. NO FILE. E2 IMPDET

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20 Feb 74

201-0005925

UX-6857

S E C R E T

12 March 1974

Memorandum for: INR/RSE/SOV

Subject: Reply to Inquiry on Shifrin, "Kozlov," and Putative Labor Camp on Wrangel Island

1. The Wallenberg Case:

201-0005925

In July 1944, Raoul Wallenberg, architect and scion of a wealthy Swedish banking family, was sent to Budapest. He was attached to the Swedish Legation and charged with a special mission to protect Hungarian Jews from Nazi persecution and deportation. He was apparently very effective in his job. In January 1945, Wallenberg was the only foreign diplomat to remain in Pest when the German troops and diplomatic corps retreated to the Buda side of the Danube. When summoned by the Swedish Minister in Buda, Wallenberg requested to remain in Pest and deal with the Soviet High Command as Charge D'Affaires in the interests of those under his protection. On 15 January 1945 when the first Soviet patrol came to Wallenberg's Legation, he asked to be taken to the Soviet Commander, General Chernyshev. Chernyshev took Wallenberg "under his protection." On 16 January 1945, the Soviet Foreign Ministry informed the Swedish Minister in Moscow that Soviet military authorities had taken Wallenberg and his property under their protection. On 17 January 1945, Wallenberg received permission to call on General Malinovsky at his headquarters at Debrecen. Wallenberg left for Debrecen with a Hungarian driver, Wilhelm Langfelder and a Red Army escort. This was the last time Wallenberg was definitely known to be alive.

Wallenberg has been missing since he left Pest for Debrecen on 17 January 1945 and no reliable information has been obtained about his fate despite continued investigations by the Wallenberg family and the Swedish government (which made at least 30 demarches to the Soviet government between 1945 and 1965). The Soviet government initially denied all knowledge of Wallenberg, but finally, in 1957, they informed the Swedes that Wallenberg had died in Lubyanka Prison of a heart attack on 17 July 1947; they claimed the body has been cremated. The

S E C R E T

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Soviets reply to the Swedes laid the blame for Wallenberg's alleged mistreatment and death at the door of the Soviet security service.

Former Soviet prisoners who have repatriated to the West have made vague references to Wallenberg's having been interned in a Soviet mental hospital and in the following prisons and camps: Krasnogorsk, Lubyanka, Lefortovo, and Vladimir. This latest claim -- the "Kozlov" report that Wallenberg had been interned in a camp on Wrangel Island -- is merely one more in a long series. Thus far, Swedish efforts to confirm these various reports have been in vain.

2. Putative Soviet Labor Camp on Wrangel Island:

A. This Agency has no hard evidence which would confirm the existence, past or present, of a labor camp on Wrangel Island. It should be noted that the Agency office which has made an extensive study of the Soviet labor camp system, based on the most reliable intelligence information available, had no indication whatsoever of such a camp or camps ever having been located on Wrangel Island. Outside of Shifrin's testimony and press reports based on that testimony, the only reference available to a camp on Wrangel Island is the following excerpt from an article in Der Bund, Bern, 28-29 July 1970:

"Penal Camps with Special Conditions: In the vernacular these camps are also called 'death camps' because practically no one is released from them. In other words, practically no one survives the 'special' conditions. They are located in the region of the Oran mines near Noril'sk and in southeastern Yakutsk, as well as in the areas of the missile-launching sites on the islands of Novaya Zemlya, Franz Joseph Land, Wrangel Island, and the Kuril Islands."

B. (FYI ONLY) The author of the above-cited article, Bruderer, is an active member of the NTS (Narodno-trudovoy soyuz -- National Labor Alliance). We do not know the source of his information. However, as Shifrin has had considerable contact with the NTS, it may be that Shifrin was the ultimate source of the information on the camp on Wrangel Island as reported by Bruderer.

3. Avraham Shifrin:

We believe Shifrin's biography is covered adequately in the published text of his testimony before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee. Additional information on

Shifrin -- of a sensitive nature -- was made available by this Agency to Ambassador Richard Davies on 5 October 1971. When queried on Shifrin, a recent Soviet emigre, who had himself served in Soviet labor camps, replied that "much of Shifrin's information is inaccurate." Based on the documentation at our disposal, it is our considered opinion that Shifrin's information should be considered less than totally reliable and should be weighed carefully. He does not appear to be completely stable and does not conduct research on a scientific basis.

4. "Kozlov":

This Agency has no information on the identity of "Kozlov" and has no means to develop this information at this time. It is recommended that the Swedish Government contact the Israeli Government on this matter.

5. (FYI ONLY) In the summer of 1973, the Swedish Intelligence Service contacted this Agency regarding the "Kozlov" item in the Shifrin testimony and requested our views on "Kozlov's" reliability. Having received a reply from this Agency that we were unable to enlighten them about "Kozlov," the Swedish IS evidently contacted Shifrin via the Israelis. Apparently they were not satisfied with Shifrin's ability to evaluate "Kozlov" or his information. It is not known whether they were able to determine "Kozlov's" identity or meet with him personally.

6. With the exception of paragraphs 2B and 5 above, at your discretion the Department may make available to the Swedish Embassy the information contained in this memorandum.

[redacted]

Attachment: #1 Article by Bruderer (undtd)
#2 Article re Arrival of Golda Meir in Moscow (dtd 22 Dec

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - INR/RSE/SOV (hand carry) with att.
1 - SB/USSR w. att.
1 - [redacted]
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1 - Shifrin 201 w. att.
1 - LJ chrono w.o. att.

201-0005925

l the data that it may possess about the prison camp on Wrangel
land, as well as about the reliability of Avraham Shifrin and
oslov".

The best of the political prisoners of other nationalities understand and respect the struggle of the Jewish prisoners for their national liberation.

MIKHAIL SHERSHELEVICH.

Taken down by G. Elbin.

To: The Senate of the United States of America.
From: Roza Kogan, 28 Serent Street, Givataim, Israel.

REQUEST

My husband, Idel' (Yehuda) Kogan, a citizen of Israel, born in Poland in 1922. Was arrested on 7 June 1963 in Kiev during a tourist trip to the U.S.S.R., for which he received a visa-permit from the Soviet Embassy in Israel.

He was arrested and sentenced to 10 years of prison, accused of deserting from the Soviet army. During the war (World War II) my husband was in the Kovel ghetto, then with the partisans, then served 6 months in the Soviet army until July 1945, and after that left for Israel.

Now my husband has now served 9 years and six months! We are both ill; ten of the best years of our lives have been snatched away from us! I beg your intercession in obtaining his release in advance of the six remaining months of his sentence, and thereby help reduce the additional and undeserved suffering of a family!

(My husband's address is: Moscow, UChR No. 5110/1, Zh. U. Idel' Kogan)

Respectfully and gratefully,

ROZA KOGAN.

DECEMBER 22, 1972.

Mrs. Golda Meir, [Israeli] Consul, arrived in Moscow on the day of Zhdanov's death; I was then working as a translator in one of the offices of the MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs) in Odessa. On the day of her arrival I was sent to the Metropol Hotel in Moscow to participate in a reception for the guests in the guise of a waiter. I was instructed to eavesdrop on everything Mrs. Meir was to say in Yiddish. Since the guests were amiably received, I took the liberty of asking her in Yiddish what the country which she represented was like. She replied in Yiddish that it was the first Jewish state in history for Jews throughout the world. After the reception was over, I was sent directly to a prison in Odessa, for someone had eavesdropped on me during the conversation and denounced me to the KGB, saying I was a Zionist. I was arrested, served a great deal of time in prison, then released but thrown out of my job, victimized for more than ten years, finally arrested again in 1958, thrown into prison, and without any trial, sent to the Amurskaya ASSR, and from there to Wrangel Island, where I remained until 1962.

At the camp I made the acquaintance of Rudolf Trushnovich, a former physician, Vasiliy Ivanovich Polyakov, a former member (colonel) of the Vlasov army, a large number of SS and Gestapo Germans, and many Italians, who had long been declared dead, but who are actually still living on Wrangel in the Belopolyar'ye. Among them:[1]

1. Kremer Ernest
2. Mgolor Paul
3. Kristover Otto

---

[1] The list of names of POWs on Wrangel Island requires further clarification, which the subcommittee is trying to obtain. Spellings are in question, first, because the names were written in by hand and some were not legible; and, second, because inaccuracies in spelling inevitably arise when German and Italian names are transliterated from Latin script to Cyrillic script for the camp record, and then transliterated back into Latin script. According to Shifrin, who has discussed the Wrangel Island matter several times with "Kozlov," "Kozlov" was in a position where he had access to camp records, but only in rare cases was he able to get to know the POWs personally. The listing of Italian names suggests that in the camp records the name was given, together with the rank, the city of residence, and the date of birth. In the case of name number 6, "Milanesa Tradath 1903," the adjective "Milanesa," meaning "from Milan," was probably used instead of "Milan." Shifrin reported to the subcommittee staff that a representative of an Italian committee which is still seeking information about missing POWs had come to Israel to interview "Kozlov," and they had been able to match some of the names of Italian POWs whom "Kozlov" had met, or whose names he had seen listed in the camp records, against the list of missing Italian POWs believed to be in the Soviet Union.

4. Ambrozio Verito—55 years old—Gestapo
5. Zulvazino Cordion—65 years old—died there
6. Milaneso Tenlall—1903—
7. Gracianeca Verona—1870—chief of police
8. Torette Firenze—1901—captain
9. Giovanni [?] Lassa—1905—SS Lieutenant
10. Rastellano Vivzina—1900—colonel
11. Lecio Viraus—1910—colonel
12. Pyairetta Piacenza—1900—died
13. Joradello Padova—1903—SS
14. Giovani Bianchi—
15. Luigi Campanella—1901—SS
16. Lucca Brantgi [?]—1905
17. Messina Donato—1914—SS

The camp on Wrangel Island was an experimental camp, where experiments were conducted on living people. The experiments were in the form of injections, diets, oxygen tests on people who were long declared dead but were alive at that time (1962) and were working very hard in the camp. The guards and the administrative staff were former convicts, such as V. N. Rudnikov, A. I. Vasil'kov, a former convict and big-time bandit; Iv. Nik. Ivanov; Nikolay Artemévich Pitanov. The camp also had a military guard for a special camp in which people were trained for spying abroad. That camp was headed by Ivan Ivanovich Sheylov, a veteran MVD trooper. There were also many others, including Italian war prisoners. There was also Raoul Wallenberg, who had been Swedish consul in Budapest during the war and who under the German occupation, aided by money, helped Jews escape from Hungary through Switzerland, into other countries. When the Russians entered Budapest, Raoul Wallenberg was immediately arrested at the request of the military commandant of the city of Budapest and sent by special train to Moscow. He was then 27 years old, and was a handsome, educated young man.

These are a few of the many facts which I know, having witnessed them personally. Unfortunately I cannot sign my real name [to the statement], as I still have some close relatives in Russia.

"Kozlov"

A true copy: [A stamp with Hebrew letters]

OUTGOING MESSAGE 70-1 153

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PAGE 1 OF PAGES 1

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CLASSIFICATION

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MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

STAFF

DATE TIME GROUP 151657Z

DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER 550669

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CONF [redacted] INFO: FIL [redacted]

TO: [redacted]

REFS: A. [redacted] IN 243464

B. [redacted] IN 016040 Y

1. POUCHING BY TM 698497, 15 MAY, THOROUGH MEMORANDUM PREPARED MARCH 1974 ON SUBJECT OF S H I F R I N, "K O Z L O V", AND PUNATIVE LABOR CAMP ON WRANGEL ISLAND WHICH ANSWERS QUESTION POSED REF A. Y

2. MEMO IS FOR STATION'S EDIFICATION AND EXCERPTING FOR AND DISCUSSION WITH [redacted]

3. FILE: 201-0005925; X-REF: 20[redacted] E2 IMPDET d

DOC. MICRO. SER.
JUN 4 1974
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15 MAY 74

DATE: 14 MAY 74

ORIG [redacted]

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S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

DATE TIME GROUP: 122021Z

CITE: DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER: 926355

STAFF

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0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
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TO: [redacted]

UNINTEL [redacted]

REF: [redacted] IN 052827Y

1. AS BEST WE CAN DETERMINE, THERE NO BOOKS CURRENTLY IN THE MILL ON WALLENBERG CASE.Y

2. PER OUR RECORDS, [redacted] AND NOSENKO HAVE NOT BEEN QUERIED RE WALLENBERG. THIS CAN BE DONE, IF YOU WISH.Y

3. FILE: 201-005925. E2 IMPDET.A

P/CI	X	

B201-099788

12 OCT. 76

DATE:
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EXT:

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12 Oct 76

201-005925

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COORDINATING OFFICERS

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S E C R E T

STAFF

[redacted]

T 298215 EIA293 PAGE 01-01 IN 067262

TOR:1313252 OCT 76

[redacted]

S E C R E T 1312577 OCT 76 STAFF

CITE [redacted]

TOT DIRECTOR,

[redacted]

REFS A DIRECTOR 926355

B [redacted] (IN 052827)

1. PLS QUERY [redacted] AND NOSENKO RE WALLENBERG. NEITHER [redacted] NOR STATION SANGUINE OVER POSSIBILITY ANYTHING WILL RESULT BUT EFFORT WOULD BE APPRECIATED.

2. FILE: 201-005925, E2 IMPDET

13 Oct 76

S E C R E T

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C.

February 2, 1978

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM

To : INR/DDC - Emerson Brown

From : EUR/NE - Ronald E. Woods

Subject: Swedish Request for Information on the Raoul Wallenberg Case

Swedish Embassy Political Counselor, Mats Berquist, called on me February 1 to pose several questions on this case. I would appreciate your passing these to NSA, CIA and any other appropriate members of the Washington intelligence community. If we have the information requested, I would hope we would be forthcoming in sharing it with the Swedes, in view of the political and humanitarian considerations involved.

Background

Raoul Wallenberg (not related to the industrial Wallenbergs) was a Swedish diplomat in Budapest during the second World War. In that capacity, he was instrumental in saving the lives of thousands of Jews, by issuing them Swedish passports which allowed them to escape Hungary. The Russians arrested Wallenberg when they took Budapest. His status and whereabouts has been an issue in Swedish/Soviet relations since.

The Soviets informed the Swedish Government in 1965 that Wallenberg had died in a Moscow prison in 1947, blamed this on the excesses of Beria and expressed official regret. Reoccurring reports have surfaced since 1965, however, that Wallenberg was still alive in one or another Russian prison. One of these reports was in testimony before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee on February 1-2, 1973, during hearings on USSR labor farms. Avraham Shifrins, a former Soviet citizen who now lives in Israel, testified that he had met Wallenberg in the 1960's at a Soviet prison camp on Wrangel Island, north of the Bering Sound, between Siberia and Alaska. This report was corroborated in a letter by a former KGB official named Jefrim Mishinski, also known as Kozlov.

CONFIDENTIAL
GDS

This letter was published with the text of the hearings. Swedish security officials have interviewed both Shifrins and Mishinski in Israel.

A more recent report was included in a story in the December 19th issue of the New York Magazine (pg. 45). This alleges that Wallenberg was alive in a Soviet mental hospital as of three years ago. Were he still alive Wallenberg would now be seventy years of age.

The Wallenberg case is still of considerable political and humanitarian interest. It is kept alive by Wallenberg's mother in Stockholm, as well as by former Hungarian Jews now resident in Sweden, the US, or elsewhere. Senator Frank Church has called Ambassador Wachtmeister within the last two weeks in response to an inquiry from one of his constituents. Swedish Parliamentarians regularly pose questions for Government response in the Riksdag.

The Swedish Government last raised this case with us in January 1974, when Embassy officer Lars Ake Nielsson posed certain questions to Swedish Desk Officer John Owens. According to Bergquist, we were, at that time, unable to confirm or deny the existence of a Soviet prison camp on Wrangel Island. We also indicated that we thought Shifrins' testimony was only "partially incorrect".

Swedish Questions

1. What is our view on veracity of Mishinski's report? After interviewing him the Swedes doubt how much weight to give his comments. He was, for example, unable to identify Wallenberg in photographs.

2. Can we provide information, from satellite photography or other sources, that would confirm or deny the existence of a prison camp on Wrangel Island?

3. Why do we believe that Shifrins' testimony was only partially correct, and do we have a judgment on his specific comments on Wallenberg?

4. Shifrins also mentioned a former US military officer, Alexander Shornik, who he said was also interned on

Wrangel Island (pages 15-16 of testimony). Do we have independent confirmation on this, or information on Shornik's current status or whereabouts?

5. In the event that we can provide responses to any of the above, which may be used by Sweden publically and which must be held in confidence?

24 March 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Forced Labor on Wrangel Island

WRANGEL ON

1. The purpose of this me
issue of whether there are forc
Island -- a small, obscure Sovie
Publicity about the subject has
legitimacy by Congressman Robert
of California, who has shown an

2. Much of the initial publi
stemmed from hearsay information gi
a former Soviet prisoner who was re
lives in Israel. Shifrin told a Ser
1973 that, as late as 1962, a large
the island held thousands of prisoner
prisoners of war and some important p
Raoul Wallenberg, Swedish Consul in Bu
War II. The Swedes, unable to locate
queried DDO about this camp and Wallenb
presence there.

3. Congressman Dornan, whose interest in Wrangel Island was first prompted by a constituent who vigorously claims to own the island, recently expanded his interest to include the forced labor issue. As quoted in the weekly newspaper, Spotlight (attached), he noted that "the Russians probably still have labor camps on Wrangel Island," Dornan found it "most shocking" that "the State Department has known the reports of the labor camps and their presence on U.S. territory since 1973, and nothing has been done...".

4. This Office has thoroughly investigated the matter and concludes that there is not now, and probably never was, a camp on the island. We have substantial evidence to support our conclusion, including aerial photography dating from the early 1950s and satellite photography from the 1960s and 1970s.

EXCLUDED FROM GDS BY: 006956

24 March 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Forced Labor on Wrangel Island

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to clarify the issue of whether there are forced labor camps on Wrangel Island -- a small, obscure Soviet island in the Arctic. Publicity about the subject has been given an aura of legitimacy by Congressman Robert K. Dornan (27th District of California), who has shown an interest in the island.

2. Much of the initial publicity over Wrangel Island stemmed from hearsay information given by Avraham Shifrin, a former Soviet prisoner who was released in 1963 and now lives in Israel. Shifrin told a Senate Subcommittee in 1973 that, as late as 1962, a large forced labor camp on the island held thousands of prisoners -- both regular prisoners of war and some important persons including Raoul Wallenberg, Swedish Consul in Budapest during World War II. The Swedes, unable to locate Wallenberg, recently queried DDO about this camp and Wallenberg's possible presence there.

3. Congressman Dornan, whose interest in Wrangel Island was first prompted by a constituent who vigorously claims to own the island, recently expanded his interest to include the forced labor issue. As quoted in the weekly newspaper, Spotlight (attached), he noted that "the Russians probably still have labor camps on Wrangel Island,"; Dornan found it "most shocking" that "the State Department has known the reports of the labor camps and their presence on U.S. territory since 1973, and nothing has been done...".

4. This Office has thoroughly investigated the matter and concludes that there is not now, and probably never was, a camp on the island. We have substantial evidence to support our conclusion, including aerial photography dating from the early 1950s and satellite photography from the 1960s and 1970s.

Declassified by DDO

SECRET

5. We are now engaged in an exhaustive study of the entire Soviet forced labor system and plan to release a finished intelligence report on the subject within a few months. In the meantime we are prepared to show interested parties the results of our research effort.

RONALD W. PODMILSAK
USSR-Europe Branch
Geography Division, OGCR

Attachment: As Stated

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

CONFIDENTIAL

March 28, 1978

MEMORANDUM

To : INR/DDI - Emerson Brown

From : EUR/NE - Ronald E. Wood

Subject: Wallenberg Case

Mats Bergquist of the Swedish Embassy called me today, March 28, to ask for more assistance on the Wallenberg case. The Swedes are interested in talking to two Soviet emigres (or possibly defectors) to see whether they know anything about Wallenberg. The two are Boras Rabbot, formerly Secretary of the Soviet Academy of Science, and Mr. Khokhlova, who is currently teaching at California State College in San Bernardino.

The Swedes have three questions:

-- Do we have objections to their discussing the case with either or both of these individuals?

-- If not, can we provide the addresses and telephone numbers of either or both?

-- Should we prefer that the Swedes not discuss the case with either or both, would we be willing to pose questions in their behalf?

Bergquist also asked me about the status of his request for information of February 2, which I transmitted to you in a memorandum of the same date. I look forward to hearing from you.

CONFIDENTIAL
GDS

3 APR 78

E/C/S

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

MEMORANDUM FOR: Harry R. Malone
INR/DDC
Department of State

FROM : [redacted]

SUBJECT : Swedish Request for Information on the Raoul Wallenberg Case

REFERENCES : A. LDX Message No. 000853, dated 2 February 1978
B. Message No. 002427, dated 28 March 1978

With regard to your memorandum of 2 February 1978 (REF A), the following are answers to questions posed therein, which may be passed to the Swedish Embassy:

1. We have insufficient information on Mishinski to give an evaluation of him and defer to the Israelis. We have no new information which would be helpful in evaluating Mishinski's statements.

2. "Available evidence does not confirm the presence of a prison camp on Wrangel Island at any time, and leads us to believe that no such camp existed on Wrangel Island in 1960 or later." Please hold this information in confidence.

3. We believe Shifrins' testimony was hearsay, i.e., that he did not actually see Wallenberg, but we cannot confirm this as fact. We suggest the Israelis be queried on this point.

4. We cannot confirm Shifrins' information on Alexander Shornik. We have no information on Shornik in our files.

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SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
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Date Impossible to Determine
(unless impossible, insert date or event)

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

SECRET

SECRET

SUBJECT: Swedish Request for Information on the Raoul Wallenberg Case

5. Although only the information in paragraph 2 is considered to be highly confidential we would prefer that our response on the other questions not be made public.

In response to your memo of 28 March 1978 (REF B), the following are answers to the additional questions posed by the Swedish Embassy concerning the two Soviet emigres who might have knowledge of Wallenberg:

1. We have no objection to Swedish officials' discussing the Wallenberg case with either Boras, Rabbot or Mr. Khokhlovs.

2. We do not have current addresses or telephone numbers for either of these gentlemen. We suggest they try to contact Mr. Khokhlovs at California State College in San Bernardino. Mr. Rabbot's name appeared recently in The New York Times in an article which stated he was negotiating a teaching contract with Columbia University. We suggest, therefore, that the Swedish Embassy contact The Times for his address.

3. Not applicable.

[redacted]

[redacted] (3 April 1978)

Distribution:
Orig. - Addressee
1 - C/EUR
1 [redacted]
1 [redacted]

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DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

CONF: IP/DP-9 INFO: FILE, RF, ODPD-D, (11/P)

78 0564974 WASHINGT 206474

MISHINSKI
(KOZLOV)
SHIFRIN

S E C R E T
DEFERRED TELEPOUCH 15
TO: [redacted]

FROM: [redacted]

SUBJECT: WNINTEL - WAL

REF: WASHINGTON 189077

[redacted] 1. FOR [redacted] IN [redacted] WE HAVE PROVID WITH FOR PASSAGE, IN CONFIDE STATE DEPT. EVIDENCE DOES NOT CONFI ILABLE ISLAND AT ANY TIME, AND ON WRANGEL EXISTED ON WRANGEL ISLAN CAMP

2. WITH REGARD TO FURTHER QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE HEARINGS HELD BY THE SENATE INTERNAL SECURITY COMMITTEE INVESTIGATING SOVIET LABOR CAMPS IN 1973, HQS ADVISED STATE DEPT. THAT WE CANNOT EVALUATE THE VERACITY OF OTHER INFORMATION GIVEN BY AVRAM SHIFRIN OR JEFRIM MISHINSKI (AKA "KOZLOV"). WE SUGGESTED THAT THE SWEDES QUERY THE ISRAELIS ABOUT THESE TWO MEN.

3. IN RESPONSE TO A FOLLOW-UP INQUIRY BY THE SWEDISH EMBASSY, HQS STATED THAT WE WOULD HAVE NOOBJECTION TO CONTACT BY THE SWEDES WITH TWO SOVIET EMIGRES (BORIS RABBOT AND MR. KHOKHLOV) CURRENTLY RESIDING IN THE U.S., BUT THAT WE DO NOT KNOW THEIR EXACT ADDRESSES OR PHONE NUMBERS.

4. <FILE: 201-5925. E2 IMPDET.>
ORIG: [redacted]
THOMPSON. CL BY 011334.

TRAVEL PROGRAM

RECORD COPY

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

15 apr 78
201-005925

/07/ SECRET FRP

DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

CONF: IP/DP-9 INFO: FILE, RF, ODPD-D, (11/P)

78 0564974 PAGE 001
TOT: 150452Z APR 78 WASHINGT 206474

S E C R E T
DEFERRED TELEPOUCH 150452Z WASHINGTON 206474
TO: [redacted]

FROM: [redacted]

SUBJECT: WNINTEL - WALLENBERG CASE

REF: WASHINGTON 189077

1. FOR [redacted] INFORMATION AND POSSIBLE DISCUSSION WITH [redacted] WE HAVE PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT TO THE STATE DEPT. FOR PASSAGE, IN CONFIDENCE, TO THE SWEDISH EMBASSY: "AVAILABLE EVIDENCE DOES NOT CONFIRM THE PRESENCE OF A PRISON CAMP ON WRANGEL ISLAND AT ANY TIME, AND LEADS US TO BELIEVE THAT NO SUCH CAMP EXISTED ON WRANGEL ISLAND IN 1960 OR LATER."

2. WITH REGARD TO FURTHER QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE HEARINGS HELD BY THE SENATE INTERNAL SECURITY COMMITTEE INVESTIGATING SOVIET LABOR CAMPS IN 1973, HQS ADVISED STATE DEPT. THAT WE CANNOT EVALUATE THE VERACITY OF OTHER INFORMATION GIVEN BY AVRAM SHIFRIN OR JEFRIM MISHINSKI (AKA "KOZLOV"). WE SUGGESTED THAT THE SWEDES QUERY THE ISRAELIS ABOUT THESE TWO MEN.

3. IN RESPONSE TO A FOLLOW-UP INQUIRY BY THE SWEDISH EMBASSY, HQS STATED THAT WE WOULD HAVE NOOBJECTION TO CONTACT BY THE SWEDES WITH TWO SOVIET EMIGRES (BORIS RABBOT AND MR. KHOKHLOV) CURRENTLY RESIDING IN THE U.S., BUT THAT WE DO NOT KNOW THEIR EXACT ADDRESSES OR PHONE NUMBERS.

4. <FILE: 201-5925. E2 IMPDET.>
ORIG: [redacted]
THOMPSON. CL BY 011334.



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END OF MESSAGE SECRET

15 Apr 78
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